Woody Box

Open Letter to Warren Stutt re: ARINC logs

2012-01-22T16:10:00.008Z

Warren,

on your website you have created a special ACARS page, introducing a list of ACARS messages as transmitted through the ARINC data system. You claim that it was obtained via a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).

http://www.warrenstutt.com/ACARSMessages/index.html

As an independent researcher, I welcome your efforts to unveil official documents which might be helpful in answering some of the most urging questions of the official 9/11 story. However, I have some objections regarding the ARINC logs as presented by you. I miss date and number of the FOIA request, and the person who initiated it. Also, I miss a header in the document itself - no reference number, no date, no names which would guarantee authenticity.

There are additional questions regarding the content of the document. Examples: Why are the ACARS data for United 175 missing? Why do the data suggest that United 93 never was in the Cleveland area? And there are more questions begging for an answer.

This being said, I don't want to say that the ARINC logs are completely faked and useless for historical research. Just to the contrary, they match the already known ACARS documents (which I have published here in former blog entrys) in big parts and clarify existing ambiguities. But they create new ambiguities as well.

Intending to make use of the ARINC logs, I'm encountering the dilemma that potential insights are standing on a shaky base and subjected to the sword of Damocles which is called "manipulation". In coming blog entries and articles I will therefore refer to the ARINC logs as "Stutt ARINC logs" to emphasize that their authenticity has not been verified yet. I also will add a disclaimer that my findings are subjected to the insecure authenticity of the document. i.e that I take an "as if" approach: as if the logs were authentic.

I ask you to support my efforts to validate the authenticity of the file by publishing number, date, and inquirer of the document on your ACARS page if possible. If this is not possible, I ask you to publish the reason why not. I also would appreciate a personal assessment of the file's authenticity by you, right on your ACARS page. Do you trust it personally, and are you ready to retract it if its authenticity is thrown into doubt by new developments?

With kind regards,

Woody Box

David Knerr, United Airlines Dispatch Manager, on ACARS

2011-12-20T13:44:00.006Z

The following interview has been conducted by the FBI on 2/15/2002. I have transcribed the relevant parts. The source URL is here:

http://www.scribd.com/doc/14094164/T7-B11-FBI-302s-ACARS-Fdr-Entire-Contents-FBI-302-s

Knerr provided information related to the printout of text messages transmitted to and from UA Flight 93 on 09/11/2001 through the AIRCRAFT COMMUNICATION ADDRESSING AND REPORTING SYSTEM (ACARS). Knerr identified this system as one means of communication that is utilized between aircraft and commercial carriers, like UA, to transmit text data. Knerr related that data is either uplinked to the aircraft from fixed communication centers or downlinked from the aircraft to receiving communication centers. Knerr explained the uplink and downlink references on an ACARS message. DLBLK refers to downlink while ULBLK refers to uplink.

These references also identify that a ACARS message has been received by its sender, either ground communications or the aircraft. In the final moments, at 10:12 AM EST, of UA Flight 93's flight, ACARS messages were being sent from ground communications but were not being received. This was causing the ACARS messages to be rejected. Knerr advised that Flight 93's low altitude may have caused this dilemma or the fact that Flight 93 had already crashed at the time messages were sent.

Knerr further advised that AERONAUTICAL RADIO INCORPORATED (ARINC) serves as the network administrator for the communication data. According to Knerr, this is important to remember when reviewing data messages because uplink and downlink times may show a time delay when compared. This is caused by multiple processing of multiple ACARS messages through the ARINC network at the same time. ARINC serves a substantial portion of the commercial airline industry operating within the United States. Depending on the time of day or region the country that an aircraft may be operating over, ACARS traffic can be delayed.

Knerr advised that when an aircraft downlinks data to communication towers it does so by sending out messages over a large geographic area that it is flying. Depending on the area of the country, more than one communication tower may receive the aircraft's message. Knerr pointed this out to be the case during Flight 93's flight over New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Ohio on 9/11/2001.

In addition, Knerr pointed out that on two separate instances during Flight 93's flight on 9/11/2001, prior to crashing in Pennsylvania, two alphanumeric messages were sent from the aircraft to ground communication. These messages were routine maintenance messages that are sent in order to identify the current state of mechanical operations onboard an aircraft during flight. It allows for specialists to view specific mechanical data onboard an aircraft while it is in operation. Knerr advised that these messages, once deciphered, may contain information that would demonstrate that the aircraft was being operated in a manner that was adversely affecting the performance of the aircraft. The analysis of these messages is forthcoming.

The ACARS report provided by Knerr will be maintained in the 1A section of this file. Moreover, this data will also be included on the Newark Investigation Summary, Flight Operations Time Line.

The Cleveland Airport Shell Game: Delta 1989, Delta 1898, United 1898

2011-08-17T21:13:00.011Z

This short piece is an update of my most popular article so far, "The Cleveland Airport Mystery" from 2004, prominently featured in "Crossing the Rubicon" by Michael Ruppert and "Loose Change, 2. edition" by Dylan Avery.

I examined the circumstances of the landing of Delta 1989, a Boeing 767 out of Boston, at Cleveland Hopkins Airport on 9/11. I was lucky to find so much evidence for the existence of a shadowy doppelganger flight of Delta 1989 - landing at about the same time and likewise being evacuated - that I published the results here.

Unfortunately, many people think the central thesis of the article is that United 93 was the mysterious plane that landed at Cleveland Airport. This ist not true. I never claimed that United 93 landed at Cleveland. For more background, look here.

I claimed, however, and do continue to claim that an unidentified Boeing 767 landed at Cleveland in emergency and was evacuated, with Delta 1989 serving as a cover, i. e. whoever asked for the identity of the mysterious plane afterwards reaped the answer: that was Delta 1989! and stopped asking questions.

In 2009, numerous documents of the 9/11 Commission came to light. There I found a perfect candidate for the eerie double of Delta 1989 - United 1898 - and published it here.

In summary, United 1898 is a most interesting case because Cleveland controllers reported it to a special unit of the FAA, named "AAT-200", which is dealing with accidents, emergency cases and other irregularities. However, on 9/11/2001 United Airlines operated no aircraft with flight number 1898. Together with the salient similarity of the flight number (1989/1898) this makes United 1898 a good candidate for "Flight X" and an interesting matter of investigation.

Two years later, I'm now proud to present an independent verification for the emergency landing of a Flight 1898 at Cleveland. This time it's called Delta 1898.

1009 DAL1989 on downwind at CLE

1024 DAL1989 on ground CLE

1035 Unconfirmed report - DAL1989 flaps up at CLE

1039 DAL1989 parked in secure area/no one exited a/c yet (pilot says he is not being hijacked)

1116 DAL 1898 confirmed by security HIJACK at CLE ATC - communication with pilot does not confirm

1119 DAL 1989 still not suspected hijack; taxiing to terminal

Source

In this internal FAA timeline, there is only one entry for DAL1898. Note that this is definitely no typo because DAL1898 was a confirmed hijacking, whereas DAL1989 (= Delta 1989) was never suspected a hijack, neither earlier nor later than the security warning of Delta 1898. It should be of no big surprise by now that this so-called Delta 1898 was not the official Delta Flight 1898 who was scheduled to depart from Salt Lake City in the afternoon, but - of course - never left the ground on that day.

So United 1898 and Delta 1898 were both fake flight numbers. The identity of the numbers and the similar context (United 1898 was an emergency case; Delta 1898 was a confirmed hijacking) leads straightforwardly to the conclusion that these two planes were one and the same. The close similarity of the flight numbers 1898 and 1989 corroborates the thesis that Delta 1989 functioned as a cover-up for Flight 1898. The plane was probably evacuated as United 1898, was quickly renamed Delta 1898, and fell into oblivion due to the informational cover provided by Delta 1989.

This very much reminds a shell game, with the shells bearing fake flight numbers. And the only entity entitled to legally use fake flight numbers was the military in case of conducting a war game, i.e. an exercise. It appears that the emergency landing of Flight 1898 and its subsequent evacuation was indeed part of a military exercise. This may be the reason why it's so difficult to obtain information about the incident: military secrecy.

Combined with the information already presented in my original article, there is now ample evidence that Flight 1898 was a Boeing 767 of United Airlines coming from Boston - but it was not the regular United 1898. The number of the United Boeing 767's departing from Boston is so small that it should narrow down the search for the identity of the mysterious plane considerably. United 177 looks like a good candidate.

Was Mohamed Atta being employed by American Airlines?

2011-05-28T19:45:00.012Z

Diane Graney is the second witness (besides Lynn Howland whom I presented in my last blog entry) with precise recollections of Mohamed Atta, but completely ignored by the 9/11 Commission. Graney worked at Portland Airport on 9/11. She didn't see the alleged hijackers Atta and Al-Omari, but recognized Atta's face from the photo that was published in the aftermath. She is positive that Atta, dressed in an American Airlines uniform and able to identify himself as an AA pilot, tried prior to 9/11 to achieve a jump seat on a US Airways flight.

Compare this to the particulars provided by Lynn Howland. According to her, Atta was "wearing a white pilot type or oxford shirt, no tie and blue pilot type slacks" and carried a "really cheap pilot bag". Furthermore, Atta approached her and asked if she was going to fly American 11. Apparently he wanted to jump seat the flight.

Here is a list of persons who occasionally are allowed to take a jump seat in the cockpit (from Wikipedia): In aircraft, jump seats - which are officially termed auxiliary crew stations - can be located in cockpits or passenger cabins. In cockpits, jump seats are provided for individuals who are not operating the aircraft. These might include trainee pilots, off-duty crew members in transition to another airport (see deadheading), government officials (such as Federal Aviation Administration staff), or airline staff.

There are also witnesses in Florida confirming that Atta boasted about his status as an American Airlines pilot. Yet the 9/11 Commission has completely blacked out the accounts of Lynn Howland and Diane Graney and missed to pursue their hints that Atta presented himself on several occasions as an AA pilot in order to jump seat a certain flight.

Was American Airlines aware about Atta's activities? And why has the 9/11 Commission failed to follow this important trace?

Here is Diane Graney's account (date: 9/22/01):

Diane Graney, date of birth ........... employed as a Customer Service Agent CSA and Ground Security Coordinator GSC, U.S. Airways USAIR, Portland International Jetport, 1001 Westbrook Street, Portand, Maine, telephone number 207775-5210, was interviewed at her place of employment. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, she provided the following information:

Graney has been employed with USAIR for approximately twelve years. As a CSA for USAIR, Graney's duties include conducting passenger check-ins, checking baggage, making seat assignments, and issuing tickets. She performs her duties at either the USAIR Ticket Counter or at the individual airport gates. As a GSC, she deals with aircraft, airport, and general security issues.

On September 11, 2001, from 5:00 AM to 1:00 PM, Graney was working at the USAIR ticket counter. At some point in her shift she heard of the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, and that one of the flights was American Airlines Flight 11 out of Logan Airport in Boston. As a GSC, she went and pulled the passenger lists for the US AIR flights to Logan to see if any USAIR passengers had a connection to thje flight. Graney saw that there were two passengers on USAIR Flight 5930 to Logan that had a connection to American Airlines Flight 11. The two names were Mohamed Atta and Abdulaziz Alomari. She also noticed the two were to sit in First Class on American Airlines Flight 11. Graney thought it was suspicious that these two passengers could have taken a better, more direct flight then what they had scheduled.

Graney observed that Atta and Alomari had checked two bags in at the US AIR Ticket Counter, and that Michael Tuohey was the CSA who checked them in. She spoke to Tuohey about the two passengers, and he advised her of what he had observed. She then contacted Chuck Severance, US AIR Station Manager, and informed him of what happened and what she had discovered.

Graney advised that later when she saw Atta's picture on the news, she believed she had seen him before. She thought he may have tried to jump seat once with USAIR, and he was in uniform using an American Airlines pilot identification. She believed that this happened within the last six months. She advised she searched the USAIR jump seat peaperwork to see who had gone through for June 2001, July 2001, and August 2001, but was unable to find Atta's name. She advised the jump seat forms are only kept for 90 days. She became more concerned about this when she heard on the news that some American Airlines uniforms were stolen in Italy.

Graney was then requested to review a photograph array containing twelve pictures of twelve of the alleged hijackers. Graney identified the picture of Mohamed Atta as the person she remembered seeing prior to September 11, 2001 attempting to jump seat a USAIR flight. She also identified the picture of Marwan Alshehhi as someone she had seen sometime at the airport ticket counter. She identified the picture of Waleed Alshehri as someone who looks familiar. Both Graney and the interviewing agent dated and initialed the pictures she identified.

A pilot's strange encounter with Atta at Boston Airport

2011-04-24T10:43:00.011Z

The following is the official paraphrased statement of an American Airlines pilot, interviewed by the FBI on October 13th, 2001. The witness describes how she was shortly approached by Mohammed Atta inside the AA terminal at Logan Airport. Her account is detailed, credible, and intriguing.

Lynn Marie Florence Howland, First Officer, American Airlines, AA, was interviewed near her home at a Starbucks Café in ................... She was advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and nature of the interview. For identification, she advised that she lives and .............................. and has been with American Airlines for eleven years.

Howland explained to the interviewing agent that she has been out of state for several days flying in her job. To assist her recollection she prepared a type written one page chronology of the events regarding the encounter with a person she thought was the suspected hijacker of AA Flight 11 on the morning of September 11, 2001. She advised that she was extremely tired after her flight. She left her home at approximately 10:00 a.m. all times local on the morning of September 10th, flew down to San Francisco to then fly as first officer for the AA red-eye flight from San Francisco to Boston. Checking a dispatch schedule, she indicated she flew AA flight 198 from San Francisco, California to Boston, Massachusetts. She indicated the flight had a 9:50 p.m. departure, with arrival at Logan Airport, Boston at approximately 6:50 a.m. on the morning of September 11th. The equipment was a Boeing 767. She advised that the captain was Douglas Balmain. She was sure that the arrival gate for her flight 198 was Bravo 33. Subsequently she checked with AA dispatch and was told her flight AA 198 became the hijacked AA flight 11.

After almost everyone had deplaned, she went up the jetway ahead of Captain Balmain. She stated as she was standing near the entrance to the jetway, in the passenger lounge, a male individual comes up to her suddenly and asks if she is going to take this plane out, referring to the flight she just brought in. She said no and he abruptly turned and went and sat down. She thought that was extremely rude. Her first impression was that he was a pilot going to fly in the jump seat. While he wasn't in uniform, he may have been wearing a pilot type shirt, open collar. She thought he may have had a rolling pilot flight kit or bag with him, which she described as black vinyl, round top, and incredibly cheap. Again she could not recall anything else, only at that time wanting to get to the hotel and sleep. She said she was so tired, when she got to her hotel room she crashed in bed, in her uniform. She woke up about one p.m. and then found out about the terrorist attacks. She said for the longest time she wasn't even sure that she was dreaming it all, until she saw photographs of the hijackers in the news, she was instantly sure that the indivdual she saw that morning was the suspected hijacker, Mohammed Atta. She added that when she first saw the pictures of the hijackers in the new media, it was like an electric shock when she saw the picture of Atta.

She described the individual she saw that morning as having dark hair, dark eyes and being approximately five feet, eight inches in height. Because she was so tired and just wanted to get to the hotel, she could not recall much, other than he may have had that cheap pilot flight bag. She could not recall anything else and stated that time she had no reason to notice. She did not think that Captain Balmain would have noticed him. As she explained in her notes, the recollection .... (??? - missing text) She was shown a photo spread of six males and instantly chose number 5, which is the terrorist described as Mohammed Atta. She then signed and dated the photo spread under photograph number five. She said that her selection was based totally on her recollection of the morning of September 11th and not from any subsequent photographs she may have seen in the news.

The following are Howland's notes, prepared prior to the interview and scanned directly into this FD-302 and corrected only for scanning errors:

"Flew flight 198 SF-BOS
Departed September 10
Arrived September 11
On the ground approximately 0650 EST
In gate probably at 0700 EST
I left the cockpit first and waited for the captain at the top of the jetbridge in the boarding area.
He was slower maybe 5-7 minutes behind me.
We went to the hotel. I went to sleep called my parents at 1300 EST and they told me what happened.
Later that day I realized it was the aircraft that I had brought in.
That is what I remembered until I saw the photos on TV.
I was instantly sure I have seen Mohammed Atta before could not remember where.

Two days later I was driving my car in at night in the rain and my thoughts were drifting to the horrible loss. I suddenly had a memory of a man approaching me and asking me if I was taking the flight out. I was stunned. Did this really happen? I thought about it some more and remembered Mohammed Atta approaching me and asking me if I was taking flight 11 out. I said "No, I just brought the aircraft in." He turned his back and abruptly walked away and I was a little annoyed with his rudeness but as it was 0400 body clock time I let it go and told myself that people are rude everyday.

This would have been between 0700 and 0720 EST. I think he was wearing a white pilot type or oxford shirt, no tie and blue pilot type slacks. I am unsure about the shirt but perhaps that was what the man he sat down next to was wearing. I also remember him having a really cheap pilot bag. The vinyl one with a rounded top with black plastic squares at the corners.

I spent 2 days trying to decide of this was a true memory and decided it was. I have decided to share this because I felt it was my civic duty."

http://www.scribd.com/doc/14094195/T7-B11-FBI-302s-Cockpit-and-American-and-Hijacker-Fdr-FBI-302-S-Entire-Contents

This statement creates a huge problem for the official Atta story: According to the BTS database and other sources, it was about 6:00 a.m. EDT when Flight 198 arrived at the gate, not 7:00 EST. (This is a minor mistake of West Coast resident Lynn Howland and in no way damages the accuracy of her other recollections.) Just at this time, a man identifying himself as Mohammed Atta boarded a Colgan Air flight in Portland, Maine, going to Boston. He did not arrive there before 6:45 EDT.

Conclusion: the "Mohammed Atta" whose face was presented on the news in the days after 9/11 and the "Mohammed Atta" in the blue shirt recorded by a security camera at Portland Airport are not the same person. This confirms the outstanding research of John Doe II who has collected plenty of evidence for the existence of - at least - one double of Atta:

http://johndoeii.blog.com/2011/03/29/mohammed-atta

Was Flight 11 a "real world exercise" ?

2011-03-07T14:30:00.006Z

Source: Newhouse News

In an old Democratic Underground posting the esteemed colleague Shoestring expressed doubts about the customary interpretation of the term "real world" which pops up on the NEADS tapes a couple of times. Here's his quote in its entirety:

The quote of Major James Fox saying, "I've never seen so much real-world stuff happen during an exercise" is really suspicious. I wonder if the staff at NEADS understood "real-world" to mean a live-fly field training exercise, as opposed to a purely simulated command post exercise?

So when Sgt. Jeremy Powell asked Boston flight control center "Is this real-world or exercise?" he could have been asking if the exercise was live-fly or not. And when Boston replied "this is not an exercise, not a test," he took it to mean that it was indeed a live-fly exercise, involving a plane under the control of the military pretending to be hijacked.

This would certainly explain the bizarre conversation between the NEADS "ID techs —Stacia Rountree, Shelley Watson, and Maureen Dooley—when they heard of the reported hijacking:

8:37:56
WATSON: What?
DOOLEY: Whoa!
WATSON: What was that?
ROUNTREE: Is that real-world?
DOOLEY: Real-world hijack.
WATSON: Cool!

I find it hard to believe Shelley Watson would have responded, "Cool!" if she thought "Real-world hijack" did really mean a genuine hijacking. Might she instead have believed it to have meant a "live-fly," with a real plane pretending to be hijacked, for which they could launch fighers in response?

Shoestring surmises that the term "real world" indicates a "live-fly exercise" with real airborne planes as opposed to a "command post exercise" which is only played on the desks and screens of the participating military units. I agree with him that this interpretation is far more plausible than the official version (that "real world" meant an actual, genuine hijacking).

A statement of Lt. Col. Dawne Deskins of NEADS shows that Shoestring is right with his conjecture:

Deskins noted that NEADS had a hijack checklist and a variety of exercises depending on higher authority involvement and direction prior to 9/11. Some of those exercises involved NORAD coordination. She does not recall ever personally designing an exercise in which a decision would be made to shoot down the hij acked aircraft. A typical design would include course deviation in which the hijacker forces the pilot to fly to a designated landing point. They would not do these hijacks exercises real world. They had a cell that would play the FAA in the exercise. Deskins noted that there really were not the assets to do a large scale real world exercise to practice hijack response. The scenarios for the exercises are created by exercise designers in the exercise shop. Sgt. Mark Stanford and Sgt. Mike Quigley, both retired, designed the exercises when she was the head of the shop. NEADS' hijack shop would not design exercises for other sectors.

Exercises that are designed on the NORAD level are created at planning conferences. NORAD planning exercises are mostly held at Peterson, or at CONR at Tindle. There is intelligence representation at the conferences, but the sector shops are more concerned with the individual exercise of the sector floor and Battle Cab. She does not personally recall the design of a hijack with multiple hijacks or terrorist take over.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/19988140/Mfr-Nara-t8-neads-Deskins-Dawne-103003-00778

For the first time, the term "real-world exercise" emerges here in the context of the 9/11 wargames, and according to Deskins, it means a voluminous large-scale exercise with the need to involve the FAA. In smaller (not "real-world" exercises) the FAA was not needed because NEADS had its own cell playing their role. A corollary of Deskins' statement is that real-world exercises were not designed by NEADS itself, but one level above, at NORAD planning conferences.

The reader can easily verify Shoestring's interpretation by searching for "real world exercise", maybe narrowed down with "air force" or "military". The output will quickly convince him that "real world exercise" is a common concept in the military world.

So whenever the term "real world" is used, it indicates that NEADS personnel are believing they are confronted with a large-scale, live-fly exercise with participation of the FAA. NEADS was prepared for these exercises, but not actual, genuine hijackings. It is not known how the air defense used to label such (very rare) genuine hijackings, but it was certainly not "real world" lest to confound it with the ongoing real world exercises.

Flight 11 was apparently viewed as a real-world exercise.

Was Flight 93 part of a military hijack exercise?

2010-11-16T13:57:00.002Z

FAA delayed alerting of NEADS on the hijacking of Flight 93

Since 2002, when Jared Israel was the first one to point out the lame reaction of the US air defense to the hijackings (not being able to intercept leastwise one of the airliners), there's still no satisfying answer to the question for those who were responsible for the fatal delays.

The 9/11 Commission basically argues that the existing protocol for the collaboration between the FAA and NORAD in the case of a hijacking was "unsuited in every respect" because it was designed for "traditional hijackings" rather than suicide terrorists using hijacked planes as missiles. The Commission Report describes meticulously how the information "Flight X is hijacked" was ought to be processed from the basic FAA controller who spots the plane, upward the FAA hierarchy to the "hijack coordinator" who contacts the NMCC (National Military Command Center), and - after seeking approval from the Secretary of Defense - down the NORAD chain of command.

There is an entire section on this subject ("Interagency collaboration", p. 17/18), which is copied word by word from the Commission's Staff Statement No. 17, a working paper from June 2004, with one remarkable exception. The sentence "Most FAA centers had a civilian employee to coordinate with NORAD, for situations like training exercises", which is written down in the statement, didn't manage it into the final report.

It should have, however. On 9/11, these civilian employees, also known as "military liaisons", were in direct contact to the NEADS air defenders. So the regional FAA Centers were by all means able to shortcut the intricate protocol by simply telling their own military liaison to call up NEADS. And this is exactly what happened:

Flight..................................................11.........175.........77.........93
Controller realizes flight is hijacked.......8:25.......8:55.......----........9:32
Notification of NEADS.........................8:37.......9:03.......----.......10:07
Delay in minutes..................................12...........8..........----.........35

While 8 or 12 minutes look to be a reasonable time for controllers to figure out the situation, discuss various options and get clearance from higher-ranking FAA managers, the outstanding 35 minutes delay for Flight 93 requires a closer look at Cleveland Center, the facility responsible for Flight 93. (Flight 77 is a special case because it was not believed to be hijacked, but missed; it completely vanished from the radar scopes of FAA controllers.)

The "Flight 93 is a hijack with a bomb on board" information needed only two minutes from the basic controller to FAA headquarters:

At 9:32, a third radio transmission came over the frequency: "Keep remaining sitting. We have a bomb on board." The controller understood, but chose to respond: "Calling Cleveland Center, you're unreadable. Say again, slowly." He notified his supervisor, who passed the notice up the chain of command. By 9:34, word of the hijacking had reached FAA headquarters. (911 CR, p. 28)

However: NEADS first received a call about United 93 from the military liaison at Cleveland Center at 10:07. We know his name from transcripts of NEADS radio messages: that was Mr. Dukelin - first name unknown. Dukelin was in direct contact to Stacia Rountree from NEADS, he spoke with her at 9:45 and again at 10:00. At both occasions, he alerted her to Delta 1989 - but not one single word on United 93.

Did Dukelin not know about the hijacking of Flight 93? This can be precluded. He was certainly in contact with the Traffic Management Unit and Ed Wolbers, the operations manager:

They are speaking to the pilot, Dukelin talks to Ed and tells him he is talking to HUNTRESS. Ed says D1989 is not being hijacked, he is landing as a precaution in Cleveland.

So Dukelin, like the Cleveland Center management, was certainly aware of the Flight 93 problem. Maybe he was eagerly waiting for an order from above to inform NEADS:

Cleveland even told the Command Center [at 9:36] it was prepared to contact a nearby military base to make the request. The Command Center told Cleveland that FAA personnel well above them in the chain of command had to make the decision to seek military assistance and were working on the issue. (911 CR, p. 28/29)

But the upper FAA management shied away from requesting the help of NEADS:

At 9:49, 13 minutes after Cleveland Center had asked about getting military help, the Command Center suggested that someone at headquarters should decide whether to request military assistance:

FAA Headquarters: They're pulling Jeff away to go talk about United 93.
Command Center: Uh, do we want to think, uh, about scrambling aircraft?
FAA Headquarters: Oh, God, I don't know.
Command Center: Uh, that's a decision somebody's gonna have to make probably in the next ten minutes.
FAA Headquarters: Uh, ya know everybody just left the room.
(911 CR, p. 29)

Everybody left the room. The Headquarters and the Command Center were tracking Flight 93 as it turned around and headed toward Washington. They got the information that it was hijacked and had a bomb on board. They knew that two airliners had already been used as guided missiles - yet nobody of the leading FAA personnel bothered to follow Cleveland Center's suggestion and tell NEADS (via Dukelin) to scramble fighters. What was going on there?

Additionally, at 9:45 the FAA issued the general grounding order for all aircraft. Who ordered it? The official story has it that it was Ben Sliney, director of the Command Center, but there are also reports that it was Monte Belger, deputy director of the Headquarters - not to forget that Norman Mineta claims the glory for himself. No matter who was it - why did this hero make the risky, unprecedented, precautionary decision to "get all the birds down", but failed to make the acute, urgent, if well-rehearsed and operationally easy decision to alert NEADS about a hijacked airliner on his way to Washington with a bomb on board?

There seems to be only one realistic recourse: Flight 93 was part of a military exercise, probably a hijack simulation, and the exercise plot included a delayed alerting of NEADS. The behavior of Belger, Sliney & co. indicates that they didn't view the plane as a threat, but were told (possibly from the Secret Service who - according to Mike Ruppert - had direct access to FAA data) that it was a "special", i.e. a military exercise flight. The purpose of the delayed alert might have been to test NEADS - to make it more difficult for them to intercept the flight in time.

To substantiate this thesis, I take a look at the function of the so-called military liaisons. I've already mentioned that the 9/11 Commission describes their job as "to coordinate with NORAD, for situations like training exercises". An analysis paper from 2001, examining the structure of Air Traffic Control, confirms that the military liaisons dealt with exercises. Moreover it looks that the exercises were the only job of the liaisons.

Military Coordinator: coordinates paper work and flight data for all military exercises within Boston Center airspace.

This certainly applies to the other FAA Centers as well. Also FAA directive 7610.4K ("Special Military Operations") shows up the central role of the military liaisons for the exercises:

FAA Military Liaison Officers’ Responsibilities

1−6−1. ACTIONS

Liaison officers shall take the following actions in connection with proposed military exercises:

a. Encourage mission planning officers to include assigned airspace requirements in the information disseminated with the request for exercise approval.

b. Recommend the use of planning conferences to mission planning officers for the resolution of problems when it is evident that the exercise requirements will generate sufficient traffic to create untenable air traffic or airspace user situations.c. Provide early notification and information to the affected ARTCCs and CARF on any exercises which are classified under subparagraph b.

So by dropping the "military liaisons" from the final report, the Commission avoided questions about their function. Their function was to coordinate military exercises with civilian air traffic. It was not to assist the FAA in the case of a hijacking. Interestingly, there is an interview with the military liaison of Boston Center, Colin Scoggins (as his alias "Cheap Shot"):

As the military specialist I am responsible for all military procedures between Boston Center and the military units in my airspace, and any visiting military units that participate in any of our Special Use Airspace (SUA).

http://sites.google.com/site/911guide/cs

Q: What can you tell about the military exercises of that day, and if they had any effect whatsoever on the response?

Cheap Shot: I never knew anything about them. Vigilant Guardian is an exercise that we don’t participate at Boston Center. We normally are involved in Fertile Spades, Fertile Angels, and Amalgam Virgo’s. Occasionally we will get involved in large-scale exercises such as a while back Amalgam Warrior, and Global Yankee.

http://sites.google.com/site/911guide/cs3

"Cheap Shot" denies any knowledge of or involvement in the ongoing exercises. This comes as a big surprise, because NORAD was conducting several large-scale exercises, Vigilant Guardian being only one of them. Other exercises, not mentioned by Scoggins, were Global Guardian, Northern Guardian, or Vigilant Warrior. NORAD covers the entire airspace of Boston Center. When Boston Center called NEADS, the air defenders thought it was the begin of Vigilant Guardian. Scoggins' "I never knew" claim would imply that NORAD conducted its exercises in Boston Center airspace without any coordination with civilian air traffic control - bypassing Scoggins, the scheduled coordinator.

This is hard to believe and entails the search for an alternative explanation. Here is one: Scoggins was involved in the exercises, but to admit this fact would have opened the doors for more gnawing questions. Many suspect Scoggins of being a gatekeeper, and the job of a gatekeeper is to absorb dangerous questions. This is exactly what he's doing.

A military liaison was not only assigned to the FAA field facilities, but to the Command Center and the Headquarters, too. There is little information available for the latter. The military liaison at the Command Center was the "Air Traffic Services Cell", consisting of Col. John Czabaranek, Lt. Col. Michael-Anne Cherry and Maj. Kevin Bridges. Mike Williams of 911myths.com speculates that the job of the "cell" on 9/11 was to help with the communication infrastructure (teleconferences etc.):

From this description the cell officers earliest task appears to have been to set up the various teleconferences. They were assisting with communications in general, and there's nothing here to say the officers would take it upon themselves to monitor FAA information and pass it on to NORAD, especially if they believed (like Sliney) NORAD had already been informed. It wasn't their job, and they had other things to do.

Other sources suggest, however, that the task of the Air Traffic Services Cell was to coordinate civilian with military aircraft movement, like their counterparts at the field facilities:

Military Air Traffic Services Cell
–Housed within the System Command Center
–Mission -To coordinate all priority military aircraft movement and airspace issues during times of tension, warfare, natural disasters or civil unrest.
–Warfare Support
–Deployment of forces
–Sensitive, specialized, or classified mission coordination
–Military training exercise support
–Natural or environmental disaster assistance
–Civil exercise collaboration involving military participation

On 9/11, there was no tension, warfare, natural disaster or civil unrest, leaving the "military training exercise support" as the residual task of the "cell". This is confirmed by an article of Aviation Week & Space Technology from December 2001, describing the job of the cell as "refresher training", i.e. conducting exercises:

In a fluke, so was what Herndon calls "the military cell"--the Air Traffic Services Cell, created by the FAA and the Defense Dept. for use when needed to coordinate priority aircraft movement during warfare or emergencies. The Pentagon staffs it only three days per month for refresher training, but Sept. 11 happened to be one of those days.

It is unclear if the Air Traffic Services Cell was in direct contact to the military liaisons at the FAA field facilities, but there is reason to assume that. The cell was able to communicate with other military facilities via SIPRNET, the military's Internet:

The ATSC’s response to the terrorist attacks benefits from the fact that, six weeks earlier, the cell had a secure terminal to access the SIPRNET—the military’s classified version of the Internet—installed, along with other hardware, which significantly enhances the movement of vital information. According to Meenan, because the cell has the SIPRNET terminal, “we could immediately look at NORAD and [Defense Department] plans as they evolved; filter, package, and format them, then walk out to the [FAA] national operations manager—who had control of the entire national airspace system—and give him current visibility into… fighter, tanker, and support aircraft activities. It cut down our response time tremendously.”

http://web.archive.org/web/20020913090602/http://www.aviationnow.com/content/publication/awst/20020610/aw52.htm

The last sentence - "it cut down our response time tremendously" - deserves only scorn and derision, considering the 35-minute delay of alerting NEADS to Flight 93. Instead, SIPRNET seems to have been the central tool to conduct the various exercises. Moreover, it was a valuable tool for "interested circles" to make the exercises a springboard for performing the 9/11 crimes.

Source of the Delta 1989 hijack rumor: the FAA teleconference

2010-10-11T17:59:00.002Z

The FAA Command Center (source:caasd.org)

Why indeed was Delta 1989 believed to be hijacked? And who was the source for this misinformation? The answers appear to change everytime when a new report on the aircraft is published.

According to USA Today (2002), the FBI was the source. Delta 1989 simply fit the "hijack profile" of American 11 and United 175 (i.e. a Boeing 767 from Boston going from East Coast to West Coast).

http://www.usatoday.com/news/sept11/2002-08-12-hijacker-daytwo_x.htm

The 9/11 Commission Report (2004) mentions the same reason (the hijack profile), but identifies Boston Center as the source. Just recently, Commission staffer Miles Kara has repeated this version.

http://www.oredigger61.org/?cat=18

But Colin Scoggins, the controller from Boston Center who called NEADS to warn them about Delta 1989, explains in an interview from 2007 that the plane became suspicious because it missed a frequency transfer from Boston Center to Cleveland Center:

http://sites.google.com/site/911guide/cs2

Lynn Spencer ("Touching History", 2008) also mentions a failed frequency transfer, but this time within Cleveland Center (i.e. from sector to sector).

http://911woodybox.blogspot.com/2009/07/lynn-spencer-spreads-misinformation-on.html

Something doesn't add up here.

But here's a document that expels all of these accounts into the land of hearsay. It's the written account of Colin Scoggins, the said Boston Center controller, from 9/20/2001. According to Scoggins, it was the FAA Open Teleconference which was established by the Command Center after Flight 11 was reported being hijacked:

Open TELCON reports that DAL1889 is NORDO in ZOB airspace. ASD indicates aircraft is near Cleveland.

Call NEADS to advise of DAL1889, possible hijack.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/13950342/T8-B3-Boston-Center-Colin-Scoggins-Fdr-Chronology-of-Events-and-FAA-Personnel-Statement-Wasnt-in-a-Rush-Went-to-the-Credit-Union-First

In plain language: One participant of the teleconference reported that Delta 1989 (Scoggins remembered the flight number incorrectly) had lost radio contact while flying over Cleveland.

Here are three annotations to this surprising message:

1 - Delta 1989 was never out of radio contact, i.e. the message is flagrant misinformation.

2 - it's Scoggins 2001 vs. Scoggins 2007; when determining which account is more reliable, just look at the date. Memories use to be more accurate after nine days than after six years.

3 - who participated on the teleconference? At least the FAA Command Center and the three facilities Boston Center, New York Center and Cleveland Center, if we follow the 9/11 Commission. Cleveland Center was in continous contact with Delta 1989, Boston Center and New York Center were not responsible for Cleveland Center airspace. Therefore these three facilities are out of the question when it comes to the source of the misinformation.

Is there any reason that someone at the Command Center spreaded misinformation on the teleconference? Just note that Scoggins was not a regular air traffic controller, but the military liaison at Boston Center, and that there was a military liaison (or military cell) at the Command Center, too, who also participated in various teleconferences. This needs further research.

The passengers of Flight 11 embarked on the wrong plane: CONFIRMED

2010-09-11T21:18:00.010Z

Memorial flag at Gate 32, Boston Logan Airport, Terminal B, American Airlines (Source: patrickmadrid.blogspot.com)

When did the passengers of Flight 11 embark on the plane? After nine years, this seemingly easy question is still lacking an answer. The 9/11 Commission Report doesn't deliver one, instead it confronts us with surprising boarding data:

See TSA report, "Selectee Status of September 11th Hijackers," undated. For boarding and seating information, see AAL record, SABRE information on Flight 11, Sept. 11, 2001. These boarding times from the American system are approximate only; for flight 11 they indicated that some passengers boarded after the aircraft had pushed back from the gate. See AAL response to the Commission's February 3, 2004, requests, Mar. 15, 2004. (9/11 Commisson Report, note #9 of Chapter 1)

It is, of course, impossible that any passenger boarded Flight 11 after it had moved off the gate. The concise explanation of the Commission: the boarding times are "approximate only". This sounds like as if the actual boarding times were spaciously rounded up by American Airlines' SABRE system which records and processes the boarding data.

Example: Given that Flight 11 pushed back at 7:40*** (see appendix). Now the Commission claims: if a passenger passed the gate at 7:37 (before the push-back), the system logged his boarding time as 7:50 (or 8:00 or whatever time after the push-back). This sizeable time gap smells funny and shows that the Commission's explanation for the oddity is concise, but far from conclusive. And indeed it doesn't withstand a closer scrutiny.

The cited note indicates that the Commission sent a request to American Airlines on February 3, 2004, which was answered at March 15, 2004. In 2009, this response was released to the public.

American previously has provided the Commission with documents that indicate the approximate times that passengers boarded AA Flights 11 and 77 and the approximate check-in times at the main ticket counters at the respective airports. These documents are Kean Commission Bates numbers 004658-004675 (Flight 77) and 004483-004518 (Flight 11) and are from American's Electronic Gate Reader ("EGR") records. The EGR records do not provide the exact time of individual passenger check-in, the check-in location (ticket counter vs. departure gate), or the identification of the check-in agent.

The EGR system for a particular flight is manually initiated by the gate agent usually several hours prior to boarding. The initation of the EGR system is done at the discretion of the gate agent. At initiation, the system downloads information for the flight, such as the names of all passengers holding reservations, check in status, seat assignment (if pre-reserved), booking class, and destination city.

Following system initation, the EGR system "polls" the Sabre passenger reservation system for any updates to this data. Prior to the start of boarding, the updates occur at approximately 15-minute intervals and provide a "snapshot" of any changes in information since the last update. For this reason, the ticket counter check-in times from the EGR system reflect only "approximate" times. During actual boarding of the flights, the "polling" process occurs more frequently, at approximately 15-second intervals. The EGR records the time that a passenger's boarding pass goes through the EGR and, provides an accurate record of when the passenger boards the aircraft.

http://www.911myths.com/index.php/Image:Team7_Box18_AAL-QFR-Responses.pdf

So the boarding times are recorded fairly accurate, with an uncertainty of +-15 seconds. In our example: if a passenger passed the gate at 7:37:48, the system might round up the time to 7:37:50 or 7:38:00, but certainly not a time after 7:40 (the push-back). While the system checks the passenger's reservation status every 15 minutes only, it doesn't create minute-long gaps between actual and recorded boarding time.

The 9/11 Commissioners ignore this difference. Why does their report insinuate that the inaccurate boarding times are inherent in the SABRE system if American Airlines declares in plain language that the system "provides an accurate record of when the passenger boards the aircraft"? Either the gentlemen did not read AA's answer (?), or didn't understand it (???), or they decided to cease further inquiries and try to get away with a half-baked explanation ("approximate only"). An internal working draft from May 2004 shows that likely the latter is the case:

At 7:31 a.m. Wail Al-Shehri and Waleed Al-Shehri boarded American Flight #11. At 7:39 a.m. Atta and al Omari embarked on the aircraft and al Suqami boarded at 7:40 a.m. (PLACEHOLDER: THESE TIMES, WHICH ARE PULLED FROM AA'S SABRE RESPONSE SYSTEM, NEED FURTHER VERIFICATION BECAUSE THAT REPORT HAS SOME OTHER PASSENGERS "BOARDING" AFTER THE FLIGHT HAD PUSHED BACK).

http://www.scribd.com/doc/15121435/FO-B4-Commission-Meeting-33004-Fdr-Tab-C-32504-Working-Draft-Narrative-2-The-Terrorist-Hijackings-of-September-11-166

The doubtfullness and need for further inquiry expressed in this paper is not reflected in the Commission report at all which was released three months later. The (too) late boarding is confirmed by two passengers of Flight 11 (Albert Filipov and Richard Ross) as well as flight attendant Madeleine "Amy" Sweeney. They called their spouse from the airport to tell her/him that the flight was delayed. Furthermore, there are conflicting reports of the gate where Flight 11 started from. Apparently the passengers embarked on a plane at gate 26, not at gate 32 as claimed by the 9/11 Commission. More about this here:

http://911wideopen.com/mirror/twin11-1/twin-11-mod.htm

*** This is not 100% correct; at 7:40, Flight 11's doors were closed. The actual push-back ocurred at 7:45, as documented by the radio transcript between Boston Tower and Flight 11. However, this inaccuracy doesn't matter for the subject.

The mysterious United 177 from Boston

2009-11-30T17:43:00.006Z

In this blog entry I postulated a duplicated United 175 at Logan Airport that took off at 8:23 besides the official one departing at 8:14. Moreover, the 8:23 flight was apparently tracked by United Airlines as Flight 175 while the FAA tracked the 8:14 flight, as I have shown here.

For obvious reasons, tracking two different planes with the same call sign is an absurdity in the world of air traffic controllers. It would inevitably lead to confusion and raise the danger of accidents.

It is therefore reasonable to establish the working hypothesis that the clandestine United 175 (take-off 8:23) identified itself to the controllers with a different flight number. Unfortunately, this hypothesis, if true, looks hard to verify.

This being said, I spotted a possible candidate. On 9/11, Mark Randol was manager of the Civil Aviation Security Field Office (CASFO) in Washington, DC, a subdivision of the FAA. He reported to the Commission:

By 9:25 AM, Marcus Arroyo (Regional manager) called to report several hijackings, including AAL #77, UAL #175 and UAL #177, and he made it clear that this was a terrorist act. Randol then immediately tasked his staff to find out everything they could about the flights. Randol remembers that the whole day was hectic. By 9:45 AM, they had identified that AAL #77 had departed from Dulles, but they could not confirm whether it had been hijacked, while they discovered that UAL #177 was being held at the gate in Boston.

http://media.nara.gov/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00969.pdf

The BTS database tells us that United 177 was scheduled to depart at 6:55 pm from Boston, destination Los Angeles.

http://www.bts.gov/xml/ontimesummarystatistics/src/dstat/OntimeSummaryDepaturesData.xml

This raises two questions:

1) Why was it reported hijacked?
2) Why was it reported "held at the gate" if its departure was only in the evening?

Misinformation #1 alone could be dismissed as a transmission error induced by the confusion that day, but putting it together with misinformation #2 creates the impression that the existence of the plane posing as "United 177" was being smothered up.

Most remarkably, the hijacking of United 177 was reported at 9:25, two minutes after Ed Ballinger, United flight dispatcher, sent the last message to "his" Flight 175 while it was over Pittsburgh. It is therefore legitimate to specify the above working hypothesis: The plane that was tracked by United Airlines as Flight 175 was tracked by the FAA as United Flight 177.

Flight 175 was duplicated: Threefold Confirmation

2009-10-06T19:33:00.017Z

DDLXCXA CHIAK CH158R
.CHIAKUA DA 111323/ED
CMD
AN N612UA/GL PIT
- QUCHIYRUA 1UA175 BOSLAX
- MESSAGE FROM CHIDD -
/BEWARE ANY COCKPIT INTROUSION: TWO AIRCAFT IN NY . HIT TRADE C
NTER BUILDS...
CHIDD ED BALLINGER

;09111323 108575 0574

As I've shown in the last blog entry, the ACARS radio messages sent from United Airlines dispatchers to Flight 93 are clear evidence that the plane was over Fort Wayne, Indiana and later Champaign, Illinois when it received its last messages. This doesn't mean that the "official" Flight 93 which turned around over Cleveland didn't exist; there is plenty of FAA material showing that it did exist. Hence the conclusion that United Airlines tracked a different Flight 93 than the FAA is inevitable - a case for duplicated planes and 9/11 being an Operation Northwoods-like maneuver.

Likewise, United dispatchers sent ACARS messages to Flight 175 locating it near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania just when the South Tower was hit (by whatever plane) and near Pittsburgh 20 minutes later. Hence the Flight 175 that was tracked by United Airlines was not identical to the plane that hit the South Tower.

Before featuring the ACARS messages in particular, I'd like to repeat why it's possible to deduce the approximate position of a plane by means of the transmitting ground station that is attached to each message:

Mr. Winter explained the Aircraft Condition and Reporting System ACARS uses radio ground stations (RGS) at various locations throughout the United States for communication. The messages from the aircraft utilize the RGS in a downlink operating system. A central router determines the strongest signal received from the aircraft and routes the signal/message to UAL flight dispatch.

http://www.911myths.com/images/1/1c/Team7_Box11_FBI302s_ACARS.pdf

In other words: if the message denotes (for example) PIT, this means that the Pittsburgh RGS has received the strongest signal and that the plane is in the vicinity of Pittsburgh (usually up to 70 miles, depending on the distance to other RGS's). A map of the RGS's of the relevant part of the United States is here:

Now to the ACARS messages. They have generously been scanned and published by Mike Williams of 911myths.com:

http://www.911myths.com/images/8/82/Team7_Box13_UAL_ACARS.pdf

I have transcribed them and added brief comments. The crucial informations are highlighted in red. The last three letters in the fourth line denote the active RGS, and the last line denotes the date and time which is given in zulu format (09111259 = September 11th, 8:59 EDT).

At 8:59, United aircraft maintenance employee Jerry Tsen sent an ACARS message to Flight 175 via the radio ground station MDT (Harrisburg), indicating that the plane was near Harrisburg, not New York.

DDLXCXA SFOLM CHI58R SFOFRSAM
.SFOLMUA 111259/JER
CMD
AN N612UA/GL MDT
- QUSFOLMUA 1UA175 BOSLAX
I HEARD OF A REPORTED INCIDENT ABOARD YOUR ACFT. PLZ VERIFY ALL
IS NORMAL....THX 777SAM
SFOLM JERRY TSEN

;09111259 108575 0543

At 9:03, United flight dispatcher Ed Ballinger sent an ACARS message to Flight 175 when it was still in the vicinity of Harrisburg - exactly when another plane (later believed to be Flight 175) crashed into the WTC South Tower:

DDLXCXA CHIAK CH158R
.CHIAKUA 111303/ED
CMD
AN N612UA/GL MDT
- QUCHIYRUA 1UA175 BOSLAX
- MESSAGE FROM CHIDD -
HOW IS THE RIDE. ANY THING DISPATCH CAN DO FOR YOU...
CHIDD ED BALLINGER

;09111303 108575 0545

Also at 9:03, United flight dispatcher Sandy Rogers sent another ACARS message to Flight 175.

DDLXCXA CHIYR CH158R
.CHIYRUA 111303/AD
CMD
AN N612UA/GL MDT
- QUCHIYRUA 1UA175 BOSLAX
- MESSAGE FROM CHIDD -
NY APROACH LOOKIN FOR YA ON 127.4
CHIDD AD ROGERS

;09111303 108575 0546

Finally, at 9:23, Ed Ballinger sent the last ACARS message to Flight 175. The message was received while the plane was near Pittsburgh (PIT). This was 20 minutes after the South Tower was hit.

DDLXCXA CHIAK CH158R
.CHIAKUA DA 111323/ED
CMD
AN N612UA/GL PIT
- QUCHIYRUA 1UA175 BOSLAX
- MESSAGE FROM CHIDD -
/BEWARE ANY COCKPIT INTROUSION: TWO AIRCAFT IN NY . HIT TRADE C
NTER BUILDS...
CHIDD ED BALLINGER

;09111323 108575 0574

The existence of the "official" Flight 175 is undoubtedly substantiated by FAA documents (ATC/pilot transcripts etc.) So like Flight 93, United Airlines tracked a different Flight 175 than the FAA. Another case of plane duplication. And for Flight 175 there is strong additional evidence that the plane was duplicated from start:

-two planes identifiable as United 175 took off from Logan ; one at 8:14 (the official one) and one at 8:23 (this one with tail number N612UA).

- the impossible phone call out of United 175: Peter Hanson, who was aboard the plane, called his father Lee Hanson at 9:00:03 through a satellite-based GTE airphone. The call lasted 192 seconds, hence ending at 9:03:15, 4 seconds after a plane later believed to be Flight 175 hit the South Tower (9:03:11, according to seismic data). With the detection of a second Flight 175, the phone call suddenly makes sense.

Disregarding the ACARS messages, the recordings of GTE phone calls, and the statement of US Airways pilot Steven Miller who observed United 175 taking off from Boston just before himself, is not an option.

The alternative explanation is straightforward and yields a consistent flight path: United 175, tail number N612UA, took off from Boston at 8:23. Peter Hanson talked with his father from 9:00 to 9:03 when the plane was in the skies over Harrisburg. It continued to fly westbound und was near Pittsburgh when it received its last message at 9:23. It is not clear yet what happened to this United 175 afterwards.

It is clear, however, that the "official" United 175 tracked by the FAA was a different plane. The research will continue.

United Airlines tracked a different Flight 93 than the FAA

2009-09-23T20:49:00.005Z

Flight 93 was lost over Illinois - revealed by ACARS radio messages

ACARS (Aircraft Conditioning and Reporting System) is the basic radio-based tool for communication between an aircraft and its company. On 9/11, United Airlines flight dispatchers sent several ACARS text messages to the planes they were responsible for, including Flight 93 and Flight 175.

On January 28, 2002, Michael J. Winter of United Airlines was interviewed by the FBI to help them with the interpretation of the ACARS messages. The full FBI report is appended at the end of this article and can also be looked here (scroll down to the very last interview):

http://www.911myths.com/images/1/1c/Team7_Box11_FBI302s_ACARS.pdf

The actual content of the messages is already known and hardly interesting ("beware cockpit intrusion" etc.), but what makes them toxic for the official story is the plane's approximate position that is attached to each message:

Mr. Winter explained the Aircraft Condition and Reporting System ACARS uses radio ground stations (RGS) at various locations throughout the United States for communication. The messages from the aircraft utilize the RGS in a downlink operating system. A central router determines the strongest signal received from the aircraft and routes the signal/message to UAL flight dispatch.

In other words: if the message denotes (for example) PIT, this means that the Pittsburgh RGS has received the strongest signal and that the plane is in the vicinity of Pittsburgh (usually up to 70 miles, depending on the distance to other RGS's).

Now these position informations reveal shocking news: Winter explicitly confirms that United 93 received the last ACARS messages when it was near Fort Wayne (Indiana) and, some minutes later, near Champaign (Illinois):

Messages #16 and #17 were sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using the RGS near Ft. Wayne, IN, FWA as designated in the line "AN N591UA/GL FWA...". The messages were sent to the ACARS printer.

Messages #18 and #19 were sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using the RGS near Champaign, IL CMI as designated in the line "AN N591UA/GL CMI...". Both messages were sent to the printer and Message #19 also activated an audible signal in the aircraft.

The original ACARS messages can be found here:

http://www.911myths.com/images/8/82/Team7_Box13_UAL_ACARS.pdf

Not all of the messages enumerated by Winter are listed in the file, but messages #16-#19 are, together with the time when they were received. So it's possible to establish a rough flight path for United 93:

9:22 PIT (Pittsburgh)

9:32 CAK (Canton/Akron)

9:36 CLE (Cleveland)

9:47 TOL (Toledo)

9:51 FWY (Fort Wayne, IN)

10:10 CMI (Champaign, IL)

After Champaign, no message was received by United 93 anymore.

The authenticity of the ACARS messages is beyond doubt. The proper interpretation has been delivered by Michael J. Winter and confirmed by David Knerr, Manager Flight Dispatch Automation, United Airlines. The flight path is consistent with the speed of a commercial airliner (keeping in mind that the plane is up to 70 miles away from the respective radio station), and the tail number of the plane that received the messages was N591UA: United 93.

Does that mean that the official flight path, with United 93 making a U turn over Cleveland, is faked? No, not at all. The U turn is confirmed multiple times by air traffic control radio messages and personal statements from Cleveland Center controllers. I will take a closer look at these sources and their relation to the RADES radar data in forthcoming blog entries. I can already promise that this checkup will further damage the credibility of the RADES files.

In my past research, I have uncovered the duplication of several planes involved in 9/11, but the case of Flight 93 over Illinois is the strongest one due to the authentic power of the ACARS messages. The Flight 93 that was tracked by United Airlines was a different plane than the Flight 93 that was tracked by the FAA.

In my previous blog entry, I already have presented evidence that Flight 93 was duplicated right from the start. Also note the same dichotomy at Logan Airport: According to ACARS, Flight 175 took off at 8:28. According to the FAA, Flight 175 took off at 8:43.

A pattern emerges.

Appendix - FBI summary of the interview with Michael J. Winter

On January 28, 2002, Michael J. Winter was interviewed at United Airlines UAL, World Headquarters, 1200 E. Algonquin Road, Elk Grove Village, IL. The interviewing Agent indentified himself to Mr. Winter and told him, the interview concerned UAL flight 93 on September 11, 2001 and the communications between UAL flight 93 and the flight dispatchers. Mr. Winter voluntarily provided the following information regarding these communications.

In reviewing the Sanitized Time and Text of ACARS messages as provided by the FBI, Mr. Winter said Meassage #1 was from the aircraft to UAL Dispatch. Message #2 was to the aircraft from UAL Dispatch at John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York, NY and Message #3 was to the aircraft from UAL flight dispatcher ED BALLINGER. Message #4 was from the aircraft to UAL flight dispatcher ED BALLINGER. Message #5, listed as unreadable, was engine data advisory information. Message #6 was from UAL flight dispatcher A.D. "Sandy " ROGERS to the aircraft and Message #7 was from UAL flight dispatcher ROBERT BRITTAIN to the aircraft.
Message #8 was to the aircraft from BALLINGER and Message #9, listed as unreadable, was the engine data advisory information. Message #10 was from UAL flight Dispatcher CHAD McCURDY to the aircraft. Except for Message #13, which was to the aircraft from UAL SAn Francisco Maintenance, DAVID PRICE, all of the other messages listed were from UAL flight dispatcher BALLINGER.

Mr. Winter explained the Aircraft Condition and Reporting System ACARS uses radio ground stations RGS at various locations throughout the United States for communication. The messages from the aircraft utilize the RGS ina downlink operating system. A central router determines the strongest signal received from the aircraft and routes the signal/message to UAL flight dispatch.

Message #1 was routed from the aircraft through the RGS near Pittsburgh, PA PIT as designated in the line "DT DDL PIT...". Message #2, to the aircraft, was also routed through the RGS near Pittsburgh, A and was directed to the ACARS printer on the aircraft. The routing to the printer is designated by the letters "AGM" following "Smi=AGM" and "STX=AGM.."

Message #3 was a message to the aircraft from Chicago Dispatch CHIDD listed as a Command Respoinse MD type message. The CMD message, designated in the line "Smi=CMD Agy/Num=65535", was sent to the ACARS screen and utilized the RGS near Pittsburgh, PA. In this type of message, the flight dispatcher can also activate an audible signal to alert the flight crew of the sent message but this was not done.

Message #4 was sent from the aircraft to UAL flight dispatch using the RGS near Pittsburgh, PA. The designation "C4" appears just before the sentence "EWRSFO..." indicating the message was sent from the aircraft.

Message #5 was an engine data message which was sent automatically to UAL Chicago dispatch and a UAL maintenance computer. The information in the message as N41.20 W080.5" was the latitude and longitude of the aircraft when the date was sent.

Message #6 was a message to the aircraft from CHIDD using a RGS near Akron/Canton, OH CAK and was sent to the ACARS screen. The designation for Akron/Canton, OH CAK appears in the line beginning "AN N591UA/GL CAK..."

Message #7 was sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using a RGS near Akron/Canton, OH. The message was sent to the ACARS screen and was a CMD type message.

Message #8 was sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using the RGS near Akron/Canton, OH. The message ws a CMD message and also activated the audible signal. The audible signal designated as "BEL" in the line "QUCHIAKUA-1-BL>UA 93".

Message #9 was an engine data message. The latitude and longitude was also listed in the message as "N41.31 W081.06".

Message #10 was sent to the aircraft from CHIDD and was sent to the ACARS screen omly. The RGS in this instance was near Cleveand, OH CLE from the line "AN N591UA/GL CLE...".

Messages #11 and #12 were sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using the RGS near Cleveland, OH. These messages also activated the audible signal in the aircraft.

Message #13 was sent to the aircraft from UAL San Francisco, CA line maintenance to the ACARS screen and also activated the audible signal. The RGS for this message was near Toledo, OH as designated "TOL" in the oine "AN N591UA/GL TOL...".

Messages #14 and #15 were sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using the RGS near Toledo, OH. The messages were sent to the ACARS printer.

Messages #16 and #17 were sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using the RGS near Ft. Wayne, IN, FWA as designated in the line "AN N591UA/GL FWA...". The messages were sent to the ACARS printer.

Messages #18 and #19 were sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using the RGS near Champaign, IL CMI as designated in the line "AN N591UA/GL CMI...". Both messages were sent to the printer and Message #19 also activated an audible signal in the aircraft.

Messages #20 to #24 were sent to the aircraft from CHIDD. However, all of the messages were rejected indicating the aircraft did not receive them.

Also present during part of this interview was David Knerr, Manager Flight Dispatch Automation, UAL WHQ.

Who was the male in Flight 93's co-pilot seat?

2009-09-13T18:20:00.006Z

Leroy Homer jr., co-pilot of United 93

Strange encounter at Newark Airport

On 9/11, Anthony F. Mazza was working at Newark Airport as a fueler. One of the planes he provided with fuel was United 93. In the cockpit of the plane, he met a person who was apparently neither Leroy Homer, jr, the co-pilot, nor Jason Dahl, the pilot. On Oct. 19, 2001, he was interviewed by the FBI. Here's the FBI report:

Mazza has worked as a fueler for Ogden Aviation Services at Newark International Airport since 1973. Mazza fueled United Airlines flight 93 on September 11, 2001 prior to its departure and crash in western Pennsylvania. Mazza stated that everything seemed normal on the flight including the amount of fuel that was pumped into flight 93's tank.

Mazza stated that prior to the passengers boarding flight 93, he had completed fueling the plane and proceeded to the cockpit to inform the co-pilot of the completed task. This has been the standard operating procedure for United flights out of Newark for many years. Mazza entered the cockpit where he handed the fueling sheet to a young Caucasian male, well groomed, brown hair and a white shirt, who was sitting in the co-pilot's seat. The male responded to Mazza by saying thank you and taking the paper from him. Mazza then departed flight 93 prior to the passengers boarding. Mazza stated that this was approximately 30 minutes prior to the scheduled departure time.

Mazza was interviewed by FAA employee John Patani shortly after the crash in western Pennsylvania. Mazza stated that he reported that there was nothing unusual on the day of the flight and that the plane had been fueled without incident.

On Friday, October 12, 2001 Mazza saw a memorial for the crew of flight 93 and saw pictures of the co-pilot of flight 93. The picture was the actual co-pilot of flight 93, who was Leroy Homer. Mazza stated that he was certain that the co-pilot he spoke with was not Mr. Homer.

http://www.911myths.com/images/e/ed/Team7_Box12_LeroyHomer.pdf

The FBI report ends here and leaves the reader to itself with the question: who was the "male" in the co-pilot's seat, if not Leroy Homer? Jason Dahl, the pilot? Given Mazza's report, this only "regular" explanation seems to be highly unlikely. After seeing the memorial, Mazza obviously took the initiative to contact the FBI. Had he identified Dahl - whose picture he certainly saw, too - as the "male", he would not have felt compelled to call the FBI.

When interviewing Mazza, the FBI surely asked him about this possibility and probably showed ihm photos of Dahl again. In any case, the absence of Dahl in the report makes clear that he was not the "male" either. And Dahl was 43, not really a young man like the "male" as described by Mazza.

Jere Longman ("Among the heroes") describes meticulously the United Airlines routine pre-flight procedures. Before the passengers board a plane, it has to be checked, of course. Basically the captain looks after the cockpit instruments along a pre-flight checklist while the first officer checks the plane outside (tires etc.). The fact that Mazza met neither Dahl nor Homer is even more disturbing than the presence of the "male".

This looks like another case of plane duplication. It is already known that according to United Airlines ACARS messages, Flight 93 took off at 8:28, other than the official take-off time 8:42. We have to accustom ourselves to two different "Flight 93" taking off from Newark Airport.

Official NEADS Tapes Transcript: Sketchy and misleading

2009-08-12T19:51:00.009Z

According to 9/11 Commission staffer Miles Kara, the NEADS tapes transcripts were accomplished by Alderson Reporting, a "professional transcribing organization", based on the audio files provided to them by the Department of Defense.

I myself have already transcribed parts of the tapes here. But comparing the very first sample - Channel 21, 1:10:30 - to the "professional" version has produced an unsettling insight: the official transcripts, however professional they are supposed to be, are sketchy, misleading, and not to be trusted.

Here's the transcript of Alderson Reporting:

MALESPEAKER 2: (inaudible) range 53. All right, 288 for (inaudible)

MALE SPEAKER 3: 288 (inaudible)

MALE SPEAKER 2: (inaudible)

FEMALE SPEAKER 1: I have a 288 for (inaudible). I have a 287 for 97. Yup. Yup. (inaudible) I do. I have two real close to go, so (inaudible). One has a code of 7112, the one right next to them.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/14142026/NYC-Box-3-Neadsconrnorad-Fdr-Transcript-Atcscc-Channel-21-Tt-Op-010

And here's my transcript:

9:41:05 Another one. (Inaudible) I hear someone going from Boston going to Las Vegas - another one

9:41:11 As before is one missing. Start a search. (Inaudible) range out of 53

9:41:35 A 288 for 92 miles search only. 92 miles? 288 miles for 92 search only

9:41:46 I have a 280 for 97

9:41:58 I have a 287 for 97. Yup.Yup. What did I do -

9:42:23 The two real close together. Here we go you see. One used - one has a code of 7112 - the one we are next to 'em

As I've learned, transcribing noisy radio transmissions is not an easy job to do, and I never would condemn someone for a petty misinterpretation. But the official transcript omits significant and clearly understandable information:

- another one is reported going from Boston to Las Vegas

- A search is started (start a search)

- A position information is reported as 280 for 97

I'm not talking of odds and ends here. The omissions are crucial for the Delta 89 case, as I will show in a coming blog entry.

Request for the reader: Don't believe me blindly. Please check the audio file for yourself to verify these omissions!

Channel 21, 1:10:30

This part on Channel 21 is the first one where I checked the veracity of an official NEADS transcript, but this example shows that there is the need to review all other channels, too.

The official NEADS tapes transcripts are not to be trusted.

Delta 89, Code 7112: The Faker Hijack Exercise

2009-07-23T18:19:00.005Z

The NORAD tapes are proof: Delta 89 was not Delta 1989.

Three minutes after the Pentagon was hit, a strange aircraft with call sign "Delta 89" popped up on the radar screens of air defense commander Kevin Nasypany's crew. It signaled a hijacking and was tracked by NEADS for three minutes before it suddenly disappeared again.

In the official story, Delta 89 doesn't exist. Better to say, for the 9/11 Commission as well as authors Michael Bronner and Lynn Spencer ("Touching History"), the plane tracked by NEADS as Delta 89 was in fact Delta 1989, i.e. a case of sloppy communication.

This, however, is impossible. It is easy to show that, apart from the different call sign, Delta 89's transponder code, flight plan and flight path differed from Delta 1989. The evidence is present on the NORAD tapes, a source of impeccable authenticity because you can virtually look over the shoulder of NEADS technicians while they're tracking Delta 89 on their displays.

To demonstrate why Delta 89 was not identical with Delta 1989, I will go through the NORAD tapes step by step and comment on them. But before starting the analysis, we need to get a rough understanding how NEADS radar works - it's quite different from the FAA radar. Lynn Spencer explains in her book "Touching History" (p.32):

Slow and cumbersome, and not nearly as user friendly as more modern equipment, the NEADS monochromic radar displays are not designed to take internal FAA radar data or to identify radar tracks originating from inside the United States. The system offers little, if any, such low-level coverage over the country.
...
Their radar scopes are filled with hundreds of radar returns not just from aircraft but from weather systems, ground interference. and what's called anomalous propagation - false returns caused by conditions in the atmosphere, or by such obstruction as flocks of birds.

So the NEADS radar screen is filled with countless radar blips from planes - without the identifying data block common to FAA radar, however - as well as irregular radar returns. Only on special occasions like emergency cases, a plane's blip is highlighted and provided with a data tag. Lynn Spencer (p. 25/26):

Pilots have three special transponder codes that they can dial in: 7500 for hijacking, 7600 for loss of radio, and 7700 for other emergencies. Any of them will cause the airplane's tag to light up on his radar screen, but he doesn't see any such tag.

Now we are ready to start with the analysis. The complete transcripts are here. It is highly recommended to listen to the original audio file of the following channels (scroll forward to the respective time):

Channel 4, 1:14:00

Channel 7, 1:09:00

Channel 21, 1:09:00

(Channel 7)

9:39:31 Colin Scoggins, Boston Center military. Hijacked aircraft Delta nineteen eighty-nine. I give you the code 1304, presently due south of Cleveland, heading westbound, destination Las Vegas. And is this one a hijack, Sir? We believe it is. Didn't it squawk hijack? We don't umm...I don't know - it's squawking 1304 if you want to crank him up. 767, altitude 350. Where did it take off? Out of Boston. We're trying to get a tail number on that if you want to get someone up.

90 seconds before Delta 89 appears on stage, NEADS receives a verbal message from Colin Scoggins, the military liaison controller at Boston Center, regarding Delta 1989. The message is affirmed with professional calm. NEADS knows now that one of the many anonymous radar blips near Cleveland is a possible hijack. Note that Scoggins is wrong on the destination of Delta 1989: that was Los Angeles, not Las Vegas.

(Channel 4)

9:41:00 Delta 89 is a hijack, they think it's a hijack, south of Cleveland, we have a code on him now

9:41:05 Good! Pick it up! Find it!

9:41:05 Another one. I hear someone going from Boston going to Las Vegas - another one

9:41:13 Eight-nine. Boeing 767 Boston-Las Vegas. Another one - same place - Las Vegas

In striking contrast to Delta 1989, the appearance of Delta 89 causes big excitement among the NEADS crew. It is echoed through all of the channels. Lynn Spencer interprets this passage as a prompt reaction to Scoggins's message, but there are several reasons why this cannot be the case:

- the different call sign: needless to say, transmitting the correct call sign of an aircraft is an absolute must in aeronautic communication. No air traffic controller would ever get the idea to abbreviate a flight number by omitting the first two digits because that will automatically lead to massive confusion.

- "we have a code on him now" - obviously, the plane has squawked a special emergency code that causes its blip to lighten up on the NEADS radar displays - just as explained above. This is immediately noticed by the NEADS crew and leads to their excited reactions. The data tag informs them about the call sign (Delta 89), the flight plan (Boston-Las Vegas), the type of the plane (Boeing 767) and the cause of the emergency: a hijacking.

- "Another one - same place - Las Vegas" - NEADS is already aware of Delta 1989 which was reported 90 seconds ago by Colin Scoggins. Now Delta 89 - "another one" - appears in the same vicinity. So NEADS does not identify Delta 89 with Delta 1989, but views it as a different plane.

Bottom line: Delta 89's blip suddenly flashes on the NEADS screens - making it easy to follow - and indicates a hijacking. In contrast, Delta 1989's blip is not spotted yet.

(Channel 21)

9:41:05 Another one. I hear someone going from Boston going to Las Vegas - another one

9:41:30 As before is one missing. Start a search. Range 53

9:41:35 288 for 92 miles search only

9:41:46 I have a 280 for 97

9:41:58 I have a 287 for 97

9:42:23 The two really close together. One used - one has a code of 7112 - the one we are next to him

To understand what's going on here, I cite Lynn Spencer again (p. 32):

To identify American 11, the surveillance and ID techs must go through a grueling process. (...) The technicians must first determine which radar data on their screens is for aircraft, which they do by monitoring its movement, which is distinctive for planes. The technician must observe for at least 36 seconds to a minute just to confirm that a blip is in fact an aircraft track. The tech must attach what's called a tactical display number to it, which tells the computer to start tracking and identifying the target. If the target is in fact a plane, then over a period of 12-20 seconds, the computer will start to generate information on the track: heading, speed, latitude, longitude, and the identifying information being transmitted by the transponder.

The NEADS technicians start a "search" for Delta 89, described by Lynn Spencer as a grueling process. But in contrast to American 11, which had turned the transponder off, Delta 89 is tagged, enabling them to curtail the procedure. In the course of the search, they detect two planes "really close together" - Delta 89 and Delta 1989 -, and obtain the squawk code of one of them: 7112. This is not Delta 1989's code, which is 1304, so it must be the code of Delta 89. The first digit "7" indicates that it's not the ID code of an usual civilian airliner - they never begin with a 7. Instead, the 7 is reserved for emergency cases like 7500, 7600, or 7700. By squawking 7112, Delta 89 manages to pop up on the NEADS radar screens and signals a hijacking.

(Channel 4)
9:42:43 Indy Center? Indianapolis Center: Delta eight-nine have you information on that aircraft? I want to give you a heads-up. This is another hijacked aircraft, Boston to Las Vegas with a Mode 3 of 1304. We do have contact. ((repeats informations)) .
9:43:04 I give you a latlong if you need that. Go ahead. 4121 North 08215 West. I'll give you a heads-up that's all we have right now, but he's a confirmed hijack
9:43:16 (Indianapolis Center) We don't show him in our system at this point - you are tracking him, you say? We have him on the radar, Sir - he's headed your way. He's headed our way, okay.

9:43:35 (Indianapolis Center) Boston to L-A-S, right? L-A-X. L-A-X? I've got Vegas, Sir, whatever Vegas says. L-A-S, okay, Las Vegas. Okay, cause we don't show him in the system anywhere. Do you have Mode 3 capability or anything? He's on a 1304 code? Okay, we bring that up.

Now NEADS contacts Indianapolis Center to inform them that Delta 89 is heading for their airspace. This is evidence that Delta 89 is flying southwest- or southbound at that point because the boundary to Indianapolis Center runs 40 miles south of Cleveland. In contrast, Delta 1989 never goes south, and especially at 9:43, it is flying westbound (direction 285) according to the Cleveland Center/Delta 1989 transcript:

9:40:57 (Lorain Radar) delta nineteen eighty nine fly heading two eight five
9:41:00 (Delta 1989) two eight five delta nineteen eighty nine

The next radio transmission between Cleveland Center and Delta 1989 occurs at 9:44. In between, there is no order to change the direction, which is proof that Delta 1989 is not heading towards Indianapolis Center at 9:43 like Delta 89 (according to Stacia Rountree from NEADS).

Back to NEADS:

(Channel 4)

9:44:03 Where did it go? Somebody dropped the aircraft. Who dropped the aircraft? I DON'T KNOW!

(Channel 21)
9:46:25 (?)52 on a 49 for 59 miles searching. We got a 1304 squawk this time
9:46:53 The 1304 guy. That's not the guy then

At 9:44, Delta 89 is suddenly "lost". NEADS doesn't know where it's gone and is unable to track it. Obviously the pilot has turned off the transponder, making himself virtually invisible. The radar technicians resume the search. At 9:46:25, they are able to identify an eligible blip, but it's Delta 1989 this time. Their comment: "that's not the guy then" - the 7112 guy they lost and were looking for.

Now it's time to sum up the data:

Call sign.................Delta 1989.......................Delta 89

Flight plan..............Boston-Los Angeles.........Boston-Las Vegas

Squawk code..........1304.................................7112

Direction at 9:43......westbound......................southwest/southbound

Transponder............continously working..........turned off at 9:44

Did the 9/11 Commission overlook these discrepancies? Unlikely. Did Commission staffers not check Channel 21 with the "code 7112" message? Oh yes, they did! On January 23, 2004, Miles Kara, Kevin Schaeffer, and Geoffrey Brown interviewed Sgt. Susan Marie Rose, whose voice is recorded on Channel 21 as she spots "code 7112":

Commission staff asked Rose is she recalled details on tracking Delta Airlines Flight 1989 or United Airlines Flight 93 (UAL 93). She replied that she and LaMarche tracked a specific suspected hijack that they believe was flight planned from Boston to Las Vegas through Cleveland and Minneapolis Center airspace. This flight, she believed, was headed to a specific airport, and he was maneuvering to turn into the airport to land.
Rose noted that she is uncertain whether the aircraft reflected in Commision staff's recording was one that was search only or one that was a mode three. She surmised there being two aircraft that they followed based on listening to the tapes in which she pointed out a mode three squawking code 1304.

The "surmise" of Susan Marie Rose is certainly correct, but squawk code 7112, evidence for a second plane, is simply omitted in the report. Miles Kara and his colleagues don't seem to be interested in this other aircraft, despite the strange code and the fact that it was considered a hijacking. Code 7112 and Delta 89 were simply glossed over.

The NORAD tapes belong to the most authentic sources for the events of 9/11, and they are certainly not faked, as everyone will attest who has listened to them. As matters stand, the tapes provide watertight proof that Delta 89 was NOT Delta 1989, Delta 89 being defined as the aircraft that was tracked by NEADS between 9:41 and 9:44.

The analysis must not stop at this point. What kind of plane was this Delta 89? Discarding exotic scenarios like a drunken pilot or a foreign intruder playing games with the air defense, the plane's known attributes allow only one reasonable explanation - Delta 89 was a simulated hijacking as part of a military exercise:

- "Delta 89" was a fake call sign. The regular Delta Airlines Flight 89 was sitting at JFK airport and scheduled to depart for Los Angeles at 3:00 p.m.

- The behavior of Delta 89 reminds of a hide-and-seek game. To facilitate the catcher's job, it left its cover and "cuckooed" for three minutes before disappearing in the dark again. Note that military exercises are often termed "war games".

- Delta 89 didn't squawk 7500, the emergency code for a "real world" hijacking, but another irregular code - 7112 - that was immediately interpreted as a hijacking by NEADS technicians.

- According to FAA directive 7110.65, certain beacon codes are regularly assigned to planes taking part in NORAD exercises - "7112" seems to have been one of them:

NORAD will ensure exercise FAKER aircraft flight plans are filed containing discrete beacon codes from the Department of Defense code allocation specified in FAAO 7610.4, Special Military Operations, Appendix 8.

Source

Delta 89 fulfills all conditions for an "exercise faker aircraft" whose job was to simulate a hijacking. Alternative explanations are hard to imagine. Therefore it's time now to establish the central thesis of this text: Delta 89 was a faker hijack exercise.

So what - the interested reader might ask - what impact has this insight on the official story of the 9/11 attacks? Indeed, Michael Ruppert has already pointed out the existence of at least one "live-fly exercise" (with real aircraft involved) in his book Crossing the Rubicon. Lynn Spencer notes: "Today's training exercise runs a number of scenarios, including a simulated hijacking in which the perpetrators overtake an aircraft for political purposes, directing it to an island in order to seek asylum". (p.24) So is the case of "Exercise Delta 89" important at all?

Yes, it is, because of Delta 1989, which was kind of a "doppelganger" plane with nearly identical call sign (promptly leading to confusion), identical aircraft type (Boeing 767), identical origin airport (Boston), and flying in close vicinity when Delta 89 exposed itself at 9:41. Clearly the designation "Delta 89" was carefully chosen by the wargame designers to create a mix-up with Delta 1989. This is the first indication that the ongoing exercises interfered with regular civilian air traffic.

In other words: Delta 1989, in spite of being a regular airliner, played a peripheral role in the exercise. It served as a cover-up for Delta 89. At first, NEADS was alerted by Delta 89, and when this plane stopped squawking and disappeared, the attention shifted to Delta 1989, which was closely observed until its landing in Cleveland.

Half an hour after Delta 1989, another mysterious airliner in distress landed at Cleveland Airport. Just like Delta 89, its existence seems to have been covered up through "merging" it with Delta 1989 - a doppelganger case again. This naturally leads to the question whether the eerie Cleveland plane was identical to Delta 89. Indeed, there are surprising congruences:

- Both planes were reportedly a 767
- Both planes were reportedly coming from Boston
- Both planes were suspected of being hijacked
- Both planes were covered up by Delta 1989

These coincidences allow the formulation of the working hypothesis that Delta 89 and the Cleveland mystery plane are identical. Confirmation pending.

Lynn Spencer spreads misinformation on Delta 1989

2009-07-04T19:06:00.008Z

Why indeed was Delta 1989 considered a hijack? I have posed this question repeatedly, but there is still no satisfying answer, to put it mildly. Here's Lynn Spencer's version ("Touching History", p. 167):

In the distraction of the emergency ((with regard to United 93)), the crew of Delta 1989 misses the hand-off to the new frequency. The new sector controller for Delta 1989 calls out to the plane several times and gets no response.

News travels fast. Soon, word on the FAA's open teleconference call is that a fifth aircraft is out of radio contact: Delta 1989, a Boeing 767 en route from Boston to Los Angeles, and the flight is added to the list of suspect aircraft.

Now an ACARS message arrives in the cockpit from Delta's Dispatch: "Land immediately in Cleveland." They've already passed Cleveland, but Captain Werener types in a quick "ok." He won't put up a fight, he just wants to get the plane on the ground.

After a couple of minutes, another message arrives in the cockpit from Delta's Dispatch: "confirm landing in Cleveland. Use correct phraseology."

Dunlap and Werner look at each other quizzically. What the hell is that about? There's such a thing as correct phraseology on the radio, but there is no such thing when typing back and forth with Dispatch on ACARS. Those messages are usually casual.

Flustered, the captain does his best to figure out what "correct phraseology" Dispatch is looking for. He carefully types a response: "Roger. Affirmative. Delta 1989 is diverting to Cleveland."

Dunlap is starting to really worry now. They think something is going to happen to this plane, he thinks to himself. They're trying to figure out if we're still in control!

Meanwhile, the captain calls up the Center controller to request an immediate diversion to Cleveland, and then starts inputting the new destination into the flight computer. Dunlap rolls the 767 into a 30-degree bank back toward the airport and pulls out his approach charts.

The Cleveland Center controllers are not happy that Delta 1989, which was out of radio contact for several minutes, has now made a turn toward the large city. They didn't initiate the diversion and they don't know that Delta Dispatch has done so. An abrupt change of course for a transcontintental B767 out of Boston raises further suspicion, and a supervisor announces the new development on the FAA teleconference.

To sum up this passage:

First, Delta 1989 misses the transfer to the next sector because of the turmoil caused by UA 93. At this time (about 9:40) this must be the hand-off from Lorain sector to Bluffton sector, the super-high sector of Cleveland Center which is adjacent to (west of) Lorain sector. As a result, Delta 1989 is not in radio contact with Bluffton sector for several minutes.

Then, the Delta 1989 pilots get a message from Delta Airlines to land in Cleveland immediately.

Then, the captain of Delta 1989 requests an immediate diversion to Cleveland, being back on the frequency.

At last, Cleveland Center, surprised by the request and unaware that Delta Airlines has ordered the captain to do so, gets suspicious of the flight.

This "Lynn Spencer version" of the diversion of Delta 1989 is completely wrong in terms of chronology and facts and easily disproven by the best imaginable source: the radio transmissions between Cleveland Center and Delta 1989.

9:38:52 (Lorain Radar) roger delta nineteen eighty nine there's traffic for you at eleven o'clock and fifteen miles southbound fourty one climbing looks like he's turning east fly heading three six zero

9:39:00 (Lorain Radar) okay thanks delta nineteen eighty nine

9:40:57 (Lorain Radar) delta nineteen eighty nine fly heading two eight five

9:41:00 (Delta 1989) two eight five delta nineteen eighty nine

9:43:56 (Delta 1989) cleveland center delta nineteen eighty nine

9:44:09 (Delta 1989) cleveland delta eighty nine

9:44:10 (Lorain Radar) delta nineteen eighty nine

9:44:12 (Delta 1989) company wants us on the ground in cleveland

9:44:12 (Lorain Radar) say again

9:44:16 (Delta 1989) the company wants us to divert to land at cleveland

9:44:19 (Lorain Radar) delta nineteen eighty niner roger fly your present heading descend and maintain flight level three three zero expect further vectoring for cleveland

9:44:24 (Delta 1989) delta nineteen eighty nine three three zero present heading

9:44:27 (Lorain Radar) delta nineteen eighty nine roger and contact cleveland one one niner point three two

9:44:31 (Delta 1989) nineteen thirty two

http://aal77.com/faa/faa_atc/zob/2%20AWA%202%20Accident%20Package%20ZOB-ARTCC-287%20UAL93%20REDACT.pdf

With this transcript at hand, it is easy to show up Ms. Spencer's grave errors:

1 - Delta 1989 does not miss the hand-off to the new frequency. It affirms the Lorain controller's request to change the frequency to 110.32, which is Bluffton sector.

2 - The message of Delta Airlines to land in Cleveland arrives before Delta 1989 shifts to the new sector, not afterwards.

3 - The controllers of Cleveland Center are well aware that it was Delta Airlines who ordered the pilots to land in Cleveland - simply because the pilot told them.

Unfortunately, the source for the misinformation in Spencer's book is not clear. It is absolutely clear, however, that Delta Airlines' diversion order was well known among controllers and not the reason they surmised it to be a hijacking. Therefore, we can also throw another account onto the dustbin of history:

The Delta flight wants to land in Cleveland? And the captain's request comes before he can know that the FAA wants every flight down. On this day, the fact that the pilot requests to be rerouted before he is ordered to land seems suspicious. Why the urgency?

Controllers don't know that Delta officials, also concerned about the flight, have ordered Werner to land in Cleveland. They continue to send messages to Werner. In code, they ask him if all is OK. Yes, he responds time and again. He doesn't know why they're so worried.

http://www.usatoday.com/news/sept11/2002-08-12-hijacker-daytwo_x.htm

Like Lynn Spencer, USA Today is flatly wrong. Controllers were well aware that Delta officials had ordered the pilot to land in Cleveland.

So the question is still pending: Why indeed was Delta 1989 considered a hijack? Why is there so much misinformation going around on this matter?

NEADS transcript on Delta 89

2009-06-02T19:32:00.022Z

This is a transcript of all NEADS radio messages related to Delta 89 between 9:39 a.m and 9:46 a.m. Channels 4 and 21 are the most important ones, Channels 7, 2 and 3 give additional information. I have put all the channels in a chronological order at the end ("Channels omni") together with the radio talk between Cleveland Center and Delta 1989).

Extern callers, like Colin Scoggins and Indianapolis Center, are shown in italic. The times should be accurate within +-5 seconds. I skipped repetitions and redundant utterances (like "oops" etc). Everyone is invited to check the audio tapes and verify the transcript here:

http://www.erpn.org/NORAD-911.htm

A transcript of the Cleveland Center/Delta 1989 talk is here:

http://aal77.com/faa/faa_atc/zob/2%20AWA%202%20Accident%20Package%20ZOB-ARTCC-287%20UAL93%20REDACT.pdf

In a forthcoming blog entry, I will deliver an interpretation of these radio talks, put them into context and show up their historical relevance.

Channel 4

9:41:00 Delta 89 is a hijack, they think it's a hijack, south of Cleveland, we have a code on him now

9:41:05 Good! Pick it up! Find it!

9:41:13 Eight-nine. Boeing 767 Boston-Las Vegas. Another one - same place - Las Vegas

9:41:23 Okay what's the special number? What do you've got in on?

9:41:30 Bravo zero-eight-nine is our Delta eight-nine

9:41:42 That's another hijack. Delta eight-nine. Bravo zero-eight-nine is the track. Make that a special fifteen and (unintelligible)

9:42:18 Do you have a possible destination of that Delta eight-nine? It's headed to Las Vegas. Okay.

9:42:43 Indy Center? Indianapolis Center: Delta eight-nine have you information on that aircraft? I want to give you a heads-up. This is another hijacked aircraft, Boston to Las Vegas with a Mode 3 of 1304. We do have contact. ((repeats informations))

9:43:04 I give you a latlong if you need that. Go ahead. 4121 North 08215 West. I'll give you a heads-up that's all we have right now, but he's a confirmed hijack

9:43:16 (Indianapolis Center) We don't show him in our system at this point - you are tracking him, you say? We have him on the radar, Sir - he's headed your way. He's headed our way, okay.

9:43:35 Boston to L-A-S, right? L-A-X. L-A-X? I've got Vegas, Sir, whatever Vegas says. L-A-S, okay, Las Vegas. Okay, cause we don't show him in the system anywhere. Do you have Mode 3 capability or anything? He's on a 1304 code? Okay, we bring that up.

9:44:02 Where did it go? Somebody dropped the aircraft. Who dropped the aircraft? I DON'T KNOW!

Channel 21

9:41:05 Another one. I hear someone going from Boston going to Las Vegas - another one

9:41:30 As before is one missing. Start a search. Range 53

9:41:35 288 for 92 miles search only

9:41:46 I have a 280 for 97

9:41:58 I have a 287 for 97

9:42:23 The two real close together. One used - one has a code of 7112 - the one we are next to 'em

9:43:55 (Background) What the hell is that?

9:46:03 just watch a track (unintelligible).

9:46:13 What's the special at Cleveland? That's what we're all tracking - special fifteen

9:46:25 (?)52 on a 49 for 59 miles searching. We got a 1304 squawk this time

9:46:53 The 1304 guy. That's not the guy then

Channel 7

9:39:31 Colin Scoggins, Boston Center military. Hijacked aircraft Delta nineteen eightynine. I give you the code 1304, presently due south of Cleveland, heading westbound, destination Las Vegas. And is this one a hijack, Sir? We believe it is. Didn't it squawk hijack? We don't umm...I don't know - it's squawking 1304 if you want to crank him up. 767, altitude 350. Where did it take off? Out of Boston. We're trying to get a tail number on that if you want to get someone up

9:42:52 Scoggins, military. We believe that aircraft is a hijack. The Delta Airlines 1989? Yes. We have a tail number for you: N189DL.

9:45:20 Delta 1989 - He has acknowledged he would land in Cleveland, so he might not be a hijack

Channel 2

9:43:45 did you get the word I got a Delta eight-niner south - excuse me - south-south-east of Toledo

Channel 3

9:41:55 southeast of Toledo approximately 75 miles - Bravo zero-eight-nine

Channels omni

(NEADS Channels 2, 3, 4, 7, 21 + Cleveland Center/Delta 1989 radio talk)

..........9:37:54 (Lorain Radar) delta nineteen eighty nine cleveland

..........9:37:56 (Delta 1989) go ahead sir

..........9:37:57 (Lorain Radar) delta nineteen eighty nine turn right now to a heading of three one five

..........9:38:01 (Delta 1989) three one five delta nineteen eighty nine

..........9:38:52 (Lorain Radar) roger delta nineteen eighty nine there's traffic for you at eleven o'clock and fifteen miles southbound fourty one climbing looks like he's turning east fly heading three six zero

..........9:39:00 (Lorain Radar) okay thanks delta nineteen eighty nine

9:39:31 Colin Scoggins, Boston Center military. Hijacked aircraft Delta nineteen eightynine. I give you the code 1304, presently due south of Cleveland, heading westbound, destination Las Vegas. And is this one a hijack, Sir? We believe it is. Didn't it squawk hijack? We don't umm...I don't know - it's squawking 1304 if you want to crank him up. 767, altitude 350. Where did it take off? Out of Boston. We're trying to get a tail number on that if you want to get someone up

..........9:40:57 (Lorain Radar) delta nineteen eighty nine fly heading two eight five

..........9:41:00 (Delta 1989) two eight five delta nineteen eighty nine

9:41:00 Delta 89 is a hijack, they think it's a hijack, south of Cleveland, we have a code on him now

9:41:05 Good! Pick it up! Find it!

9:41:05 Another one. I hear someone going from Boston going to Las Vegas - another one

9:41:13 Eight-nine. Boeing 767 Boston-Las Vegas. Another one - same place - Las Vegas

9:41:23 Okay what's the special number? What do you've got in on?

9:41:30 Bravo zero-eight-nine is our Delta eight-nine

9:41:30 As before is one missing. Start a search. Range 53

9:41:35 288 for 92 miles search only

9:41:42 That's another hijack. Delta eight-nine. Bravo zero-eight-nine is the track. Make that a special fifteen and (unintelligible)

9:41:46 I have a 280 for 97

9:41:55 southeast of Toledo approximately 75 miles - Bravo zero-eight-nine

9:41:58 I have a 287 for 97

9:42:23 The two real close together. One used - one has a code of 7112 - the one we are next to 'em

9:42:43 Indy Center? Indianapolis Center: Delta eight-nine have you information on that aircraft? I want to give you a heads-up. This is another hijacked aircraft, Boston to Las Vegas with a Mode 3 of 1304. We do have contact. ((repeats informations))

9:42:52 Scoggins, military. We believe that aircraft is a hijack. The Delta Airlines 1989? Yes. We have a tail number for you: N189DL.

9:43:04 I give you a latlong if you need that. Go ahead. 4121 North 08215 West. I'll give you a heads-up that's all we have right now, but he's a confirmed hijack

9:43:16 (Indianapolis Center) We don't show him in our system at this point - you are tracking him, you say? We have him on the radar, Sir - he's headed your way. He's headed our way, okay.

9:43:35 (Indianapolis Center) Boston to L-A-S, right? L-A-X. L-A-X? I've got Vegas, Sir, whatever Vegas says. L-A-S, okay, Las Vegas. Okay, cause when I sow him in the system anywhere. Do you have Mode 3 capability or anything? He's on a 1304 code? Okay, we bring that up.

9:43:45 did you get the word I got a Delta eight-niner south - excuse me - south-south-east of Toledo

9:43:55 (Background) What the hell is that?

..........9:43:56 (Delta 1989) cleveland center delta nineteen eighty nine

9:44:03 Where did it go? Somebody dropped the aircraft. Who dropped the aircraft? I DON'T KNOW!

..........9:44:09 (Delta 1989) cleveland delta nineteen eighty nine

..........9:44:10 (Lorain Radar) delta nineteen eighty nine

..........9:44:12 (Delta 1989) company wants us on the ground in cleveland

..........9:44:12 (Lorain Radar) say again

..........9:44:16 (Delta 1989) the company wants us to divert to land at cleveland

..........9:44:19 (Lorain Radar) delta nineteen eighty niner roger fly your present heading descend and maintain flight level three three zero expect further vectoring for cleveland

..........9:44:24 (Delta 1989) delta nineteen eighty nine three three zero present heading

..........9:44:27 (Lorain Radar) delta nineteen eighty nine roger and contact cleveland one one niner point three two

..........9:44:31 (Delta 1989) nineteen thirty two

9:45:20 (Scoggins) Delta 1989 - He has acknowledged he would land in Cleveland, so he might not be a hijack

9:46:03 just watch a track (unintelligible).

9:46:13 What's the special at Cleveland? That's what we're all tracking - special fifteen

9:46:25 (?)52 on a 49 for 59 miles searching. We got a 1304 squawk this time

9:46:53 The 1304 guy. That's not the guy then

The Cessna witness, the WTC North Tower, and the missing page 2

2009-03-31T19:20:00.007Z

On Nov. 6, 2001, FBI special agent Joan-Marie Turchiano sent a fax to FAA investigator Douglas Gould. The fax consisted of three pages (the page number is in the upper right corner).

Page 1 is the cover sheet with general information.

Page 2 is missing, for whatever reason.

On Page 3, we jump right into an eyewitness statement:

that if the Cessna's transponder was turned off then he would believe that this Cessna was involved in the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center.

#########s advised that he was informed by other tenants in the apartment building that they also observed this Cessna. ########### advised that he will contact ############## with witness contact information.

http://www.911workinggroup.org/foia/911%20COMMISSION%20REPORT%20DATA%20(redact)/5%20AWA%20755%20Package%20Docs%20on%20AAT-200%20LAN%2091101%20Subfolder%20REDACT.pdf

(scroll down to page 12/13)

Page 2 would certainly reveal more interesting information about the circumstances when and where this eyewitness spotted the Cessna. But unbelievably, Page 2 is missing.

Where is Page 2?

United 1898 - the Cleveland Airport mystery plane identified!?

2009-03-24T19:17:00.014Z

Another interesting find from the http://www.911workinggroup.org files.

"AAT-200" is a special investigation agency inside the FAA and deals with aircraft accidents, emergency cases, near mid-air collisions, and other irregular incidents. As soon as an accident occurs, the involved controllers are obligated to submit a report to AAT-200:

http://www.faa.gov/airports_airtraffic/air_traffic/publications/atpubs/atq/APNDX%2010.htm#_ftn1

The information flow is: local FAA facility -> Regional Operations Center (ROC) -> Washington Operations Center (WOC) -> AAT-200. Example: if an accident occurs in the skies over Ohio, Cleveland Center controllers (responsible for Ohio) send their reports to the Great Lakes Regional Operations Center where it is passed on to the WOC and finally the AAT-200.

On 9/11/2001 at 7:30 p.m. AAT-200 updated a request list from the facilities involved in the attacks:

AEA - Voice and CDR data in RAPTOR format from:

New York TRACON Time 0930-1015ET........................ Received
Washington National - Pentagon................................... Received
Dulles - Both Pentagon and Camp David incidents..........received
Pittsburgh - Camp David incident....................................Received
Washington Center radar for AAL77................................Received
Washington Center voice..................................................Received
New York Center radar....................................................Received
New York Center voice replay.........................................Received
Voice tape Millville AFSS..................................................Waiting

AGL - Voice and CRD in RAPTOR format:

Cleveland for UAL1898................................................Waiting
Cleveland Center radar for AAL77..................................Received
Cleveland Center voice replay for AAL11......................Received
Indianapolis Center radar................................................Received
Indianapolis voice tape via telephone.............................Received
Cleveland Center radar for DAL1989.............................Waiting
Cleveland Center voice for DAL1989..............................Waiting

ANE - Boston Center radar and voice replay................Received

http://woodybox.info/5 AWA 755 Package Docs on AAT-200 LAN 91101 Subfolder REDACT.pdf

The list addresses FAA en-route centers (identifiable by the affix "Center") and airports. In the latter cases, the affix "airport" is obviously seen as redundant and omitted (Washington National = Washington National Airport).

I have highlighted the most interesting entry. "Cleveland" stands for Cleveland Hopkins Airport (as distinct from Cleveland Center). This means that controllers at Hopkins had reported an incident (emergency landing or the like) involving United 1898. They reported it to AAT-200 via the Great Lakes Regional Operations Center (AGL). And AAT-200 was still waiting for voice and CRD data.

However, the BTS database ( http://www.bts.gov ) reveals that United Airlines operated no aircraft with flight number 1898 on 9/11. In plane language: There was no United 1898. So what airliner was being reported by the controllers of Cleveland Hopkins?

In the light of Cleveland mayor Michael White's famous news conference and ample additional evidence that an airliner with unknown identity made an emergency landing at Hopkins "United 1898" looks like an excellent candidate for this mystery plane:

http://911woodybox.blogspot.com/2007/02/cleveland-airport-mystery.html

http://911review.org/inn.globalfreepress/Cleveland_Airport_Mystery.html

Interestingly, Delta 1989, the plane that also landed at Hopkins and apparently functioned as a cover-up for the mysterious emergency landing, was not reported by Cleveland Airport, but Cleveland Center. This means that Delta 1989 was not seen as an emergency case by airport controllers and therefore not reported to AAT-200. The reason why it was reported by en-route controllers remains to be investigated.

More interestingly, the flight numbers of the two airliners - 1989 and 1898 - are very similar and easy to confound, a curiosity amplifying the impression that Delta 1989 was used as camouflage to send the other plane into oblivion.

Most interestingly, the airline of the mysterious plane seems to be United. The controllers were maybe not able to check if the flight number 1898 was operational , but they were certainly able to recognize the United markings.

The most authentic report on the incident was delivered by the Akron Beacon Journal http://911review.org/brad.com/Woodybox/JET-93_land-Ohio.html ):

Cleveland Mayor Michael White said at a news conference this morning that a Boeing 767 out of Boston made an emergency landing at Cleveland Hopkins International Airport because of fears a bomb was aboard.

Combining this newspaper report with the AAT-200 paper results in the conclusion that a United Boeing 767 from Boston landed in emergency at Cleveland Hopkins.

The number of the United Boeing 767's departing from Boston is so small that it should narrow down the search for the identity of the mysterious plane considerably.

The Flight 77 loop - circular, triangular, multiangular or what?

2009-03-22T18:18:00.005Z

The above picture illustrates the final loop of Flight 77 according to the National Transportation & Safety Board (NTSB), which allegedly relies on military (RADES) radar data.

The statements of nine controllers from Dulles Airport (TRACON), published on my last blog entry

http://911woodybox.blogspot.com/2009/03/dulles-airport-controllers-on-loop-of.html

are still pending interpretation, which I'm going to deliver here. Needless to say, if the official Flight 77 loop is correct, it should match the controllers' accounts.

Here are the key results of my analysis:

1 - None of the controllers mentions the striking circular shape of the NTSB loop. You would expect the word "circle" or "circular" somewhere, but nil return. Quite the contrary, according to some controllers, the radar target was moving along a polygonal path, with corners and straight segments between the corners.

Robert Utley describes a triangular path with two sharp corners: "I observed a primary target approximately 7 miles east of AML, heading eastbound, when the target was about 1 mile west of DCA it made a right turn heading southwestbound. When it was about 3 miles north of DAA it made a sharp turn northbound, when it was about 10 miles east of AML it made a sharp turn eastbound, the target then dropped out of radar about 3 miles west of DCA. Equipment configuration was unknown to me."

James E. Walsh's path is a slight variation to Utley's, adding a corner and thus generating a quadrangle: The target proceeded to a point 1 mile west of Chrystal City and turned southwest to a point 5 miles northeast of DAA. It then made a right turn, 2 miles north of DAA, and proceeded northbound. 3 miles later the target turned northeastbound and shortly thereafter radar contact was lost.

William T. Howell also mentions a sharp turn: "The target went a few miles south of DCA and then made a sharp turn northbound, back in the direction of DCA."

Robert Devery mentions several turns, too, and stresses that, after turning south, "for a few miles, it continued south.", implying that the target moved straight south for a while.

2 - The position data of some accounts are absolutely incompatible with the NTSB loop:

Todd Lewis locates the target east of the Potomac: "The target went just south of the White House then turned southeast and disappeared."

Robert J. Brickley: "The aircraft proceeded to a point approximately 8 miles southwest of P-56, made a right 360 degree turn". The starting point of the NTSB loop is located 4 miles (not 8) southwest of P-56.

Robert Utley claims that the target was "10 miles east of AML (Dulles Airport)" after the loop and turned sharply eastbound before dropping from radar 3 miles west of DCA; so according to him, the target approached the Pentagon from due west, not southwest, as the NTSB data imply.

3 - The statements were made on 9/12/01, one day after the attacks, as part of a routine FAA procedure to document and investigate accidents. Bad memory can therefore neither explain the huge factual discrepancies between the controllers and the NTSB nor the discrepancies between controller and controller. The Flight 77 (?) target popped up on the radar screens for at least 5 minutes, enough time to concentrate on the path and keep it in memory for a few hours. We can be sure that controllers were not conducted by carelessness when filling out the FAA form.

4 - The assumption that the NTSB loop is correct leads inevitably to the question why the controller's accounts are not compatible with it, and what have been the motives of the controllers to alter it. I can't see any reasonable motive in this scenario.

However, the correctness of the NTSB loop is being shattered by eyewitnesses who have seen the plane east of the Potomac ( http://www.thepentacon.com/ ) as well as real-time radio messages open to the public. NEADS commander Kevin Nasypany and his crew have located the target at "six miles east of the White House", a point that is far away from the official loop.

The conflicting accounts of the controllers suggest that they were told - possibly for "national security reasons" - to keep their mouth about the real loop and move it to an area exclusively west of the Potomac. The exact position and shape was obviously not specified, thus generating a logical mess.

In the light of this scenario, the NTSB flight path was probably created by someone who tried to "average" the controller's versions. This must have happened weeks, months, or years after the attacks.

Dulles Airport controllers on the "loop" of Flight 77

2009-03-17T19:39:00.006Z

Here's another collection of air traffic controller statements, written on 9/11 or the day after and therefore of superb authenticity. Many thanks again to http://911workinggroup.org/ for their efforts to obtain and publish the documents. The URL of these hand-written notes is a pdf file - scroll down to page 145:

http://www.911workinggroup.org/foia/911%20COMMISSION%20REPORT%20DATA%20(redact)/5%20AWA%20928%20Documents%20and%20Data%20Douglas%20Gould%20hard%20drive%20REDACT.pdf

I have not evaluated the position data in detail yet, but the bottom line is: none of the observations match the official Flight 77 loop, some of them are absolutely incompatible with it. The reports of Todd Lewis and Rosanne McConnell, for instance, imply that the plane was east of the Potomac at one point.

Abbreviations:

AML - AML VORTAC navigoid, at Dulles Airport
DAA - Davison Army Airfield, approx. 12 miles southwest of the Pentagon
DCA - Reagan National Airport
P-56 - Restricted airspace over the White House
1330z - Zulu time, corresponds to 9:30 EDT (subtract four hours)

Todd Lewis (TL), South Departure position, 9/11/01

I was working South Departure radar postion when someone mentioned a primary target south of AML heading east at a high rate of speed. This or another controller said we need to call National Approach and warn them. This was done immediately over the handoff line. The target went just south of the White House then turned southeast and disappeared.

William T. Howell, West/South arrival, 9/12/01

I was working the West Arrival and South Arrival positions combined. Danielle O'Brien was working the final position next to me. She leaned in my direction and asked if I have a primary target on my scope just south of Dulles. I scanned the scope and observed the same target. I told her I see it, ad it appears headed eastbound. At that point I yelled for the supervisor and told him we had a target headed eastbound towards the White House. I continued to watch the target move eastbound and then turn southbound. The target went a few miles south of DCA and then made a sharp turn northbound, back in the direction of DCA. I was continuing to give position reports to the supervisor. Shortly after he turned northbound. I no longer observed the target on radar.

James E. Walsh (FM), 9/12/01

The following is a preliminary statement from FM regarding the observation of a primary target just prior to the attack on the Pentagon being reported. It was dictated to TW over the telephone at approximately 9 am on 9/12/01. It should be noted that due to this being dictated and copied inaccuracies may be present.

FM was alerted to a fast moving primary target by QZ ((Danielle O'Brien)), who was working the target 2 miles east of AML. The target proceeded to a point 1 mile west of Chrystal City and turned southwest to a point 5 miles northeast of DAA. It then made a right turn, 2 miles north of DAA, and proceeded northbound. 3 miles later the target turned northeastbound and shortly thereafter radar contact was lost.

The elapsed time of the observation was 1,5 to 2 minutes. During this time FM kept JH and Bob Birckly updated on the position of the aircraft.

Danielle O'Brien (QZ), Final West/East, 9/12/01

I was working the Final West/East position. I observed a primary target approximately ten miles northwest of the Manassas Airport, proceeding southeastbound at a high rate of speed. I adjusted the filter limits on the scope so as to display limited data blocks for altitudes higher than standard to the final control position. No transponder information was displayed for the target.

I moved to the West Arrival position located immediately to my left. I asked the West Arrival controller if he observed a primary target south of Dulles now moving eastbound at a high rate of speed. He agreed with my observation. I was suspicious because I had viewed the media video of the incidents in New York City, and I was aware an aircraft was unaccounted for with Washington ARTCC.

I tried to gain the attention of the TRACON Operations Supervisor (OS) by yelling for him. I again adjusted my filter limits. I tried to contact Washington National's radar controllers via the 62 line. I advised the Dulles TRACON OS of the target's heading and rate of speed. I again adjusted the filter limits. I provided updates to the OS as I observed the target tracking toward the White House. I heard the OS relaying the information vial landline (ICSS) and then via the dedicated phone to the White House switchboard.

I heard Washington National state over the ladline to hold their traffic because the Pentagon had been hit. I do not recall the equipment configuration at the time of the incident.

Rosanne McConnell (RO), North Arrival, 9/12/01

While working radar on the North Arrival position I was alerted by the final controller that there was a primary target in Dulles airspace heading for the White House. I looked for the target and saw it west of the White House. It was primary only and it appeared to be traveling at a very high rate of speed. It then started a right turn and came back towards DCA and the White House. Myself and other controllers gave the supervisor up-to-the-second information as the position of the target. When the target was just west of DCA the target disappeared. Seconds later an unknown DCA c0ntroller told us that the Pentagon was hit.

Robert J. Brickley Jr. (BY), 9/12/01

I observed a primary target approximately 8 miles east of Manassas Airport moving eastbound at a high rate of speed. I advised the OS (other controllers were doing the same). The aircraft proceeded to a point approximately 8 miles southwest of P-56, made a right 360 degree turn, proceeded northeastbound and dropped from radar approximately 6 miles south-southwest of P-56.

Equipment configuration was unknown.

John Hendershot (JH), RS position, 9/12/01

Both World Trade Centers had been crashed into. There was a report that one aircraft had been hijacked and another was missing. Several controllers reported simultaneously to me that they saw a primary target moving at a high speed in DCA airspace heading for the White House. I immediately picked up the hotline to the White House and advised them that Dulles Approach observed a target closing on the White House at a high speed. The White House operator acknowleged. I then immediately advised DCA Approach of the same. I then described the movements of the aircraft on the Critical Event Eastern Region Hot Line as they were described to me by the controllers observing the primary return. I continued this for a short period of time until we lost radar contact with the aircraft. The equipment configuration is unknown.

Robert Devery (DR), North Departure, 9/12/01

I was working the North Dept position when the incident occurred. We had been advised that all departure would be stopped. I was told that I had 2 more coming to me. Both aircraft did depart, were radar identified and handed off to North High as per (SoP?). Shortly after handing off the 2nd aircraft, I heard final controller mention a primary target. The time is not fixed in my mind but it was at 1330z-1335z. The target was eastbound at a high rate of speed based on the tracking of it. I believe that I saw the target initially just to the SE of Dulles. To me it appeared as though it were heading 090 degree +- 10 degree ((east to east-north-east)). It appeared that it was heading towards P-56 where the White House is.

I called to anyone at DCA on the 62 line to advise of a primary target moving fast forward towards P-56. After the 2nd call, someone acknowledged "I see him". At that time or shortly after, someone on the 62 line confirmed "notifying P-56". Then, the aircraft (target) turned south to parallel the North final to DCA as though it was entering a west downwind for Rw((Runway)) 1 at DCA. For a few miles, it continued south. Then, it made a right turn for a moment, it appeared as though it were turning towards a DCA departure being handed off to our High Sector. At that moment, I thought it may try to hit the dept. or perhaps it may be a U.S. fighter checking the area (since the observed target movement was still very fast). However, the target continued the right turn back to a NE heading - again, aimed, in my opinion, at P-56. I think I called again on the 62 line to try to warn DC(A?). Everything was a blur at that moment. Thought someone reaffirmed contacting the White House. Target disappeared approx. 3-4 miles from P-56. Shortly after, DCA called on 62 line to advise that the target had hit the Pentagon.

Robert Utley (UY), AD/DD position, 9/12/01

I observed a primary target approximately 7 miles east of AML, heading eastbound, when the target was about 1 mile west of DCA it made a right turn heading southwestbound. When it was about 3 miles north of DAA it made a sharp turn northbound, when it was about 10 miles east of AML it made a sharp turn eastbound, the target then dropped out of radar about 3 miles west of DCA. Equipment configuration was unknown to me.

Monte Belger vs. Norman Mineta

2009-02-06T18:14:00.002Z

Who's right? Norman Mineta has repeatedly claimed that he was in contact with Monte Belger (FAA deputy) since the point when Flight 77 was 50 miles out of Washington, and that Belger was tracking the plane on radar:

And a little later on, someone said, "Mr. Vice President, there's a plane 50-miles out." So I was talking to Monte Belger, the Deputy Director of the FAA, and I said, "Monte, what do you have 50-miles out?"

He said, "Well, we have a target, bogey, on the radar, but the transponder's been turned off, so we have no identification of this aircraft. We don't know who it is. We don't know what altitude it's at, speed or anything else. All we're doing is watching with the sweep of the radar, the dot moving from position to position."

So then someone came in, the same person came in and said, "Mr. Vice President, it -- the plane's 30-miles out." So I said, "Monte, can you see it, and where is it in relationship to the ground?"

He said, "Well, that's difficult to really determine. I would guess it's somewhere between Great Falls and National Airport, coming what they call the DRA, the down river approach."

And so then the person came in and said, "Mr. Vice President, the plane's ten-miles out," and so I said, "Monte, where is it?" and he said, "Well, I'm not really sure but I'd be guessing somewhere maybe between the USA Today building and, and National Airport."

And then pretty soon he said, "Oh-oh, we just lost the target." And so a few moments later, someone came in and said, "Mr. Vice President, there's been an explosion at the Pentagon."

So I said, "Monte, is there something -- can you identify it as being at the Pentagon?" He said, "No, we can't really pinpoint it like that."

http://www.msnbc.com/modules/91102/interviews/mineta.asp?0cb=-31a105678&cp1=1
(this link - a MSNBC interview from 9/11/02 - doesn't work at present; the full text can be read here:
http://911woodybox.blogspot.com/2007/10/statements-of-norman-mineta-chronology.html)

Some young man came in and said to the Vice President, "There's a plane 50 miles out coming towards D.C." So I said to Monty Belger, who is the No. 2 at FAA, I said, "Monty, what do you have on radar on this plane coming in?" He said, "Well, the transponder has been turned off, so we don't know who it is, and we don't know the altitude or speed." I said, "Well, where is it?" He said, "It's somewhere beyond Great Falls right now." Then, the young man came in and said it's 20 miles away. I'd say, "Well, Monty, where is this plane in relationship to the ground?" On radar it is hard to associate with a ground point, but they'd be able to tell you roughly the distance from wherever you are, but he couldn't tell you the speed or altitude, and then all of a sudden, as I was talking to him, he said, "Oh, I lost the bogie. Lost the target." I said, "Well, where is it?" He said, "Well, it's somewhere between Rosslyn and National Airport," and about that time someone broke into the conversation and said, "Mr. Secretary, we just had a confirmation from an Arlington County police officer saying that he saw an American Airlines plane go into the Pentagon." So then I said, "Monty, bring all the airplanes down." When you see one of something happen, it's an accident; when you see two of the same thing happening, it's a trend, something. When you see three, it's a plan. So I said, "Bring all the planes down."

http://www.achievement.org/autodoc/page/min0int-8

It is interesting to confront these accounts with two statements of Monte Belger (note that both Mineta and Belger refer to the same time interval 9:20-9:45).

"The most frustrating after-the-fact scenario for me to understand and to explain is the communication link on that morning between the FAA operations center and the NMCC," said Monte Belger, who was the acting FAA deputy administrator when the attacks occurred. "I know how it's supposed to work, but I have to tell you it's still a little frustrating for me to understand how it actually did work on that day."

FAA and Defense officials testified during the final public hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States on Thursday. Belger said the FAA initiated a "hijacking net" at 9:20 a.m. that he thought included the NMCC.

"The hijacking net is an open communication net run by the FAA hijack coordinator, who is a senior person from the FAA security organization, for the purpose of getting the affected federal agencies together to hear information at the same time," he said. "It was my assumption that morning, as it had been for my 30 years of experience with the FAA, that the NMCC was on that net and hearing everything real time," he added. "And I can tell you I've lived through dozens of hijackings in my 30-year FAA career, as a very low entry-level inspector up through to the headquarters, and they were always there."

Belger added that after initiating the hijacking net, he turned his attention to getting airplanes that were still in the air to land safely.

http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0604/062104c1.htm

Between 9:20-9:45 there were many confusing reports about various aircraft being unaccounted for. He ((Belger) heard of a crash on the Indiana/Kentucky border that was thought to be AAL 77. By this point he believes he talked with Bob Baker and Russ Chew at AAL. Jane Garvey talked to Don Carty.

Belger doesn't recall any discussion that morning about the need to contact aircraft in the air about securing their cockpits, even though they were considering an order to land all planes.

With regard to the Primary Net, Belger said he believes that Lee Longmire was in charge. He had the impression that the military was on the line at some point and had assumed that the proper contacts had been made. He had no knowledge about the problem that Lee Longmire shared with the Commission that the NMCC was supposed to be on the Net but was in fact absent for some undetermined length of time. Belger wasn't aware of the NORAD response until after AAL 77 crashed (he subsequently learried that Boston and New York Centers had called NORAD earlier)

Belger was told about UAL 93 after it crashed. He stressed that everyone was very confused about which aircraft hit the Pentagon. UAL and AAL weren't sure what planes hit where. He said that the carriers were searching for information from the FAA not providing it. It took a long time to confirm what aircraft hit the Pentagon.

Belger believes that the "hijack coordinator" would have been the senior security person present who was Lee Longmire. (SEE FAA PROTOCOL ON "Hijack Coordinator).

Belger learned of the crash into the Pentagon shortly after it happened. He and Garvey got on the phone with Norm Mineta who decided to bring everything down (around 9:45) which was implemented. Belger continued to monitor the system as it executed this order. All aircraft were down and the system grounded by 12:15 P.M.

http://media.nara.gov/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00054.pdf

Belger mentions neither the approaching Flight 77 nor being in contact with Mineta prior to the Pentagon crash. In the interview to the Commissioners he indicates that first contact with Mineta was established after the crash. In case he was in contact with him before, this blatant omission would constitute a lie.

So who's right? Mineta or Belger?

Two "Flight 175" taking off from Boston Logan: CONFIRMED

2008-12-30T19:47:00.008Z

My personal 9/11 researcher "career" started with the detection of a duplicated "Flight 11" at Boston Logan Airport: one departing from Terminal B, Gate 32, at 7:45, the other one from Terminal B, Gate 26, somewhat later because the departure was delayed:

http://911wideopen.com/mirror/twin11-1/twin-11-mod.htm

As opposed to that, the gate departure of United Airlines 175 is indisputable: 7:58 a.m., which is also confirmed by the database of the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS):

http://www.bts.gov/xml/ontimesummarystatistics/src/dstat/OntimeSummaryDepatures.xml

However, the BTS database reveals a strange discrepancy regarding the "wheels-off time" of Flight 175 - i.e. the moment when the plane lifted off from the runway. The BTS notes a wheels-off time of 8:23, which differs distinctly from the "official" wheels-off time, which is 8:14.

This 8:14 take-off is confirmed by the ATC/pilot radio transcript and various radar data. So what about the 8:23? How was this datum being generated?

The wheels-off time of is triggered automatically by a mechanical switcher when the plane loses contact to the ground. The data are sent automatically to the airline via ACARS, and the airline forwards them to the BTS on a regular base. So apparently no human failure is possible. The fact that the gate departure 7:58 coincides with the official story suggests that the data are valid.

Being familiar with the duplication of Flight 11 at Logan Airport as well as the duplication of Delta 1989 at Cleveland Hopkins Airport, I arrived at the inevitable conclusion that this was another case of a duplicated plane - i.e. a "Flight 175" taking off at 8:14 and another "Flight 175" taking off at 8:23. However, there was no independent confirmation, so I hinted at the discrepancy on occasion, but always added a question mark -here, for instance:

http://pilotsfor911truth.org/forum//index.php?showtopic=29

I am now able to proudly present an eyewitness for the 8:23 wheels-offtime of Flight 175: Steven Miller, US Airways pilot, who was next in line behind Flight 175 to take off from the runway:

On the taxi-out in Boston, they ((the pilots of US Airways 6805)) waited at the runway's hold-short line, where Miller looked up to watch a United Boeing 767 take off, United Flight 175. The final weight and balance calculations from dispatch came over the ACARS at 8:05, and with that in hand, the crew was ready to fly. Wide-body aircraft produce especially powerful wingtip vortices - horizontal, tornado-like winds off the ends of the wings - which require time to dissipate before other aircraft can take off, so he waited the required three minutes after United 175 departed before he received his takeoff clearance.

(Lynn Spencer, "Touching History", p. 58)

A quick check with the BTS database reveals that USA 6805 had a wheels-off time of 8:28. Miller explicitly describes that he waited 3 minutes before getting takeoff clearance; adding a little bit for the timespan between takeoff clearance and actual wheels-off, Flight 175 must have lifted off the runway around 8:23-8:24. It is out of the question that Miller observed a plane that took off at 8:14.

Did Miller maybe see a different United plane? Very unlikely. Searching the BTS database for other United Boeing 767's delivers no results for the relevant time. There is a very slim possibility that a non-domestic United Boeing 767 took of just then, because the BTS database lists only domestic flights. However, Miller himself says it was Flight 175; so either he overheard the flight number when taxiing out, or, as someone who was frequently flying from Logan (as he says) he was familiar with the wide-body planes departing at that time.

The BTS database also reveals that the tail number of the plane that took off at 8:23 was N612UA. This was United Airlines Flight 175. And there is no proof that the plane that took off at 8:14 was indeed N612UA, leading to the conclusion that the pilot only pretended to fly United Airlines Flight 175.

Cleveland Center supervisor memos on Flight 93

2008-12-29T17:37:00.005Z

Transcript of handwritten statements concerning Flight 93 by Cleveland Center supervisors. Many thanks to http://911workinggroup.org for their efforts and the citizen (unknown to me) who initiated the FOIA to obtain these important documents.

Richard Barnett (YN) Area Supervisor 9:00-11:00

The Franklin Controller advised me that UAL93 was unexpectedly changing altitude near EWC PA. I observed altitude deviation of approx. 500 feet high. Aircraft was on LOR freq. I was observing DAL1989 so this was a surprise however due to flight profile (long distance coast to coast) I became alarmed. I went to Area 4 to ascertain status and observed the turn, decent and transponder problem. I was advised by Area 4 sup(ervisor) that UAL93 was turning around and coming back. I returned to area to advise controllers. I became involved in other area activities (helping land aircraft, evacuating personnel, answering calls and combining sectors) when the Westmoreland and Indianhead controllers adivsed that UL93 was possibly entering our airspace over PIT. I observed the data block with only 350N, so I did not know altitude. As the aircraft approached near the Nesto intersection, the Westmoreland Controllers (D&R) both advised a visual confirmation of UAL93's altitude by another (VFR) aircraft. We verified and determined that UAL93 was at 7000'. I was very surprised at the low altitude. The aircraft that observed UAL93 stated that aircraft was rucking wings. UAL93 appeared as if it were heading to JST. We knew aircraft was hijacked so I ordered the controller (D-side) to call JST tower and evacuate and to give reason. Approximately 3 or 4 minutes later aircraft went into coast track and we started receiving reports from other airborne aircraft of smoke and an apparent crash. I asked the controllers to give me the track back coordinates and lat./long. of site which I passed on to the operations manager.

I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident.

Gary M. Klingler (GK) Command Post 10:00-22:30

Upon hearing of the Worls Trade Center accident, I left a meeting at NASA and returned to Cleveland Center (ZOB). I arrived at the watch desk area at approximately 1400Z. I observed that the Traffic Management Unit had been turned into a command post. The ATM and three operations managers were staffing the command post. I was briefed upon arrival by Rich Reid, operations manager, of the situation. The briefing focused on UAL93, DAL1989, reports of an aircraft circling over ZOB and the subsequent release of non-essential personnel. Numerous individuals were following up with the situation concerning UAL93 and DAL1989. I started to investigate the possibility of an unidentified aircraft circling over ZOB. Actual scanning the skies over the Center, discussion with law enforcement personnel on scene and discussions with Cleveland Approach Control about what they were observing on terminal radar led to the following determination: either the aircraft had left the Center area or personnel on the ground had observed DAL1989 turning back toward Cleveland Hopkins Airport. Upon return to the command post I learned of UAL93's accident. DAL1989 was being worked by CLE Approach. We received another report of a large aircraft over ZOB. My investigation revealed it was a military refueler which had been positioned to support the military fighter aircraft. I remained at the facility through the evening providing support at the command post. 9/19/01

Leo E. Wolbers (LV) Operations manager 2:00-10:00

About 0820 I heard that we were trying to find AAL77 that had lost its transponder in Boston Center airspace. I then went to the 0830 stand-up, after the stand-up I was told that a plane had hit the World Trade Center. We were told by Central Flow that they thought the aircraft was AAL77. We were then told that a second aircraft believed to be UAL175 had hit the other tower. We were told both aircraft were thought to have departed BOS for LAX. We did a quick check and found we were working DAL1989 who had departed BOS for LAX. We advised Delta operations of what information we had at that time. The next thing we were told was that DAL1989 was a confirmed hijack and was diverting to CLE. While we were trying to assist DAL1989 we were informed that UAL93 was being hijacked and was on the LOR sector frequency. I went to Area 4 at that time to assist with UAL93. Since UAL93 was overhead our facility we made the decision to evacuate all non-essential personal and get as many controllers out as possible. We were then told to pur every aircraft we were working on the ground. I went to each area and advised them to land all aircraft ASAP. We were then advised an aircraft had hit the Pentagon. The next event was UAL93 was confirmed to have crashed at Somerset PA. After we got all of our aircraft on the ground we went to one person in each area until the building was searched and found to be secure.

To the best of my knowledge this is the order that events occured. The only time that I am sure of is the 0830 stand-up. 9/19/01

Craig Pass (CP) STMC 5:50-17:50

Operations Manager came into the unit from the Area 4 specializtaion advising of a possible problem with UAL93 in the Lorain (R49) sector. We brought up the frequency (133.37) for monitoring at Pos 96 in the Traffic Management Unit. Transmissions were made without call sign identification. Other aircraft on frequency overheard the unidentified transmissions and inquired if the controller was aware of situation. As UAL93 neared DJB, the data block reflected the aircraft climbing (without clearance). Then the target diappeared. Controller selected the primary button at his position and tracked UAL93's primary target. The primary target was observed making a left turn, heading southeast bound. Coordination with the ATCSCC was being accomplished by Traffic Management personnel. Another transmission was made which was unidentified. Information was relayed to the unit from aircraft in the vicinity of UAL93 that the aircraft was at a low altitude. Primary target assosciated with UAL93 was lost. Black smoke was reported in the are of the loss of primary target. Visual report by aircraft in vicinity confirmed a crash.

I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. 9/19/01

Kimberly W. Warnica (KW) Watch Desk 8:40-11:20

I came to the watch desk to relieve Ed Wolbers the operations manager in charge. He was at the 8:30 stand-up. We received news that an aircraft had hit the World Trade Center. Central flow then informed us it was AAL11 a 767. ZNY went ATC Zero and I coordinated this with the areas. We were then told a second aircraft it the World Trade Center. Central flow called and told us to monitor DAL1989 who fit the profile (BOS to LAX) as the other 2 aircraft. I found out that the Franklin sector was working the Delta. So while the other s were coordinating with Delta, I went to Area 6 to talk to the controllers and supervisors. I told them that Delta fit the profile of the other two aircraft and to report anything out of the ordinary to me immediately. I asked who Franklin would be handing the aircraft off to and they told me the Lorain Sector. I then went to Area 4 to talk to the controllers and supervisor. While I was briefing them on DAL1989 the Lorain controller said he heeded someone to listen to his frequency because there was screaming on it. I told Mark Barnick, the supervisor, to plug in and I went up to the watch desk. I asked STMC Craig Pass to bring up the Lorain frequency so we could hear it because there was a problem. When we listened we heard the controller trying to track UAL93 several times, then I heard him talk to 2 other aircraft about the transmissions he had just heard. Both aircraft heard the screaming. Then a voice came on shouting and used the words "bomb onboard". The controller asked the caller to say again. I went to the area and confirmed that they also heard "bomb onboard". The sup(ervisor) confirmed this. I went back to the watch desk and was told and aircraft had hit the Pentagon. I was then told to have the controllers land everyone. Leo Wolbers and I went to the areas and told them to put everyone on the ground. When I returned to the watch desk, I was asked to take a phone call at the military position. It was Huntress and she told me that DAL1989 was a confirmed hijacking. I went to the Sandusky sector in Area 4 who was working DAL1989 inbound to Cleveland and told them he was a confirmed hijacking. The controller then used the word "trip" in his transmission to the Delta. He said "the pilot doesn't think he's a hijack. When I used the word trip, he said: not in less you know something we don't." I told them to treat him as a hijack anyway. I went back to the watch desk and the sup(ervisor) from Area 6 asked me to come to the area. I went to Area 6 and was informed by the Imperial controller that Gopher-06 saw a black cloud of smoke at his 9 o'clock and 30 miles which I recognized as the United jet's last known position. I gave my report to the watch and they told me to confirm it. I went back to Area 4 and asekd the controller to descend the Gopher to confirm it was the United. The controller coordinated for lower with Area 5. Area 5 then yelled to me that they had a report. I walked over to the Indianhead sector and the controller told me she had an aircraft that positively confirmed the aircraft was a United jet. I went back to the watch desk and told them about the positive confirmation. I went back to Area 4 who had put the Delta on Cleveland Approach's frequency. When I returned to the watch desk they told me to evacuate. I went outside the facility at this time.

I certify, to the best of my knowledge and recollection, the above statement is correct. 9/19/01

Rick Kettell Air Traffic Manager

At approximately 1310Z, I was advised that an air carrier at FL290 in ZBW airspace, destined through ZOB airspace had lost its transponder and communications with ATC. I then learned of events regarding the World Trade Center and at 1315Z established a temporary command post in the TMU. I began tracking aircraft in ZOB airspace identified by the STMC's as BOS-LAX flights. I observed DAL1989 as the aircraft entered the Lorain sector. At approximately 1330Z, I was told by OM Kim Warnica that NORAD confirmed that DAL1989 was possible hijack aircraft. I instructed OM Ed Wolbers to contact Delta operations. OM Warnica then advised me that UAL93 in the Lorain Sector may have reported a bomb on board. I then began monitoring the Lorain sector frequency and heard two aircraft (Am 1060 and EJA) confirm to the Lorain sector controller that they heard a report of a bomb aboard an aircraft. I then heard a transmission in English, but an Arabic accent stating "that a bomb was onboard the aircraft, the aircraft was returning to the airport until demands were met, stay in your seats and be quiet." I informed OM Rich Reid to contact the ROC, and reported the information on a national telecon to David Caroles in headquarters at 1340Z. I then continued to monitor the track of UAL93 until the transponder disappeared and then proceeded to follow the primary target as the aircraft turned southeastbound. I remained on the national telecon updating the position of the target until the target disappeared from ZOB radar at 1403Z. I received confirmation from OM Kim Warnica that two aircraft had confirmed smoke and fire in the vicinity that radar contact with UAL93 was last observed. I relayed that information to Mr. Caroles and remained on the telecon and continued to operate the temporary command post.

Mark E. Evans (YP) STMC 9:25-19:15

I entered the Traffic Management Unit at approximately 1323Z. At 1331Z we received a call from the ATCSCC asking us to inventory all flights and report any missing flights or unusual situations directly to the ATCSCC. At 1340Z I initiated a call from the TMCSC position in the TMU (Tape ID 45) to report erratic altitude changes by UAL93. At 1341Z I reported via the same line that we had lost the transponder on UAL93 and he was headed eastbound. This was a reversal of his flight plan. We were not in communication with the flight. A decision was made to leave the ATCSCC line open to facilitate updates on UAL93. I continued to coordinate all information provided to me by the area managers and traffic management personnel. This included updates on the primary target we believed to be UAL93, requests for military verification, and other data. We received verification from a VFR aircraft of a UAL jet in the location of our primary target at 8000! This was also forwarded along with location and direction for the flight (southeast). Shortly after this we had a report of black smoke in the vicinity of the last radar returns. This was reported along with location to the ATCSCC at 1404Z.

Mark Barnick (AB) Area 4 Ops Supervisor 8:51-11:54

On Tuesdax, september 11, 2001, I was working the Area 4 Operational Supervisor's position from 1251Z to 1554Z.

At approximately 1328Z, the Lorain radar controller (John Werth), advised med that he had lost radio contact (NORDO) with United Airlines Flight Number 93 (UAL93) and that he needed to talk to the aircraft. I telephoned United flight operations and advised them that we had lost radio contact with UAL93 and that we needed them to send the aircraft a message to contact the Lorain radar controller on frequency 133.37. The United flight operator was upset to hear about another NORDO aircraft but stated that he would send the message to the aircraft. A few minutes later, John Werth advised me that he had a problem with shouting on the frequency. Using a hand set, we plugged into the Lorain radar position and monitored the frequency. Shortly thereafter, I heard some type of yelling and screaming on the frequency as well as someone stating that "they have a bomb". Numerous other aircraft on the frequency confirmed that they also heard the "have a bomb" statement. At this time, John Werth was the Lorain radar controller and Daver Leister was the D-side associate. During this time, UAL93 was descending from FL350 without a clearance and would not answer any transmissions made to the aircraft.

I paged Mike Zientarski and Mark Saunders back to the area from their breaks. I assigned Mike Zientarski to track and assist John Werth on the radar position. I assigned Mark Saunders to assist Dave Leister with the D-side outies and to ensure that all coordination was completed with surrounding radar sectors.

I notified the watch operations manager (Leo Wolbers) and two other operation managers (Kim Warnica and Rich Reid) of the reported bomb and of the problem with UAL93. During this time, UAL93 continued on course (westbound) but began to climb from FL343 without a clearance or any communications.

I paged all Area 4 controllers back to the area in order to assist the other area radar positions. All controllers were advised of a possible bomb threat/hijacking on UAL93. Controllers were instructed to keep other aircraft be they above, below or at the same altitude, well clear of UAL93. I continued to monitor UAl93 on the radar scope and continued to monitor the Lorain radar frequency. More yelling and screaming could be heard at times but UAL93 would not answer any calls. The aircraft continued to climb without any radio contact.

When UAL93's transponder indicated an altitude of FL407, the aircraft began to turn to the south. Other aircraft in the area were vectored well clear of UAL93's new course. UAL93 then began to descend and when the transponder indicated FL397, the aircraft turned towards the southeast. I suggested to Rich Reid, who was in the area at that time, that the military should be contacted regarding this situation.

UAL93's transponder was then lost or shut off and the radar tag went into coast. Other aircraft in the area verified that they had visual ontact with UAL93 and that it was still flying southeastbound. In order to follow the aircraft, John Werth started a new flight following tag on UAL93's primary radar target. No altitude information was available and all other controllers were advised to keep all aircraft well away from the target of UAL93.

As UAL93 continued southeastbound, it was going to enter the airspace of Allegheny radar position in Area (?). UAL 93 continued not to respond to any broadcasts made to it. The Allegheny radar controller was advised of the situation with UAL93 and confirmed the position of the radar track in order to continue flight following. Altitude was still unknown.

Area 4 had no further contact with UAL93 after the aircraft left the Lorain radar airspace.
9/19/01

URL of the original document:

http://www.911workinggroup.org/foia/911%20COMMISSION%20REPORT%20DATA%20(redact)/5%20AWA%20324%20Package%20ZOB%20Copies%20of%20Addtnl%20Personnel%20Statements.pdf

Cleveland Center controller memos on Flight 93

2008-12-20T22:46:00.012Z

Transcript of handwritten statements concerning Flight 93 by Cleveland Center controllers. Many thanks to http://911workinggroup.org for their efforts and the citizen (unknown to me) who initiated the FOIA to obtain these important documents.

David M Norton (HD) Franklin Sector 8:42-9:50

UAL 93's flight through Franklin airspace was normal from initial handoff from NY Center until handoff to Lorain Sector. After switching UAL 93's frequency I noticed a change in the altitude of UAL 93 and called Lorain to see what was going on and to verify they were talking with the aircraft.

I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. 11/29/01

Brad Kennedy (KB) Franklin-D 9:02-9:50

UAL 93 was westbound toward DJB at FL350. We were busy diverting aircrraft from ZNY airspace, handed UAL 93 off to sector (Lorain?) about 20-30 miles from boundry. About 10 miles from boundry noticed UAL93 altitude descended slowly 4 to 5 hundred feet. We advised supervisor Barnett to watch aircraft something might be wrong and then we continued working.

I did not view satori or listen to tapes to confirm my statement, but would like to do that in the near future. I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. 9/13/01

John Werth (WH) Lorain Radar 8:55-10:18

I was working the Lorain radar position when the incident with UAL93 occurred. I issued traffic to UAL93 and received a normal response from the crew. I heard two transmissions which sounded like a struggle took place. Shortly afterwards the aircraft descended several hundred feet. The aircraft made an abrupt turn at DJB VOR to the south. Two more transmissions followed, stating that a bomb was on board, the aircraft had started to climb and was heading s/e in the general direction of two other aircraft which I had already started to vector away from UAL93. When UAL93 reached approx. FL410 he stopped his beacon squawk. I then started a primary track to follow the target. I received no more transmissions from UAL93, and continued vectoring several other aircraft clear of his position. I then transferred control of the data block to the area s/e of mine to monitor the aircraft's track.

I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. 9/13/01

David Leister (LE) LOR (Lorain)-D 8:39-10:18

I have listened to the voice tape of UAL93 and I would like to say I am deeply shocked and horrified about this event. The data tapes have recorded my computer input as well as my voice transmissions. As the events unfolded, I quickly realized there was nothing we could do for UAL93. Our training and common sense dictated that we protect surrounding aircraft, and that became my primary goal. I called for a supervisor at the first indication of trouble, which brought two additional controllers to our aid, making sure that we fulfilled our mission of protecting other aircraft. God bless the souls of UAL93.

I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident.

Mike Zientarski (MW) LOR (Lorain) Handoff position 9:30-9:43

I was put in to track at LOR-radar because traffic was starting to build. About that time UAL93 descended about 500 feet. A transmission was made that was unintelligible to me but another aircraft claimed to have heard that a bomb was on board. At that time I told another controller to assist on the associate position. I then began to direct him to pointouts and reroute aircraft away from our sector. Southeast of DJB contact was lost and then I helped to reestablish his positioning. We continued tracking what we believed to be UAL93 and I continued to have aircraft moved away. This continued until the target we believed to be UAL93 was out of the airspace.

I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. 9/13/01

Mark Saunders (MS) Assoc. Radar D-side 9:33-10:00

I was told to plug in and help the D-side position, because of the unusual situation. I saw UAL93 make radical turns and head to the southeast. The transponder went off and we tracked the primary target. I told sectors around us about this and to move all aircraft around us because we didn't know what altitude he was at.

I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. 12/10/01

George W. Keaton (VP) IRL (Imperial) 8:52-10:20

During the time in question I was the radar controller at the IRL sector, obviously aware at this time of what had occurred at the Pentagon and World Trade Center. During my time on position a PVD appeared on my scope with no altitude readout (UAL93). A controller from Area IV appeared in the area and explained the aircraft was deviating from its flight path and noone was receiving altitude information. I was told to keep all aircraft away from UAL93, which was proceeding towards the Washington area approximately on J518. I had to vector 2 - 4 aircraft away from the flight path of UAL93, including one NWA flight and a C130 proceeding northwest on J518. I remember turning the C130 to about a 030 heading, because of its speed. Observing UAL93, I saw it proceed almost directly over the PIT area, and the southeast of PIT it made an abrupt turn up to the northeast for about 10-15 miles. Once it turned back to the Washington area it disappeared from my scope one to two minutes later. Sometime during this period I was ordered to land all aircraft. I asked the pilot of the C-130 if he had observed anything off his left side. He said he observed a dark cloud of smoke off his left in the clouds. I asked for approximate distance and, if I remember correctly, he said about 15 miles. As I turned and told my supervisor (Tim Guess), I heard someone in Area V say they had a visual sighting of the plane at low altitude. The location gioven by the C130 pilot was the approximate position UAL93 went down. Few minutes later I questioned the C130 pilot for his reason for being in the air. He informed me his mission was noncritical and he would call for orders. A few minutes later he requested clearance to YNG, which I gave. At that point my airpace was sterile.

I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. I certify, to the best of my knowledge and recollection the above statement is correct. 9/12/01

Linda Justice (LJ) IRL (Imperial)-D 8:15-10:20

We were given a data block with which to track UAL93. The aircraft appeared to be heading toward Washington Center airspace. In an attempt to expedite the situation I put a charge of routing in to reflect HGR->DCA. This was only to forward to (the) information to the sectors the aircraft appeared to be tracking toward. I then called POT sector to verbally point him out and flashed the handoff to HGR sector. We took the handoff back when UAL93 changed direction to the east and did not resume the handoff to ZDC. Contact (visually) was lost with the target shortly thereafter.

I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. 9/12/01

Donald Edouard Lamoureux (DF) WMD (Westmoreland)-R 8:34-10:13

While working the R-position of the WMD sector I had been notified that UAL93 was a hijacked plane had a bomb on board and was headed toward Pittsburgh Airport and WMD sector. UAL93 was tracking as a primary target with no altitude readout. UAL93 was tracking passed PIT and near a VFR aircraft (N56865) with whom I was in contact with, I asked the VFR pilot to look to his left and up to see if he could see him visually. The VFR aircraft reported the B757 about 1000 feet above him which would put him at about 8000 ft. The VFR pilot reported the UAL93 landing gear was down and his wings were rocking back and forth. UAL93 began to track NE toward JST Tower. Tower has been advised of the situation. Shortly after UAL93 turned SE and then the primary target disappeared in the Somerset area. 9/13/01

I did not review SATORI and voice tape information and I would like to do so before I make a final statement. I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. 9/16/01

Brian C. Hanlon (AZ) WMD (Westmoreland)-D 9:42-10:13

UAL93 was reported visually by a VFR aircraft at 070 near LBE airport. VFR reported he had a UAL flight visually and appeared 1000 ft above; reported the landing gear down and wings flapping, and said the aircraft appeared to be in distress. Several minutes later, UAL93 appeared to track NE bound towards JST airport. Tower was advised aircraft had been hijacked, may have a bomb, and to evacuate. Shortly after, UAL turned SE and dropped track on sector boundry.

I did not review satori or voice information, and would like to so do before making a final statement. I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. 9/14/01

Stacey Taylor (ST) IHD (Indianhead) 9:14-10:17(?)

I was working the Indianhead sector and observed the primary target and associated data block of UAL93 enter my airspace altitude and flight path unknown. I had been told the aircraft was a hijacking and that there was a bomb aboard the aircraft. At some point I was given the hand-off on UAL93, but at no time did I have communications with the aircraft. I observed the aircraft heading towards Johnstown and attempted to get another aircraft out of his flight path. We had been told that the aircraft was reported to be flying at 7.500 (?) feet by a supervisor. UAL 93 flight then appeared to take turn down toward the southeast and I had two radar hits on him showing an altitude of 8.200 feet. I turned my aircraft back to the north to avoid UAL93 and around the Somerset airport, shortly after the turn. I lost the primary target on UAL93 and we suspected it had gone down. I then vectored N20VF toward the supected incident side and asked if he would look for smoke. I explained that we were looking for a downed aircraft that may have a bomb on board, and we didn't know if the bomb had gone off. He said he would overfly the site and he spotted smoke and flames and gave us the position of the crash site and a description of the area.

I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. 9/16/01

URL of the original document:

http://911workinggroup.org/foia/911%20COMMISSION%20REPORT%20DATA%20(redact)/5%20AWA%20323%20Package%20ZOB%20Copies%20of%20Personnel%20Statements%20from%20Package.pdf

John Farmer's failed analysis of the NORAD tapes

2008-12-14T19:15:00.004Z

- this critique has been published half a year ago on the website www.pilotsfor911truth.org. For actual reasons - John Farmer has publicly ceased 9/11 research and shut down his website www.911files.info - it is reposted here.

John Farmer is a Pentagon researcher and firmly believes that Flight 77 hit the Pentagon. He has recently analyzed the NORAD tapes

and arrives at the conclusion that air traffic controllers from Washington tracked Flight 77 on its way back to Washington, but failed to inform NEADS about it. However, the NORAD tapes are the best proof so far that Flight 77 did not fly back to Washington - a FAA manager stresses that several Air Traffic Control Centers were looking for it, but couldn't find any radar blip.

Unlike the 9/11 Commission and Michael Bronner/Vanity Fair, Farmer doesn't omit messages from the NORAD tapes. His transcript is fairly accurate. But he distorts the messages and misinterpretates them, and his "conclusions" are rash and unfounded (Farmer's comments in italic, mine in plain writing):

Conclusions

Boston Military (Scoggins) is the only source of information that NEADS has for the approach of AAL77.

Wrong in multiple ways. At the same time Scoggins provides NEADS with information about a suspicious plane, a NEADS technician reports another "aircraft six miles east of the White House". The message is echoed through several channels, including MCC Kevin Nasypany's one. It is clear that the NEADS crew track this plane directly on their radar screens, completely independent from Scoggins. They assign a tag number to it - 0032 - and watch as it turns into "MCA" (military controlled airspace=restricted area) and finally fades at 9:38.

These two planes - let's call it the "Scoggins plane" and the "Nasypany plane" are clearly not identical. They are reported on different channels with different positions for a fixed time: 6 miles southwest of the White House (Scoggins) vs. 8 miles east of the White House (Nasypany). The Nasypany plane has its transponder off, turns into restricted area and fades at 9:38, fulfilling essential conditions for being "Flight 77"/the decoy jet.

As opposed to that, the Scoggins plane is reported 6 miles southwest of the White House at 9:36:15 and still deviating away (i.e. flying west), making it virtually impossible to be over the Pentagon at 9:38.

He is making it a point to pass on information that he is overhearing in the Boston ARTCC. His initial report (13:20:56) of an aircraft headed towards Washington is second-hand information and mistakes the identification as AAL11. This may have caused momentary confusion but none-the-less established that a 3rd hijacked aircraft was headed towards the DC area. The only significant problem this caused for the MCC is that he scrambled the Langley fighters to Baltimore-Washington International (north of DC) in anticipation of an approach from the north.

Scoggins gives a position for this phantom flight 11: "somewhere over New Jersey or further south." That's exactly the reason why Nasypany sent his fighters to the Baltimore area. Farmer seems to insinuate that Scoggins reports the eastbound Flight 77, but at this time Flight 77 was (according to the official story, which Farmer sticks to!) somewhere over the Appalaches in West Virginia, far away from New Jersey or Baltimore.

At 13:24:02 Boston Military calls back and gives the position of the approaching aircraft as "southwest" of Washington, but has no specific coordinates for it. This is exactly what the 84 RADES radar shows at that time. This confirms that Washington ARTCC was tracking AAL77’s primary return although Scoggins was still under the impression that it was being identified as AAL11.

Wrong. Scoggins reports phantom Flight 11 "southwest", but not "southwest of Washington". He gives no reference point, making the remark practically worthless. Did he mean "southwest of New York" or "he's heading southwest"? Our fears that Farmer wants to use the messages on phantom flight 11 improperly as evidence that Flight 77 was tracked by controllers on its way back to Washington are validated. Even the official story has Flight 77's position at 13:24 not southwest, but straight west of Washington.

Here's Scoggins' message: "We did hear from Washington, there is an aircraft, they believe it is American 11 and he is southwest, only just don’t have a point…"

For reasons unknown, the Washington ARTCC was NOT sharing this information with NEADS after multiple phone calls by them to get more information. This includes a call (13:33:58) with the Washington ARTCC Operations Manager who does identify the 3rd missing plane as AAL77, but makes no mention of the primary track headed straight for the Washington, DC area. After AAL77 impacts the Pentagon, the Washington ARTCC is still (13:38:32) denying that they are tracking anything headed towards the Washington area and calls it a "rumor."

Hard to believe, but Scoggins' mistakable "southwest" remark is enough proof for Farmer that Washington ARTCC tracked Flight 77, but failed to share this information with NEADS for "unknown reasons". However, the manager of Washington ARTCC states very clearly that Washington and the surrounding ARTCC's desperately tried to pick up primary targets who possibly could have been the missing Flight 77. The manager not only "makes no mention of the primary radar track headed straight for Washington DC" (Farmer) - he explicitly says that there was no such primary radar track!

Here's what the manager of Washington ARTCC said:

"so what we have done at the surrounding centers here is tell everyone to look out for limited codes, primary targets, or whatever the case may be. And that was the last time, that was about fifteen minutes ago since I talked to the Indianapolis Center Operations Manager."

It is well documented in media accounts that the Dulles TRACON was watching the final approach of AAL77. Further, GOPHER 6 (the infamous C-130) was diverted by the Andrews TRACON to intercept and identify the approaching plane. It has been argued that these were the first indications that the Washington ARTCC had of the plane.

However, Boston Military indicates they were watching it very early on when it was southwest of the area and recognized it as a threat. This minor detail, if Washington ARTCC had been forthcoming with NEADS would have resulted in the MCC scrambling Langley to intercept a plane coming from the west, not the north.

The next significant issue is why the Langley fighters were handed off by the Langley TRACON to Giant Killer instead of the Washington ARTCC. Giant Killer followed the SOP for airspace under its control and sent the fighters out over the Atlantic. NEADS was very specific in where to send the fighters which would have required a hand off to the Washington ARTCC, and it is not clear at this point why that did not happen. Once the error has been noted and corrected by NEADS, it is at least three minutes before the planes are turned to the north and then only after NEADS takes direct control from Giant Killer. At 13:49:26 Washington ARTCC calls NEADS wanting to know what the planes are entering their airspace (squawking 7777). So undoubtedly, something has gone very wrong with the handoff by Giant Killer to Washington ARTCC. What many have not understood (including myself until recently) is that the Andrews and Langley TRACON’s are all under the Washington ARTCC control.

In the quest to learn what went wrong, what went right is often overlooked. From the NORAD tapes and 84 RADES radar data, it is clear that what went right was NEADS. They responded professionally and rapidly to a very unique and dangerous situation with minimal resources and information. For some reason, Washington ARTCC did not keep NEADS in the loop on what it knew about the approach of AAL77 and the Langley TRACON mishandled the scramble of the Langley fighters, both of which are civilian components of the FAA. Why this happened is an avenue ripe for further research.

Again: There is no reason at all to believe that Washington ARTCC did withhold any information to NEADS about a primary radar track heading for Washington. It's amazing how Farmer uses one single meaningless word - "southwest" - to accuse FAA controllers and officials of failing to do their job in an extreme emergency situation - "for some reason".

Here's a better and simpler explanation: Flight 77's radar track was not reported to NEADS because Washington controllers didn't spot any primary target. And they didn't spot it because Flight 77 was not there. So simple.

The statements of Norman Mineta - a chronology

2007-10-26T16:51:00.000Z

Here's a survey of Mineta's statements on the events in the morning of 9/11 without comments - for documentation purposes. I learned only recently of the The Daily Californian and MSNBC interviews.

Congressional testimony, September 20, 2001

On the morning of September 11th, on first word of the attack, I moved directly
to the Presidential Emergency Operations Center in the White House. As soon as I was aware of the nature and scale of the attack, I called from the White House
to order the air traffic system to land all aircraft, immediately and without
exception. That was an unprecedented step. But with the risk of additional
flights that might be used as terrorist weapons, I believe that it was the right
and necessary step to take.

http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/sept_11/dot_008.htm

Washington Post, January 27, 2002

Transportation Secretary Norman Y. Mineta, summoned by the White House to the bunker, was on an open line to the Federal Aviation Administration operations center, monitoring Flight 77 as it hurtled toward Washington, with radar tracks coming every seven seconds. Reports came that the plane was 50 miles out, 30 miles out, 10 miles out-until word reached the bunker that there had been an explosion at the Pentagon.

Mineta shouted into the phone to Monte Belger at the FAA: "Monte, bring all the planes down." It was an unprecedented order-there were 4,546 airplanes in the air at the time. Belger, the FAA's acting deputy administrator, amended Mineta's directive to take into account the authority vested in airline pilots. "We're bringing them down per pilot discretion," Belger told the secretary.

"[Expletive] pilot discretion," Mineta yelled back. "Get those goddamn planes down."

Sitting at the other end of the table, Cheney snapped his head up, looked squarely at Mineta and nodded in agreement.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A42754-2002Jan26

Daily Californian, March 18, 2002

That morning, I was having breakfast with the Deputy Prime minister of Belgium Isabelle Durant. Mrs. Durant is also the minister of transport for Belgium. So Jane Garvey, the administrator of the FAA and I were having breakfast with her in my conference room.

My chief of staff then came in and said, 'Mr. Secretary, can I see you?' The television was on and obviously it was the World Trade Center with all this black smoke coming out of it. So I asked John, 'What the heck is that?.' And he said, 'Well we don't know. We have heard explosion, we have heard the possibility of an airplane that went into the building.' And so I said, 'Keep me posted,' and I went back into my breakfast meeting. I explained to Mrs. Durant what was going on.

Then in about five or six minutes, the chief of staff came back in and said, 'Mr. Secretary, may I see you again?' He said at that point that it has been confirmed it was a commercial airliner that went into the World Trade Center. And as I was standing there watching the television set, all of a sudden from the right side of the screen came a gray object and then it sort of disappeared and the next thing, from the left of the screen was this white yellow orangey billow of cloud coming out of the left side of the screen, so I ran into the conference room and told Mrs. Durant I was going to have to leave and take care of whatever this was about.

I told Jane to come back in with me, and soon after that, I got a call from the White House saying for me to get over there right away. So I grabbed some papers, grabbed some stuff and went to the garage. I got in my car and went over to the White House. Its only seven minutes away. I drove into the White House grounds, and everyone was running out of the White House, running out of the Executive Office Building.

And I said to the people with me, 'Is there something wrong with this picture? We are driving into the White House and everyone else is running out of it. So I went into the White House and was briefed by Dick Clark of the National Security Council and he said, 'You have to get over to the Presidential Emergency Operation Center to be with the vice president.' ...

We started to monitor what was going on. We knew that there were now two airplanes that had gone into World Trade Center 1 and World Trade Center 2, and I had a direct line set up with the FAA.

Someone came in and said, 'Mr. Vice President, there is a plane 50 miles out.' I asked our FAA people, 'Can you see an aircraft coming in 50 miles out?' and they said, 'Yeah, we're tracking it, but the transponder is off, so we don't know what the identification of that airplane is.' Pretty soon the same person came in and informed the vice president, sitting right across from me at the conference table, that the airplane is 30 miles out. I asked the FAA about it and they said, 'Yeah, we know where the plane is, but we don't know who it is.'

Then they came in and said it was 10 miles out. Soon after that, I was talking to the deputy director of the FAA, and he told me they had lost the target off the screen. Soon after that, then, the vice president was informed that there was an explosion at the Pentagon. So I was trying to relate with the air traffic controllers where that plane went to see whether it was close to the Pentagon. The radar is very difficult to pinpoint it to a ground location.

But while I was talking to the FAA, someone broke into the conversation and said, 'Mr. Secretary, we have just had confirmation from the Arlington County Police Department that they saw a commercial airliner-an American airline-go into the Pentagon.

Well, its like anything else, if you see one of something occur you consider that an accident. But when you see two of the same thing occur then you know that there is a pattern or a trend. In this instant we had three of the same thing occur, and that is a program or a plan. So I then informed the FAA to bring all the airplanes down.

I said, 'Any airplanes coming into the Eastern seaboard, turn them around and get them out of the Eastern seaboard heading west. Any planes heading west, have them go on to their destination if they are close by. But in any event bring all the airplanes down."

http://www.dailycal.org/sharticle.php?id=8072

MSNBC, September 11, 2002

MINETA: I had a breakfast meeting with the Deputy Prime Minister of Belgium who also is the minister of Transport. She, Mrs. Durante, Jane Garvey, the head of FAA, and I were going to have breakfast.

And so we were in the midst of having breakfast and my chief of staff came into the breakfast and said, "Mr. Secretary, may I see you?"

So I excused myself, went into my office, and at the other end of the office is a TV set and as I walked in, obviously it's the World Trade Center, black smoke billowing out of there, and I said, "What the heck is that?"

He said, "Well, we don't know, we've heard explosion, we've heard GA -- general aviation -- aircraft go into it. So we don't know."

I said, "Well, keep me posted," and I went back into the conference room, and then told Mrs. Durante about what I saw and knew so far about what was happening in New York.

Then about five minutes later, John Flaherty, my chief of staff, came back in and said, "Mr. Secretary, may I see you?"

So I came back into the office and he said it's been confirmed, it was a commercial airliner that went into the World Trade Center, and so as I then started getting closer to my TV set and I was watching it, and all of a sudden from the right side of the set I see something gray, and then it sort a disappears, and then from the right side of the screen I see this white billowing, yellow-orange cloud, and I go, "Holy cow!"

I turned around, ran into the conference room, and I said, "Mrs. Durante, I'm going to have to excuse myself cause I don't know what's going on in New York City. Jane, you've got to get back to FAA."

And so by the time I came back into my office, I had a call from the White House saying, "Get, get over here right away." So I grabbed a, a few papers and a manual, and ran down to the car, red light and sirens, went over to the White House.

HAGER: So you already knew commercial airliner fairly early on then. Initially, initially you were wondering, "Is it general aviation?"

MINETA: That's right.

HAGER: Which would be the first reaction.

MINETA: That's right. And I was thinking about the, the B-25 that went into the Empire State Building during World War II.

And so anyway, we drove into the White House on West Executive Drive. People were coming out of the White House, pouring out of the Executive Office Building, running over towards Lafayette Park, and I said to my driver and security person, I said, "Hey, is there something wrong with this picture, cause here we are driving in and everybody else is running out."

So I ran into the White House and someone said you have to be briefed by Dick Clarke of the National Security Council.

So I went into the Situation Room and he briefly told me what was going on, and then he said you've got to be down in the PEOC with the Vice President. I said I don't know where the PEOC is, the Presidential Emergency Operations Center, and there was a Secret Service agent standing there, and he says, "I'll take you over there right away."

So we went running down and went into the PEOC which is the bunker, as you know, under the White House.

I started to establish a direct line to the FAA to find out what was going on, and the Vice President and I were across from each other on the conference room table in the PEOC, and about this time someone came in and said this was -- when I finally got in there, it was probably about 9:27, is what I recall.

And a little later on, someone said, "Mr. Vice President, there's a plane 50-miles out." So I was talking to Monte Belger, the Deputy Director of the FAA, and I said, "Monte, what do you have 50-miles out?"

He said, "Well, we have a target, bogey, on the radar, but the transponder's been turned off, so we have no identification of this aircraft. We don't know who it is. We don't know what altitude it's at, speed or anything else. All we're doing is watching with the sweep of the radar, the dot moving from position to position."

So then someone came in, the same person came in and said, "Mr. Vice President, it -- the plane's 30-miles out." So I said, "Monte, can you see it, and where is it in relationship to the ground?"

He said, "Well, that's difficult to really determine. I would guess it's somewhere between Great Falls and National Airport, coming what they call the DRA, the down river approach."

And so then the person came in and said, "Mr. Vice President, the plane's ten-miles out," and so I said, "Monte, where is it?" and he said, "Well, I'm not really sure but I'd be guessing somewhere maybe between the USA Today building and, and National Airport."

And then pretty soon he said, "Oh-oh, we just lost the target." And so a few moments later, someone came in and said, "Mr. Vice President, there's been an explosion at the Pentagon."

So I said, "Monte, is there something -- can you identify it as being at the Pentagon?" He said, "No, we can't really pinpoint it like that."

Then about that time someone broke into our phone conversation and said, "Mr. Secretary, we've had a call from an Arlington County police officer saying that he saw an American Airlines airplane go into the Pentagon."

At that point I said, "Monte, bring all the airplanes down," and we had a slight conversation about that, and then the professionalism of the air traffic controllers and the skill of the pilots and the flight deck, and the flight attendants in the flight cabins, we're able to bring down over 4600 airplanes in about two hours, safely and without incident.

And it was one of these, where every so often Monte would call me and say, "3212 airplanes still in the air." "2112." "1174." And he just kept on reporting back to me as to the number of airplanes left. And as I recall, about 12:20, somewhere around in there, I finally said to him, -- to the Vice President -- I said, "Mr. Vice President, all the airplanes are down" and to me it was just miraculous that the great working team of the airplanes and the air traffic controllers were able to bring everything down safely.

HAGER: Let me take you back over some of that. Now, when you're in your office and you're first seeing it on the TV, I think you said your initial reaction is maybe it's a private plane of some kind. But I think in the second case, you knew right away that was a commercial airliner.

MINETA: I saw a gray airplane, and first I thought maybe -- and I didn't think of it in terms of a commercial airliner and I thought maybe it might be the size of a King Air or a G5, or something of that nature. And then I really should have, if I thought about it, gray -- United Airlines, and -- but it just happened so quickly, that it just, other than seeing a gray object come in, I really couldn't assess what kind of an airplane it might have been.

HAGER: I'm wondering when the first explosion occurred, you could think, you know, somebody had a heart attack -- a pilot, or somebody lost, something like that, equipment failure. But when the second tower is hit, I'm wondering what was flashing through your mind, because then we begin to get sinister implications.

MINETA: Well, the whole issue was what was the nature of what's going on, not only was it a commercial airline, but what's going on with two airplanes going into the World Trade Center, into the twin towers?

Well, when that third one went into the Pentagon, it's like anything else. If you see one of something it's an accident. When you see two of the same thing, it's a pattern or a trend. But when you three -- see three of the same thing occurring, then you know it's a program or a plan.

And so that's when it was decided that all the airplanes had to be brought down.

HAGER: Had the implication of the idea of terrorist attack -- was that one of the things you might have thought of after the second tower?

MINETA: Not at all. I mean, to have the thought of a commercial airliner being used as a missile or the weapon itself, at that point was the farthest thing in my mind.

HAGER: Even after the second tower was --

MINETA: Ever after the second one.

HAGER: Now coming over to the White House and you're down there in the bunker, and that third unidentified blip is coming down the Potomac.

For one thing, had you thought about the possibility that it might be -- I mean you're at the White House. That's the center where everything is going on. Is that something that would have gone through your mind?

MINETA: Well, the question was where is it coming. And so as I was asking Monte, it was following pretty much the DRA, the down river approach, and it had not crossed over towards the White House or towards the Capitol. It was staying on its line towards what would normally be the traffic pattern into National Airport.

And in fact, later on, in looking at the radar track, the plane had actually over-passed the Pentagon, then turned around and then came back into it, and it never took a wide sweep to cross over to the east side of the White House.

On the other hand, we had seven or eight uniden -- or unaccounted-for airplanes, and then I heard about an airplane going down on the Ohio-Kentucky border.

So I said to Monte, I said, "Have we heard anything further about what you just mentioned a little while ago, about that plane down in, along the border of Ohio and Kentucky?" And he said no, we haven't heard anything.

I said, "Well, have you called the Ohio State Patrol or the Kentucky State Patrol to find out if they've heard anything?"

Cause if someone sees an airplane crash, they're immediately going to call the law enforcement agency. I said find out from them if they've heard anything.

But that turned out to be negative. And then about what, 10:15 or so, then we heard about the crash up in Shanksville, and so then the question of course -- and the other thing that happened when the person came in and said that the plane was ten miles out, he said do the orders still stand, and the Vice President said of course the orders still stand.

Have you heard anything to the contrary? I was thinking what are they talking about?

Then I thought, "Oh, my gosh, I wonder if they've scrambled aircraft and have aircraft up there now."

HAGER: And the order would be to shoot --

MINETA: Shoot it down. So then when I heard about the Shanksville plane, then I thought what happened to that airplane? Did it go down on its own?

HAGER: When you first heard that plane went down in Shanksville, what were you thinking?

MINETA: Well, the question, when I first heard about that plane was what happened to it. Did it go down on its own or might it have been shot down by one of the aircraft that had been scrambled, and -- now I knew that afterwards, that planes had been scrambled to intercept the airplane coming in on the river approach, but because it was coming up from Norfolk, it was still 10, 11 minutes away when that plane went into the Pentagon.

But by that time I knew that there was an airplane now in the area and so then when I heard about the Shanksville airplane, then the question came up, "Wow, what happened to that?"

Did it go down on its own or was it shot down? And even the Pentagon was not able to answer that until some two hours after that plane had gone down.

HAGER: Was it a fleeting idea at all in, in your head, that, "Gee, they might be coming for us?"

MINETA: Oh, absolutely, it's something like that, but at least at the time the track of the radar was following what would be considered the down-river approach and it never came over to cross the east side of the Potomac River and it just followed the river all the way in.

But the -- of course the thought about, you know, is the White House the target, because I think as we found out later on, about the way al Qaida operates, they were looking for significant, something of a significant nature and that they wanted to go after political, economic and a military icon.

So here in terms of icon, they had hit the twin towers in New York, in terms of economic icon and then now they've struck the Pentagon, the military icon, and you think about political icon either being in the White House or the Capitol.

HAGER: Not to dwell on the personal, but besides being Secretary of Transportation, you're a human being. Did this thing ever get your heart pumping or make your adrenaline go?

MINETA: Oh, absolutely. I mean you're on the edge of your seat and you're saying, "Monte, tell me what's going on. What is it?" Because we're in the bunker and we're getting bits and pieces of news.

We frankly have had CNN, Fox and NBC on in the screens inside the bunker, and that was really as probably up to date news as we were getting in the bunker and then the input that the Vice President was getting from his staff.

HAGER: Now moving to the decision to bring the planes down, you said you had a discussion, but I heard it described as a somewhat more animated discussion than that.

MINETA: It was. What had happened was that earlier that day, as this was all unfolding, I had already talked to Don Carty, the CEO at American Airlines, and Jim Goodwin, the CEO of United Airlines about accounting for their own airplanes, and so they had placed ground holds on their airplanes on the East Coast, in other words, no airplanes were to take off.

When the third one struck, I told Monte -- I said bring all the airplanes down and he said we'll do them, we'll do that according to pilot discretion.

Well, pilot discretion was to me a little too loose in the sense of I don't want pilots to go another hour to flight or their destination. I wanted those airplanes down.

So I told Monte, I said, you know, in effect, "The hell with pilot discretion, get those planes down."

http://www.msnbc.com/modules/91102/interviews/mineta.asp?0cb=-31a105678&cp1=1

ABC News, September 11, 2002

04:03:34 NORMAN MINETA, TRANSPORTATION SECRETARY

Someone came in and said Mr. Vice President, there's a plane out 50 miles.

04:03:39 CHARLES GIBSON, ABC NEWS

(VO) Mineta confers with Federal Aviation Deputy Chief Monty Belger.

04:03:43 NORMAN MINETA, TRANSPORTATION SECRETARY

And so I said, Monty, what do you have? He said, well we're watching this target on the radar, but the transponder's been turned off. So we, have no identification.

04:03:56 CHARLES GIBSON, ABC NEWS

(VO) At the FAA's Air Traffic Control Center near Washington's Dulles Airport, Danielle O'Brien is at a radar scope.

04:04:03 DANIELLE O'BRIEN, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER

It was an unidentified plane to the southwest of Dulles moving at a very high rate of speed.

04:04:11 NORMAN MINETA, TRANSPORTATION SECRETARY

Someone came in and said, Mr. Vice President, the airplane's 30 miles out.

04:04:16 LT COLONEL DAWNE DESKINS, AIR NATIONAL GUARD

We caught on the radar scope, a few blips, maybe seven or eight, you know, just enough to kind of go around in a half circle and then fade right over, losing radar contact right over, Washington. I said, my God, what is that?

04:04:31 DANIELLE O'BRIEN, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER

He was fast and it was just, it would be unprecedented for a commercial plane to come screaming through your air space at that kind of speed, unidentified, without making some type of communication.

04:04:45 MASTER SERGEANT MAUREEN DOOLEY, AIR NATIONAL GUARD

We knew that he was headed in that direction and we were calling, Washington Center, oh, my God, you've got, he's coming towards you.

04:04:51 NORMAN MINETA, TRANSPORTATION SECRETARY

The fellow came in and said, it's ten miles out. Assuming that it was coming into, National Airport, Ronald Reagan National Airport.

04:05:01 CHARLES GIBSON, ABC NEWS

(VO) At Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, F-16 fighter pilots Brad Derrig and Dean Eckmann scramble into the air. They are 105 miles, 12 minutes south of Washington. It is just 9:30 a.m.

04:05:15 MAJOR BRAD DERRIG, PILOT, AIR NATIONAL GUARD

We're directed to go and which turned out to be Reagan National which is right by the Pentagon.

04:05:20 DANIELLE O'BRIEN, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER

Our supervisor picked up our line to the White House and started relaying to them the information. We have an unidentified, very fast moving aircraft inbound toward your vicinity, eight miles west, seven miles west, and it went, six, five, four, . . .

04:05:39 NORMAN MINETA, TRANSPORTATION SECRETARY

He said, uh-oh, we just lost the bogey, meaning the target went off the screen. So I said, well, where is it? And he said, well, we're not really sure.

04:15:04 CHARLES GIBSON, ABC NEWS

(VO) Deep beneath the White House, Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta issues an unprecedented order.

04:15:10 NORMAN MINETA, TRANSPORTATION SECRETARY

The planes that are coming into the eastern seaboard, turn them around and get them going west. If they're going west, have them land at their destination, but in any event if they're not too far away, have them land.

04:15:22 CHARLES GIBSON, ABC NEWS

(VO) More than 4,000 planes are in the skies over the US. FAA policy allows pilots to use their own discretion to decide where and when they land in an emergency. But on this morning, . . .

04:15:35 NORMAN MINETA, TRANSPORTATION SECRETARY

I said, "screw pilot discretion, get the damn planes down."

.....

04:22:07 CHARLES GIBSON, ABC NEWS

(VO) White House photographer David Bohrer watches the tense moment and records it on film.

04:22:13 DAVID BOHRER, WHITE HOUSE PHOTOGRAPHER

Eventually it narrowed to Flight 93. That was the biggest threat at that point.

04:22:19 KARL ROVE, WHITE HOUSE COUNSELOR

If you take the trajectory of the plane, of Flight 93 after it passes Pittsburgh and draw a straight line, it's gonna go to Washington, DC.

04:22:27 NORMAN MINETA, TRANSPORTATION SECRETARY

You just had to do something instantaneously.

04:22:30 DAVID BOHRER, WHITE HOUSE PHOTOGRAPHER

There was a, a PEOC staffer who would keep coming in with updates on Flight 93's progress towards DC.

http://911research.wtc7.net/cache/pentagon/attack/abcnews091102_jenningsinterviews.html

9/11 Commission testimony, May 23, 2003

On Tuesday morning, September 11th, 2001, I was meeting with the Belgian transport minister in my conference room adjacent to my office, discussing aviation issues. Because of the agenda, FAA Administrator Jane Garvey was also in attendance.

A little after 8:45 a.m., my chief of staff, John Flaherty, interrupted the meeting. He asked Administrator Garvey and me to step into my office, where he told me that news agencies were reporting that some type of aircraft had flown into one of the towers of New York's World Trade Center.

Information was preliminary, so we did not know what kind of aircraft nor whether or not it was intentional. Jane Garvey immediately went to a telephone and contacted the FAA operations center. I asked to be kept informed of any developments and returned to the conference room to explain to the Belgian prime minister that our meeting might have to be postponed.

In an incident involving a major crash of any type, the Office of the Secretary goes into a major information-gathering response. It contacts the mode of administration overseeing whatever mode of transportation is involved in the incident. It monitors press reports, contacts additional personnel to accommodate the surge in operations, and centralizes the information for me through the chief of staff.

In major incidents, it will follow a protocol of notification that includes the White House and other agencies involved in the incident. These activities, albeit in the nascent stage of information-gathering, took place in these initial minutes.

A few minutes after my return to the conference room, my chief of staff again asked me to step back into my office. He then told me that the aircraft was a commercial aircraft and that the FAA had received an unconfirmed report that a hijacking of an American Airlines flight had occurred.

While Mr. Flaherty was briefing me, I watched as a large commercial jet flew into the second tower of the World Trade Center. At this point things began to happen quickly. I once more returned to the conference room and informed the minister of what had happened and ended the meeting. I received a telephone call from the CEO of United Airlines, Jack Goodman, telling me that one of United's flights was missing. I then called Don Carty, the CEO of American Airlines, and asked him to see if American Airlines could account for all of its aircraft. Mr. Flaherty reported to me that Jane Garvey had phoned to report that the CEO of Delta Airlines had called the FAA and said it could not yet account for all of its aircraft.

During this time, my office activated the Department of Transportation's crisis management center, which was located on the 8th floor at that time of the Department of Transportation headquarters, and provides for senior DOT personnel to conduct surge operations in a coordinated manner.

By this time, my office had contacted the White House. A brief moment later, the White House called my chief of staff and asked if I could come to the White House and operate from that location. I decided that, given the nature of the attack and the request, that I should be at the White House directly providing the president and the vice president with information.

When I got to the White House, it was being evacuated. I met briefly with Richard Clark, a National Security Council staff member, who had no new information. Then the Secret Service escorted me down to the Presidential Emergency Operations Center, otherwise known as the PEOC. I established contact on two lines, one with my chief of staff at the Department of Transportation, and the second with Monty Belger, the acting deputy administrator of the FAA, and Jane Garvey, both of whom were in the FAA operations center.

And as the minutes passed, the developing picture from air traffic control towers and radar screens became increasingly more alarming. Some aircraft could not be contacted. While on a normal day that may be just a communications snafu, we were faced with trying to quickly sort out minor problems from significant threats. We did not know how many more attacks might be in progress.

The FAA began to restrict air travel in the Northeast United States by a combination of actions which included sterilizing air space in certain regions and at various airports, and ultimately a nationwide ground stop of all aircraft for all locations, regardless of destination.

Within a few minutes, American Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon. At this time, as we discussed the situation with the North American Aerospace Defense commander and his staff, we considered implementing an emergency system of coordinated air traffic management to allow maximum use for defensive activities.

It was clear that we had to clear the air space as soon as possible to stop any further attacks and ensure domestic air space was available for emergency and defensive use. And so at approximately 9:45 a.m., less than one hour after I had first been notified of an airplane crash in New York, I gave the FAA the final order for all civil aircraft to land at the nearest airport as soon as possible. It was the first shutdown of civil aviation in the history of the United States.

Within minutes, air traffic controllers throughout the nation had directed 700 domestic and international flights to emergency but safe landings. Within another 50 minutes, air traffic controllers, working with skilled flight crews, made sure another 2800 airplanes returned safely to the ground.

By shortly after noon, less than four hours after the first attack, U.S. air space was empty of all aircraft except military and medical traffic. A total of approximately 4500 aircraft were landed without incident in highly stressful conditions. Additionally, all international inbound flights were diverted from U.S. air space and U.S. airports.

Unfortunately, during this time we also learned that United Flight 93 crashed in Stony Creek Township, Pennsylvania. As America knows, but it is important to keep repeating, that aircraft never reached the terrorists' target due to the heroic actions taken by the passengers and crew on United Flight 93.

...

MR. HAMILTON: We thank you for that. I wanted to focus just a moment on the Presidential Emergency Operating Center. You were there for a good part of the day. I think you were there with the vice president. And when you had that order given, I think it was by the president, that authorized the shooting down of commercial aircraft that were suspected to be controlled by terrorists, were you there when that order was given?

MR. MINETA: No, I was not. I was made aware of it during the time that the airplane coming into the Pentagon. There was a young man who had come in and said to the vice president, "The plane is 50 miles out. The plane is 30 miles out." And when it got down to, "The plane is 10 miles out," the young man also said to the vice president, "Do the orders still stand?" And the vice president turned and whipped his neck around and said, "Of course the orders still stand. Have you heard anything to the contrary?" Well, at the time I didn't know what all that meant. And --

MR. HAMILTON: The flight you're referring to is the --

MR. MINETA: The flight that came into the Pentagon.

MR. HAMILTON: The Pentagon, yeah.

MR. MINETA: And so I was not aware that that discussion had already taken place. But in listening to the conversation between the young man and the vice president, then at the time I didn't really recognize the significance of that.

And then later I heard of the fact that the airplanes had been scrambled from Langley to come up to DC, but those planes were still about 10 minutes away. And so then, at the time we heard about the airplane that went into Pennsylvania, then I thought, "Oh, my God, did we shoot it down?" And then we had to, with the vice president, go through the Pentagon to check that out.

MR. HAMILTON: Let me see if I understand. The plane that was headed toward the Pentagon and was some miles away, there was an order to shoot that plane down.

MR. MINETA: Well, I don't know that specifically, but I do know that the airplanes were scrambled from Langley or from Norfolk, the Norfolk area. But I did not know about the orders specifically other than listening to that other conversation.

MR. HAMILTON: But there very clearly was an order to shoot commercial aircraft down.

MR. MINETA: Subsequently I found that out.

MR. HAMILTON: With respect to Flight 93, what type of information were you and the vice president receiving about that flight?

MR. MINETA: The only information we had at that point was when it crashed.

MR. HAMILTON: I see. You didn't know beforehand about that airplane.

MR. MINETA: I did not.

MR. HAMILTON: And so there was no specific order there to shoot that plane down.

MR. MINETA: No, sir.

MR. HAMILTON: But there were military planes in the air in position to shoot down commercial aircraft.

MR. MINETA: That's right. The planes had been scrambled, I believe, from Otis at that point.

...

MR. ROEMER: Nice to see you, Mr. Secretary, and nice to see you feeling better and getting around as well, too.

I want to follow up on what happened in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center and try to understand that day a little bit better. You said, if I understood you correctly, that you were not in the room; you were obviously coming from the Department of Transportation, where you had been busy in a meeting in official business, but you had not been in the room when the decision was made -- to what you inferred was a decision made to attempt to shoot down Flight 77 before it crashed into the Pentagon. Is that correct?

MR. MINETA: I didn't know about the order to shoot down. I arrived at the PEOC at about 9:20 a.m. And the president was in Florida, and I believe he was on his way to Louisiana at that point when the conversation that went on between the vice president and the president and the staff that the president had with him.

MR. ROEMER: So when you arrived at 9:20, how much longer was it before you overheard the conversation between the young man and the vice president saying, "Does the order still stand?"

MR. MINETA: Probably about five or six minutes.

MR. ROEMER: So about 9:25 or 9:26. And your inference was that the vice president snapped his head around and said, "Yes, the order still stands." Why did you infer that that was a shoot-down?

MR. MINETA: Just by the nature of all the events going on that day, the scrambling of the aircraft and, I don't know; I guess, just being in the military, you do start thinking about it, an intuitive reaction to certain statements being made.

MR. ROEMER: Who was the young man with the vice president?

MR. MINETA: Frankly, I don't recall.

MR. ROEMER: And was there another line of communication between the vice president -- and you said you saw Mr. Richard Clark on the way in. Was Clark running an operations center as well on that day?

MR. MINETA: Dick was in the Situation Room.

MR. ROEMER: So there was the Situation Room making decisions about what was going to happen on shootdowns --

MR. MINETA: I don't believe they were --

MR. ROEMER: -- as well as the PEOC?

MR. MINETA: I don't believe they were making any decisions. I think they were more information-gathering from various agencies.

MR. ROEMER: Could it have been in the Situation Room where somebody in the Situation Room recommended the shoot-down and the vice president agreed to that?

MR. MINETA: Commissioner Roemer, I would assume that a decision of that nature would have had to be made at a much higher level than the people who were in the Situation Room.

MR. ROEMER: So take me through that. The Situation Room is monitoring the daily minute-by-minute events and they find out that Flight 77 is headed to the Pentagon. Somebody's got to be getting that information. The Situation Room is then communicating with the PEOC and saying, "We've got another flight that's on its way toward the Pentagon. Here are the options." Then the vice president talks to the president and says, "Here are the options; we have a shoot-down recommendation. Do you agree, Mr. President?" Is that what happens?

MR. MINETA: Again, that would be speculation on my part as to what was happening on that day, so I just wouldn't be able to really answer that -- on that inquiry.

MR. ROEMER: I know, because you had been conducting official business, and I'm sure you were hurriedly on your way over there.

MR. MINETA: As I was listening --

MR. ROEMER: I'm just trying to figure out how the Situation Room, which was gathering the minute-by-minute evidence and information and talking probably to a host of different people, and how they're interacting with the PEOC and then how the PEOC is interacting with the president, who is at that point on Air Force One, how a decision is made to shoot down a commercial airliner.

And then would you say -- let's say we're trying to put that part of the puzzle together. Then would your inference be that they scrambled the jets to shoot down the commercial airliner, it failed, and the commercial airliner therefore crashed into the Pentagon, the jets were not able to get there in time to succeed in a mission that they'd been tasked to do?

MR. MINETA: I'm not sure that the aircraft that were scrambled to come up to the DC area from Norfolk were under orders to shoot the airplane down. As I said, I just --

MR. ROEMER: But it was an inference on your part.

MR. MINETA: It was an inference, without a doubt. And that's why, in thinking about the United plane that went down in Pennsylvania, the question that arose in my mind --

MR. ROEMER: Right away was "Was that shot down?" And did you ever get an answer to that?

MR. MINETA: Yes, sir. The vice president and I talked about that. We then made the inquiry of the Department of Defense. They then got back to us saying, "No, it was not our aircraft."

MR. ROEMER: No shots were fired and no effort was made to shoot that down.

MR. MINETA: That's correct.

http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing2/9-11Commission_Hearing_2003-05-23.htm#panel_one

Academy of Achievement, June 3, 2006

Norman Mineta: That morning I was having breakfast with the Vice Premier of Belgium, Isobel Durant, who was also the Minister of Transport, and Jane Garvey, the head of the Federal Aviation Administration, was also there at breakfast. So the three of us were having breakfast, and my Chief of Staff, John Flaherty, came in and said, "Mr. Secretary, may I see you?" So I excused myself, went into my office. At the other end of my office, I have a television set. Obviously, the World Trade Center, black smoke pouring out of there. I said, "What the heck is that?" He said, "Well, we don't know. We have heard 'explosion,' we've heard 'general aviation plane going into the building,' we've heard 'commercial airplane going into the building.' We don't know." So I said, "Well, I am going to go back into the breakfast, keep me posted." So I went in and explained to Jane and to Mrs. Durant what I had just been told. About six or seven minutes later, John came back in and said, "May I see you?" So I excused myself, went back in, and he said, "It has been confirmed. It was an American Airlines (plane) that went into the World Trade Center." I went up to the TV set to get a closer look, see if I could see the hole where the plane went in, and as I was watching the TV set, all of a sudden a gray object comes from the right side of the screen, comes across, sort of disappears, and then a yellow and white billowy cloud over here, and I go, "Holy Cow, what the heck was that."

I ran back into the conference room and said, "I don't know what is going on in New York, but Mrs. Durant, I have got to excuse myself. Jane, you have got to get back to the Operations Center over at FAA." I excused myself, came back into the office. By that time, the White House had called and said I had to get over there right away.

I grabbed some manuals and some papers, went down to the car, and we went over to the White House. As we went in West Executive Drive, people pouring out of the Executive Office building, people running out of the White House, and I said to my driver and security guy, "Is there something wrong with this picture? We are driving in, and everybody else is running away." So I went into the White House and someone said, "You have to be briefed by Dick Clark in the Situation Room." So I went in there, he talked to me for four or five minutes, and he said, "You have got to go to the PEOC." I said, "What's the PEOC?" He said, "That's the Presidential Emergency Operations Center." I said, "I don't know where that is or what it is." There was a Secret Service agent standing there, says, "I will take you." Well, it's that bunker that's way under the White House.

I got to the PEOC and the Vice President was already there. Big conference table, and there are phones all along here. I took a phone and called my office, kept it an open line, and then I took another phone, called FAA -- Federal Aviation Administration Operations Center -- and kept it at open line and kept working the two phones.

Some young man came in and said to the Vice President, "There's a plane 50 miles out coming towards D.C." So I said to Monty Belger, who is the No. 2 at FAA, I said, "Monty, what do you have on radar on this plane coming in?" He said, "Well, the transponder has been turned off, so we don't know who it is, and we don't know the altitude or speed." I said, "Well, where is it?" He said, "It's somewhere beyond Great Falls right now." Then, the young man came in and said it's 20 miles away. I'd say, "Well, Monty, where is this plane in relationship to the ground?" On radar it is hard to associate with a ground point, but they'd be able to tell you roughly the distance from wherever you are, but he couldn't tell you the speed or altitude, and then all of a sudden, as I was talking to him, he said, "Oh, I lost the bogie. Lost the target." I said, "Well, where is it?" He said, "Well, it's somewhere between Rosslyn and National Airport," and about that time someone broke into the conversation and said, "Mr. Secretary, we just had a confirmation from an Arlington County police officer saying that he saw an American Airlines plane go into the Pentagon." So then I said, "Monty, bring all the airplanes down." When you see one of something happen, it's an accident; when you see two of the same thing happening, it's a trend, something. When you see three, it's a plan. So I said, "Bring all the planes down."

You mean ground all the planes?
Norman Mineta: Ground all the planes. We already had a ground hold on planes going into New York. Any plane that was going to leave from Atlanta heading to New York, those planes were left on the ground in Atlanta. That happened maybe about 8:30 or 8:40 in the morning. Now this is about 9:27.

I said, "Bring all the planes down." Well, at that point, we had 4,638 airplanes in the air. With the skill of the air traffic controllers and the skill of the airplane pilots and the flight cabin crew, getting all the passengers prepared, they brought all those planes down in two hours and 20 minutes. It was really the skill of everybody just bringing those airplanes down. Now, he said, "We will bring the planes down per pilot discretion," and I said, "Screw pilot discretion," because I didn't want a pilot who was over Kansas City thinking, "Well, I will fly on to LA, sleep in my own bed tonight," because I wanted all those airplanes down. We had, at that point, seven to ten airplanes still unaccounted for from the airlines, and so I wanted to get all those airplanes down. I didn't want that pilot in Kansas making his own decision. I said, "Bring them all down."

http://www.achievement.org/autodoc/page/min0int-8

Where was Flight 77 after 8:56?

2007-08-21T19:27:00.000Z

This article has been published on the Loose Change forum a while ago. I was surprised that the fate of Flight 77 is widely unknown, so I re-post it here.

I would like to illuminate the fate of Flight 77 after it vanished from radar because it looks to me that many people don't know much about it, despite its importance.

At 8:56, the blip of Flight 77 vanished from the radar screens of Indianapolis Center, the responsible ATC facility, and at the same time radio communication was lost. This is a well known and well confirmed fact. Just take a look at the ATC transcript:

http://0911.site.voila.fr/transcript.htm

The controllers thought it had crashed and submitted their assessment to other ATC centers, FAA headquarters and American Airlines. This caused the top AA management to believe that Flight 77 crashed into the South Tower - they believed it until the Pentagon strike! There were also rumors going around that a plane crashed near the Ohio-Kentucky border (as confirmed in Richard Clarke's "Against all enemies"), which is exactly the area where Flight 77 vanished (take a look at the Flight Explorer animation in the transcript link).

For sure, the controllers activated primary radar as soon as they lost Flight 77 to look for him, but this measure was obviously not successful. Flight 77 was not detected by any controller until it was picked up at 9:32 by Dulles TRACON controllers. (The only man who knew its position at 9:25 was Norman Mineta...)

For someone who's aware of Operation Northwoods this stinks of a plane swap: Flight 77 crashed or landed somewhere near the Ohio-Kentucky border, and the plane that was detected by the Dulles controllers was not Flight 77.

The 9/11 Commissioners are surely aware of Operation Northwoods, but advocate another theory:

The failure to find a primary radar return for American 77 led us to investigate this issue further. Radar reconstructions performed after 9/11 reveal that FAA radar equipment tracked the flight from the moment its transponder was turned off at 8:56. But for 8 minutes and 13 seconds, between 8:56 and 9:05, this primary radar information on American 77 was not displayed to controllers at Indianapolis Center.142 The reasons are technical, arising from the way the software processed radar information, as well as from poor primary radar coverage where American 77 was flying.

According to the radar reconstruction, American 77 reemerged as a primary target on Indianapolis Center radar scopes at 9:05, east of its last known posi-tion. The target remained in Indianapolis Center's airspace for another six minutes, then crossed into the western portion of Washington Center's airspace at 9:10.As Indianapolis Center continued searching for the aircraft, two managers and the controller responsible for American 77 looked to the west and southwest along the flight's projected path, not east-where the aircraft was now heading. Managers did not instruct other controllers at Indianapolis Center to turn on their primary radar coverage to join in the search for American 77.143

In sum, Indianapolis Center never saw Flight 77 turn around. By the time it reappeared in primary radar coverage, controllers had either stopped looking for the aircraft because they thought it had crashed or were looking toward the west. Although the Command Center learned Flight 77 was missing, neither it nor FAA headquarters issued an all points bulletin to surrounding centers to search for primary radar targets. American 77 traveled undetected for 36 minutes on a course heading due east for Washington, D.C.144

So the Commission thinks that at first, Flight 77 slided into a radar hole and was therefore not visible to controllers. This raises the question why the controllers, who surely were familiar with the position and extent of this alleged radar hole, were so quickly convinced that Flight 77 had crashed.

After that, the Commissions surprises us with their finding, obtained through "radar reconstruction", that Flight 77 reemerged at the radar screens of Indianapolis controllers, but was missed by them, because they were looking into the wrong direction.

Someone here who has the same little trust in the competence of professional controllers?

Then the Commission continues with the claim that Flight 77 crossed the border to Washington Center at 9:10, heading eastwards. But the Washington controllers didn't detect the plane either, because they were "not told to look for primary targets."

This is a breathtaking claim. Of course, Washington Center was informed by Indianapolis pretty early about the loss of Flight 77. Did the controllers expect it to reappear with full transponder data, and did they refrain from activating the primary radar routine for this reason?

The claim is not only an insult to the intelligence of the controllers, it is also wrong. Here is a transcript snippet between Washington Center and NEADS which proves that they were indeed looking for AA 77 for a long time:

09:34:01

WASHINGTON CENTER: Now, let me tell you this. I—I'll—we've been looking. We're—also lost American 77—

WATSON: American 77?

DOOLEY: American 77's lost—

WATSON: Where was it proposed to head, sir?

WASHINGTON CENTER: Okay, he was going to L.A. also—

WATSON: From where, sir?

WASHINGTON CENTER: I think he was from Boston also. Now let me tell you this story here. Indianapolis Center was working this guy—

WATSON: What guy?

WASHINGTON CENTER: American 77, at flight level 3-5-0 [35,000 feet]. However, they lost radar with him. They lost contact with him. They lost everything. And they don't have any idea where he is or what happened.

Bottom line: Whatever happened to Flight 77, it's official flight path after 8:56 is pure speculation, and the evidence suggests that it didn't fly back to Washington at all. To those who say that Flight 77 hit the Pentagon or are agnostic on this question, this is another serious blow.

Mineta and the elusive plane crash at Camp David

2007-05-15T18:41:00.000Z

"With respect to the events of the day, as you know when we took off, both towers of the World Trade Center had fallen, serious fire at the Pentagon which is still raging and has not been brought under control yet. Other planes crashed elsewhere in the United States, one crashed near Camp David and the other crashed out in western Pennsylvania."

Colin Powell, Secretary of State, September 11, 2001, ~12:30 a.m. on a news conference aboard the aircraft that took him back from Lima, Peru, to Washington DC.

In the previous entry I have summarized evidence that Mineta didn't tell the truth in his testimony. Now some questions arise automatically: did he confuse certain facts, or did he lie, and if he lied, why did he do it? In this entry I will deal with these questions and their consequences.

Mineta's motives

Some researchers argue that Mineta "mixed up" times unintentionally. Mineta does not only report the wrong time, however, but the identity of the incoming plane, too, and this was certainly not unintentional. Bob Woodward had interviewed him in January 2002 already:

Transportation Secretary Norman Y. Mineta, summoned by the White House to the bunker, was on an open line to the Federal Aviation Administration operations center, monitoring Flight 77 as it hurtled toward Washington, with radar tracks coming every seven seconds. Reports came that the plane was 50 miles out, 30 miles out, 10 miles out-until word reached the bunker that there had been an explosion at the Pentagon.

Like everybody in the PEOC and the White House, Mineta was aware of the Pentagon crash after 10 o'clock. So as a direct witness of Cheney's shootdown order, he knew that the order didn't refer to the plane that hit the Pentagon, a detail he certainly had not forgotten when testifying to the Commission.

This leaves us with the only conclusion that Mineta lied in his testimony and the interesting question why he did it. I do not claim to be able to look into his head, but there are three key points:

- Vanity: Mineta has shown that he is not immune against giving himself airs; for instance, he claims to have issued the historical FAA grounding order, but in The Mineta Myth we learn otherwise.

- Carelessness: Mineta has shown that his public remarks are not always well thought-out; in this interview from June 2006 he himself delivers contradiction to his testimony in reporting how people were running out of the White House when he arrived there. He testified that he arrived at 9:15~9:20 at the White House, but at this time, there were no panicky people running away. This happened at 9:40~9:45.

- Pressure: Mineta was probably not supposed to talk about certain things that happened in the PEOC. It is only this last point that I will concentrate on now.

It should be noted that his story was on the public market since his congressional testimony of September 20, 2001, that's why he was compelled to repeat it. Weeks later, he was thoroughly squeezed out by Woodward, but he had no motive to fantasize a story out of the blue. So while he was pleased to tell Woodward insider stories of what he experienced in the PEOC, he understandably didn't dare to bust the official story by mentioning "phantom Flight 93" - this is the plane that caused Cheney to issue his "shootdown order".

I will now try to make the case for my main thesis:

Mineta indeed was talking about a plane that was headed towards Washington, and it was identical to the ominous plane that allegedly crashed near Camp David. But the existence and identity of this plane was supposed to be kept hidden. And Mineta played alongside the rules.

Evidence for the Camp David crash rumor

Surprisingly, there is a lot of information to find out about the Camp David crash. So let's chase it down. Whether the crash was fact or only rumor doesn't matter for the moment; what's relevant is that the crash message was common knowledge to a lot of top-level government officials and even leaked out to the media.

Source #1: Powell's news conference; all we know at this point is that a hijacked airliner allegedly crashed in the vicinity of Camp David. No details available yet.

Source #2: CBS News; the following segment was aired at about 11 a.m. We learn here that the plane belonged to United Airlines and had the flight number 93. Source: FAA, via FBI. This is very strange, of course, because the Pennsylvania crash had already been reported 30 minutes earlier by CBS and other stations (without identifying the airliner, however).

JIM STEWART reporting:

Dan, we've just received word from the FBI that a United Airlines flight has apparently crashed at Camp David, the home of--or the retreat of the president. We have no word on casualties. The FBI tells us only that they have a report from the FAA that they are trying to confirm that a United Airlines flight has crashed in the vicinity of or at Camp David.

Only moments ago when I was speaking with the FBI, the thought there was that he would possibly go to Camp David. If this report is true from the FAA by way of the FBI, that would now appear not to be a--a plausible alternative. Where to take Congress, since that--the House and Senate now have been evacuated--is also a question for them to decide.

RATHER: Jim, about this report that a United Airlines plane has crashed into Camp David, Maryland, the presidential retr--retreat just outside of Washington, repeat the source on that for our listeners and viewers, please.

STEWART: The source of this information is an FBI official in Washington who says that he has been informed by the FAA; has not confirmed it, himself, but has been informed by the FAA that a United Airlines flight--he says it's United Airlines Flight 93--has crashed into the vicinity of or at Camp David.

Dan, I will tell you one other thing, too, that the FBI and terrorist experts here have immediately noted. And that is today, September the 11th, is the anniversary of the Camp David accords signed at that historic location after--after weeks of negotiations between the Arabs and the Israelis and, of course, has been a thorn in the de--side of--of both parties now for some years and--and a source of great consternation. You can't help but notice, according to the FBI, the coincidence of the date. And now, if this is true, the coincidence of the target. Dan.

Source #3: Northwestern Chronicle; here we learn that the plane was "forced down" by F-16 fighters near Camp David, which can be interpretated as a shootdown.

Source #4: 9/11 Commission Report; here's a radio conversation between NEADS and a controller from Washington Center (p. 31):

NEADS: I also want to give you a heads-up, Washington.
FAA (DC): Go ahead.
NEADS: United nine three, have you got information on that yet?
FAA:Yeah, he's down.
NEADS: He's down?
FAA:Yes.
NEADS: When did he land? 'Cause we have got confirmation-
FAA: He did not land.
NEADS: Oh, he's down? Down?
FAA: Yes. Somewhere up northeast of Camp David.
NEADS: Northeast of Camp David.
FAA: That's the last report. They don't know exactly where.

The extremely vague description of the crash site - "somewhere northeast of Camp David" - shows that the airplane in question here is not identical to the plane that crashed near Shanksville, because the location of the latter one was known to the FAA with a high degree of accuracy: 15 miles south of Johnstown. Here's a radio talk in reference to the Shanksville crash (Source: 9/11 Commission report, p. 30):

Command Center: O.K. Uh, there is now on that United 93.
FAA Headquarters: Yes.
Command Center: There is a report of black smoke in the last position I gave you, fifteen miles south of Johnstown.
FAA Headquarters: From the airplane or from the ground?
Command Center: Uh, they're speculating it's from the aircraft.
FAA Headquarters: Okay.
Command Center: Uh, who, it hit the ground. That's what they're speculating, that's speculation only.

Which controller would circumscribe the location of Shanksville by "somewhere up northeast of Camp David"? Camp David is about 100 miles away from Shanksville. So this is strong evidence that twe two "United 93"s are not identical, and that NEADS and Washington Center were aware of the alleged Camp David crash, too.

Source #5: Arlington After-Action Report; this report confirms the CBS information about airline and flight number, mentions the same sources (FAA/FBI) and adds a few details: this "United 93" was heading towards Washington at about 10:15 and caused an evacuation of the crash site at the Pentagon. It proceeded on its way and dropped under radar when it was 4 minutes away from the Pentagon.

The first of these (evacuations) occurred at about 10:15 a.m. on September 11, when Special Agent Combs told Chief Schwartz another hijacked airliner was flying on a trajectory toward Washington, DC, and was 20 minutes away. Special Agent Combs got this information from the command center at the FBI WFO, which was in direct contact with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Using a radio belonging to an airport firefighter, he confirmed the information directly with the control tower at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport. The Incident Commander ordered fire and rescue personnel to relocate to the relative safety of a highway overpass. The evacuation required fire and rescue personnel to move in full firefighting gear the equivalent of five football fields. Chief Schwartz issued a warning with each flight status update until the last warning when the airliner went below radar coverage in Pennsylvania, an estimated 4 minutes flying time from the Pentagon. Five minutes later, Special Agent Combs told him the airplane had crashed in Pennsylvania and the all clear was sounded. At 10:37 a.m., United Airlines Flight #93 crashed into a field near Shanksville, PA. The heroic actions of doomed passengers had thwarted the terrorist plan.
...
At about 10:15 a.m. on September 11, the WFO Command Center was notified by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) that another airliner, United AirlinesFlight #93, was hijacked after taking off from Newark, NJ, and was flying on acourse from western Pennsylvania toward the Washington Metropolitan Area. The FAA estimated it would reach Washington, DC, in 20 minutes. The Command Center relayed the information to Special Agent Combs at the ACFDICP who alerted Chief Schwartz. Special Agent Combs located a Washington Metropolitan Airports Authority (WMAA) firefighter equipped with a radio and confirmed the information about Flight #93. Chief Schwartz ordered a complete area evacuation, directing the response force to relative safety beneath nearby highway overpasses. Special Agent Combs stayed at Chief Schwartz’ side, giving him updates as the FAA tracked the course of Flight #93. The last update came when the airliner was 4 minutes away from the Pentagon. Five minutes later, Special Agent Combs reported to Chief Schwartz that Flight #93 had crashed into Camp David in Maryland. In fact, it crashed in a field near Shanksville, PA. Chief Schwartz sounded the all clear.

The PEOC situation

The latter report (hereafter referred to as AAAR) is most important because

- it confirms the CBS report that Washington FBI was the source for the Camp David crash info (after being informed by the FAA);

- it is the missing link between the Camp David crash and the Commission's "phantom Flight 93", matching its time, distance, direction, and flight number (p. 41):

At 10:02, the communicators in the shelter began receiving reports from the Secret Service of an inbound aircraft-presumably hijacked-heading toward Washington. That aircraft was United 93.The Secret Service was getting this information directly from the FAA. The FAA may have been tracking the progress of United 93 on a display that showed its projected path to Washington, not its actual radar return. Thus, the Secret Service was relying on projections and was not aware the plane was already down in Pennsylvania.

At some time between 10:10 and 10:15, a military aide told the Vice President and others that the aircraft was 80 miles out. Vice President Cheney was asked for authority to engage the aircraft.218 His reaction was described by Scooter Libby as quick and decisive, "in about the time it takes a batter to decide to swing." The Vice President authorized fighter aircraft to engage the inbound plane. He told us he based this authorization on his earlier conversation with the President. The military aide returned a few minutes later, probably between 10:12 and 10:18, and said the aircraft was 60 miles out. He again asked for authorization to engage. The Vice President again said yes.

It should be noted that the Secret Service was directly linked to FAA radar data and thus able to track "Flight 93" on his own display. This is confirmed by Richard Clarke ("Against all enemies") and, more clearly than in the final report, in the Commission's "Staff Statement No.17":

At 10:02, the communicators in the shelter began receiving reports from the Secret Service of an inbound aircraft—presumably hijacked—heading toward Washington. That aircraft was United 93. The Secret Service was getting this information directly from the FAA, through its links to that agency. The Service’s operations center and their FAA contact were tracking the progress of the aircraft on a display that showed its projected path, not its actual radar return.

So the Secret Service was able to track the path of "phantom Flight 93" just like the FAA and the FBI. This means that he knew of the crash rumor, and of course he forwarded the message to Cheney and the PEOC crew. Furthermore, Colin Powell had spoken with Condoleezza Rice, who was in the PEOC, and they certainly exchanged the crash information. And Mineta himself was on an open line to the FAA, the primary source of the message. This is sufficient evidence that Mineta was not only witnessing the inbound "phantom Flight 93" in the PEOC, but its alleged subsequent crash at Camp David, too.

But with the exception of Powell, no government official lost a word about the Camp David crash. Note that this prevalent silence was not due to the rumor character of the information; none of the officials shied away from mentioning the rumored car bomb at the State Department despite the fact that it was quickly discounted. But the Camp David rumor was never mentioned by Cheney, Mineta, Clarke, or Rice.

We are now in a position to relive Mineta's perception of the PEOC occurrences.

The Secret Service and the "young man" repeatedly update the politicians about the incoming Flight 93. A very scary situation. At about 10:12, Cheney orders the military to engage the plane, and the order is repeated and confirmed a few minutes later. Then, some minutes later again, a plane crash at Camp David is reported. Mineta must believe that the plane has been shot down there by the air force (there were indeed reports circulating that the plane was "forced down" by fighters). He soon realizes that this shootdown is not meant to become public, so he keeps his mouth shut in his congressional testimony on September 20, but weeks later he can't resist to tell Woodward interesting insider stories about a scary hijacked plane on its way to Washington. The existence of the plane is not part of the official story, however, so he projects his experiences onto Flight 77, not realizing that this distortion of the truth generates plenty of contradictions.

This sequence of events is not meant as proven fact, rather to present a plausible explanation why Mineta was not honest. And it is certainly less speculative than the theory that Cheney issued a "standdown" order to allow Flight 77 attacking the Pentagon because it's not based on the questionable premise that Mineta and Cheney were in the PEOC before the Pentagon strike.

Now is the time for "phantom flight 93" and the Camp David crash to undergo a reality check. Was "phantom flight 93" only a radar blip without corresponding physical existence, or was it a real plane?

Evidence for the existence of "phantom flight 93"

The 9/11 Commission presents a stunning solution for the phantom flight: the FAA didn't submit position data of a real plane, but the "projected path" of Flight 93, i.e they were guessing its position. This means that Cheney's shootdown order was meant for a not existent flight, and that the evacuation of the Pentagon area, disrupting the efforts of so many firefighters, was based on a false alarm.

But you might ask: how can a phantom flight - i.e. a pure radar blip - go "under radar coverage", as reported in the AAAR? And how does it look like when a phantom flight crashes, also reported by the AAAR? And how is it possible that the FAA conveys false position data of a hijacked airliner to the FBI and the Secret Service in the most threatening situation one can imagine?

The Commission's explanation implies that the responsible FAA controllers were complete failures, i.e., they propose the well-known "incompetence" theory. Here's an alternative and better founded answer: the "phantom Flight 93" was no phantom; it was a real plane flying towards Washington. If it was indeed Flight 93 is of secondary interest at the moment. But there is indeed strong confirmation that a plane called "Flight 93" was observed after the Shanksville crash:

In contrast, controllers at the Washington Air Route Traffic Control Center had much more warning that something was wrong. Those controllers, who handled American Airlines Flight 77, which dived into the Pentagon, knew about the hijacking of the first plane to crash, even before it hit the World Trade Center, those involved said. That was more than an hour before they watched another hijacked plane, United Flight 93, cross their radar screen on its way to the Pentagon. ( New York Times, 9/13/2001; )

This is confirmed by Leslie Filson, who has spoken with many military members for his book "Air War over America", p. 79:

Everything was happening at once, says wing safety officer Lt. Col. Phil Thompson, who was now the acting SOF. "We were taking calls from the Secret Service and Washington Center", he recalls. " We have a special relationship with the Secret Service and know these guys by name and face...They were worried about Flight 93."

Neither Filson nor the New York Times nor the AAAR mention a "projected fligh path" or a "phantom flight". Their sources talk about a real airplane named "Flight 93" inside Washington Center airspace. The problem here is that according to the official story, Flight 93 was never in or near the airspace of Washington Center, but crashed at Shanksville which is covered by the adjacent Cleveland Center.

Conclusion: the Commission's fishy claim that the radar signal tracked by the FAA and the Secret Service was just a phantom is contradicted by Filson, the New York Times, and the AAAR. Their sources don't mention a "projected flight path" or a "phantom flight". They talk about a real airplane named "Flight 93", which is not identical to the plane that crashed at Shanksville, however.

The Camp David crash - just a rumor

At Camp David, there were indeed rumors going around that a plane had crashed near Thurmont, which is 3 miles away:

Early reports that an airliner had crashed on or near Camp David, the presidential retreat in Western Maryland's Catoctin Mountains, proved unfounded.

Theresa Hahn, manager of banquet and catering services for Thurmont's Cozy Restaurant, the Camp David haunt of the presidential media retinue, said at mid-morning yesterday that she heard that a plane went down about three miles from Thurmont, in the Catoctin Mountain National Park.
Thurmont is located about three miles east south east of Camp David.

"Lots of fire trucks were on the road and no one can get up there," Hahn said, adding that she had not been able to get through by telephone to an aunt who lives closer to Camp David on the other side of the state park. ( http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4183/is_20010912/ai_n10048109 )

While Mrs. Hahn has observed strange activities ("lots of fire trucks"), her account about a plane crash is only hearsay. J. Mel Poole, Catoctin Mountain Park superintendent, denied a crash at Camp David or Catoctin Mountain Park. An official report of the National Park Service gives no hints either. Lacking any witness accounts of smoke, noise, etc. this means there is no evidence that any accident happened there.

Interestingly, after the crash rumor had popped up in the news, Camp David appeared in the news for a second time, but in a different context:

Rep. James Moran, D-Va., said after a Marine Corps briefing in Washington that Flight 93 was apparently intended for Camp David, the presidential retreat in the mountains of Maryland.

http://www.post-gazette.com/headlines/20010911paplanep3.asp

Unfortunately, we don't learn why Flight 93 was so "apparently" intended for Camp David. Given the 100 miles distance between Shanksville and Camp David, this assumption doesn't make sense and was apparently supposed to "blur the picture" and cover up the crash information that was leaked shortly before. Now the news was not "a plane crashed near Camp David", but "the plane that crashed in Pennsylvania was headed for Camp David". An obvious attempt to sweep the "phantom Flight 93" and its alleged crash under the carpet.

Conclusion: the "phantom flight 93" existed, but it didn't crash; this means it's still unaccounted for. The inventor of the Camp David crash rumor wanted to make the plane - whose existence had been leaked to the media already - vanish from the news as quickly as possible. Its existence was not meant to come to light. And Norman Mineta was not willing to bring it to light. Colin Powell's remark was a singular unplanned mishap.

The Camp David crash rumor seems to be the origin of the "shootdown myth" - a carefully planted limited hangout to make people believe that the government covered up the shootdown of Flight 93. Additionally, it served as a cover-up for the secret and rarely reported landing of a mysterious plane at Cleveland airport...

The Cleveland Airport situation

So what happened to "phantom Flight 93" if it didn't crash, the interested reader might ask. Interestingly, an airliner whose identity is still not clarified made an emergency landing at Cleveland airport at 10:45. The Akron Beacon Journal reports:

Cleveland Mayor Michael White said at a news conference this morning that a Boeing 767 out of Boston made an emergency landing at Cleveland Hopkins International Airport because of fears a bomb was aboard.He reported that air traffic controllers could hear screaming aboard the plane.The 200 passengers were reportedly released from the plane at 11:15 a.m., though White said the pilot was still concerned that a bomb remained.

And according to someone who was at Cleveland Airport on 9/11, this airliner was the same one that was reported headed towards Camp David somewhat earlier:

I'm sure there was a fifth plane involved that was headed toward Camp David; however, that plane was forced (yes forced, militarily) to land in Cleveland. I thought the target could also have be NASA's Glen/Lewis Research Center that is right next to the Cleveland Airport. The news reported that the plane landed because of a suspected bomb on board but they haven't released anyone that was on that plane. The closed NASA and transported everyone that was on the plane there for questioning.

"Phantom Flight 93" was 60 miles out of Washington at about 10:15. If it was intercepted by fighters - and I will present evidence that it indeed was in the next blog entry - and diverted to Cleveland, it would well have arrived there around 10:45, which is the arrival time of the mysterious Cleveland airliner. This is no proof that it is the same plane - but a strong hint.

The next blog entry will deal with the interesting story of Cheney's so-called "shootdown order" and its (non)-execution.

The four lies of Norman Mineta

2007-04-27T19:48:00.000Z

The first lie of Mineta is that Cheney was in the PEOC as early as 9:25. Evidence against:

- White House transcript
- White House notes
- White House record, PEOC Shelter Log, Sept. 11, 2001
- USSS report, "Executive Summary: U.S. Secret Service Timeline of Events" Oct. 3, 2001
- USSS memo, OVP 9/11 Timeline, Nov. 17, 2001
- Statement of Dick Cheney
- Statement of Lynne Cheney

More here:

http://911woodybox.blogspot.com/2007/02/mineta-cheney-5th-plane-and-shootdown.html

The second lie of Mineta is that he himself was in the PEOC at 9:20 already. Evidence against:

- The implausible narrow timeline for his actions between 9:03 and 9:20
- His phone call out of his car to Richard Clarke, which occurred at about the same time he allegedly entered the PEOC
- His own statement that he arrived at the White House when people were running out of it as well as the Old Executive Office Building, an incident that happened at 9:40~9:45, according to all sources (CNN, Richard Clarke, Bob Woodward)

More here:

http://911woodybox.blogspot.com/2007/03/contradictory-statements-of-norman.html

The third lie of Mineta is that the FAA - which he had an open line to during his time in the PEOC - was tracking Flight 77 since 9:25. Evidence against: There is not one single person, neither in the FAA nor somewhere else, who knew Flight 77's position at 9:25.

- The controllers of Washington Center didn't know where it was at 9:25 - here's a dialogue between a FAA controller from Washington Center and a NEADS technician:

09:34:01
WASHINGTON CENTER: Now, let me tell you this. I—I'll—we've been looking. We're—also lost American 77—
WATSON: American 77?
DOOLEY: American 77's lost—
WATSON: Where was it proposed to head, sir?
WASHINGTON CENTER: Okay, he was going to L.A. also—
WATSON: From where, sir?
WASHINGTON CENTER: I think he was from Boston also. Now let me tell you this story here. Indianapolis Center was working this guy—
WATSON: What guy?
WASHINGTON CENTER: American 77, at flight level 3-5-0 [35,000 feet]. However, they lost radar with him. They lost contact with him. They lost everything. And they don't have any idea where he is or what happened.

- FAA headquarters didn't know where it was at 9:25:

The center also contacted the West Virginia State Police and asked whether any reports of a downed aircraft had been received. At 9:09, it reported the loss of contact ((to Flight 77)) to the FAA regional center, which passed this information to FAA headquarters at 9:24.
Source: 911 Commission Report.

- Nobody else in the FAA knew where it was at 9:25:

We have reviewed all FAA documents, transcripts, and tape recordings related to American 77 and have found no evidence that FAA headquarters issued a directive to surrounding centers to search for primary radar targets. Review of the same materials also indicates that no one within FAA located American 77 until the aircraft was identified by Dulles controllers at 9:32.
Source: 911 Commission Report.

- The Secret Service, who was directly linked to the FAA radar data with an own display, didn't know where it was at 9:25. They learned about an incoming plane the first time at 9:33 - after being alarmed by Dulles TRACON controllers - causing them to order an immediate and quick evacuation of the White House.
Sources: 911 Commission Report, Richard Clarke "Against all Enemies"

The fourth lie of Mineta is that he issued the general order to all planes to land at the nearest airport while he was in the PEOC. Evidence against: The order was submitted to the pilots at 9:45. According to Don Phillips, a Washington Post reporter, aviation specialist and FAA insider, the order was given by FAA hadquarters, very probably Monte Belger, because they couldn't reach Mineta to ask him for authorization.

According to insiders, that honor belongs to Monte Belger, at the time the No. 2 official at the FAA. A precise, diligent career bureaucrat known among colleagues as "the Forrest Gump of the FAA," Belger was on a phone bridge with controllers at the David J. Hurley Air Traffic Control System Command Center in Herndon, Va., and ordered flights grounded 15 minutes before Mineta was even notified of the attacks. So, when the secretary issued his blunt order—"Monte, bring all the planes down!"—Monte had already done so.

FAA officials and beat reporters have known this for months. "Any clued-in transportation reporter knows what went on that day," says one. But Mineta apparently does not. After he gave his congressional testimony, FAA officials, including Belger, who is a consummate team player, kept quiet in deference to their boss. Though beat reporters knew the truth as long ago as November, none came forward for fear of being frozen out.

Until last Tuesday, when, at the end of a speech before the Aero Club of Washington, D.C., the Washington Post's veteran transportation reporter Don Phillips let the cat out of the bag. Phillips told his audience he felt it necessary to make a "historical correction," although FAA officials had begged him to maintain the fiction. Phillips proposed, charitably, that Mineta's order was a simple misunderstanding; that the secretary was unaware that "[f]or at least 15 minutes before Mineta's conversation with the FAA, controllers were bringing the planes down ... at the nearest airport." Phillips continued:

I'm told by very high sources that it happened this way: First, the decision was made on a regional basis by some gutsy local FAA officials, and the FAA command center and headquarters officials agreed that it should be spread to the whole country. First, [the FAA] acted. Then they sought permission. A top FAA official ... then called Mineta, finding him in a bunker with the vice president and other officials. He explained the plan, and Mineta agreed.

Then there was a pause in the conversation. You know what many of us do when there is a pause in the conversation. We try to fill the dead time. The FAA official, unfortunately said something like, "Of course we could have let them go on to their destinations, or ..." Big mistake. Norm heard that throwaway line as saying the FAA was still considering letting them go on to destination. He then fired off his now-famous order.

http://www.slate.com/?id=2063935

So it took the FAA more than 15 minutes before they detected him in the PEOC and informed him about the order. But according to Mineta, while he was in the PEOC, he was in contact with Belger since 9:25 (if not earlier). Why did Belger not ask him for authorization at 9:45, why did he have to search for him?

The last article - "The Mineta Myth" - suggests that Mineta liked to swagger a little bit about his role in the attacks. But the similarity of his testimonial account and the incidents inside the PEOC as described in the 911 Commission Report (Chapter I.3, Section "United 93 and the Shootdown Order") is striking and show that he didn't fabricate a story out of the blue. Only his times and the identity of the plane were false.

The next blog entry will deal with the real identity of the plane that Mineta was talking about.

The contradictory statements of Norman Mineta

2007-03-20T19:18:00.000Z

The question whether Mineta told the truth in his testimony, especially regarding his timeline, more and more boils down to the question when he arrived at the White House. If he entered the PEOC bunker at 9:20, as he claims, he must have arrived some minute before.

Some researchers argue that a CNN report, aired at 9:52, proves that he indeed arrived that early because of an evacuation beginning "slowly" about 30 minutes before, i.e. at about 9:22. But the report clearly says that the evacuation lasted at least 30 minutes, so a later arrival is not excluded.

A hitherto unknown interview with Mineta from June 2006 however shows that the CNN report supports just the opposite: a "late arrival" at the WH at about 9:40~9:45.

Here's an excerpt from CNN:

Just moments ago they started slowing evacuating the White House about 30 minutes ago. Then, in the last five minute people have come running out of the White House and the old executive office building, which is the office building right directly across from the White House.
...
It ((the evacuation)) started off as orderly, much like we get when there are ocassional bomb scares near the White House. But then, again in the last 10 minutes or so, the people who came out -- the last several hundred I saw leaving the grounds, were told and ordered by the Secret Service to run. They were running through the gates. These were of course professionals in business suits.

And here is what Mineta says:

I grabbed some manuals and some papers, went down to the car, and we went over to the White House. As we went in West Executive Drive, people pouring out of the Executive Office building, people running out of the White House, and I said to my driver and security guy, "Is there something wrong with this picture? We are driving in, and everybody else is running away."

It is obvious that CNN and Mineta are talking about the same incident: people hectically running out of the West Wing of the WH and the Old Executive Office building, which is just across the street. Thanks to CNN, we can pinpoint it to a time of 9:40~9:45. This is in accordance with all available reports on the WH evacuation.

If Mineta is telling the truth in his testimony, he must have arrived before 9:20. No noticeable evacuation is reported at this time.

Additionally, we learn from Mineta's interview that he spent 4 or 5 minutes in the Situation Room with Richard Clarke before walking to the PEOC. Given that he needed at least 2 or 3 minutes for the 170 yards from the Situation Room (West Wing) to the PEOC (East Wing), and 1 minute to get from the car to the Situation Room, he must have arrived at the WH at 9:10~9:13 if the "early arrival" hypothesis is true. This leaves 7 to 10 minutes for his actions inside the Department of Transportation after the South Tower impact and the 1,7 miles car drive from the DoT to the WH. An extremely narrow timeline, theoretically possible but not plausible.

Furthermore, the advocates of the "early arrival" hypothesis claim that it is confirmed by Richard Clarke in his book "Against all enemies". Again, the opposite is true. Clarke's story proves that an early arrival is impossible. Here's his timeline:

- Clarke is informed about the South Tower crash (9:03) when he is in his car, shortly before arriving at the WH;
- Clarke enters the West Wing, hurries up to Cheney's office and convenes with Cheney and Rice;
- Clarke goes to the Situation room and prepares a video conference with several agencies (CIA, FBI, DoD, DoJ, State Department, FAA...);
- Clarke begins the video conference with the question "Where's Norm?" - he was not able to reach Mineta;
- Jane Garvey, head of the FAA, reports that she has issued a ground stop for all airports of New York and Washington; Clarke requests a grounding order for all airborne flights;
- Mineta calls up from his car; he's on his way to the WH.

Clarke gives no exact times, but clearly Mineta's call came in some minutes after the start of the video conference. According to the 9/11 Commission, the conference start was logged at 9:25; considering Clarke's meeting with Cheney and the preparations for the conference, a starting time earlier than 9:15 is not realistic, which means that Mineta called from his car at a time when he was supposed to enter (or already to be at) the PEOC. A clear contradiction.

A little bit later - after the Pentagon crash - Clarke relates the same story of the WH evacuation that we know already (re-translated from German, apologies to Mr. Clarke):

Meanwhile, Stafford's evacuation order showed effect: the employees left the area, they came out of the Residence, the West Wing and the Executive Office Building (sic!). The uniformed guards of the Secret Service yelled at the women: "If you wear high heels, put them off and run, run!"

Sounds familiar, doesn't it?

While Clarke's remarks insinuate that Cheney moved to the PEOC immediately after the meeting with him, there is no clear indication at what time Cheney actually did. This might have been Clarke's intention.

Bottom line: Mineta did not enter the PEOC at about 9:20. Numerous witness statements, White House logs and documents, Clarke's account, and Mineta himself contradict it. Instead, the following timeline looks much more accurate:

- 9:40 Mineta's car turns into the West Executive Drive, and Mineta notices people running out of the West Wing an the Executive Office Building;
- 9:45 Mineta meets Clarke in the Situation Room and talks with him for 4 or 5 minutes;
- 9: 52 Mineta arrives in the PEOC;

So the question arises: Why didn't he tell the truth in front of the Commission? Why didn't he say that the plane that was heading to Washington was just a "phantom flight" or a "projected flight path"? He was not the one who had to feel embarassed by this misinterpretation. So why did he do it?

This blog will try to give answers, beyond any "projected flight paths" of a "phantom flight". Stay tuned.

Mineta, Cheney, the 5th plane and the shootdown order

2007-02-16T18:52:00.000Z

This essay has been posted weeks ago on diverse forums and is being re-published because of its growing relevance.

The testimony of Norman Mineta in front of the 9/11 panel has drawn much attention recently because his account differs from the official story in one essential point. He claims that he was in the White House shelter (PEOC) with Cheney and his staff at 9:25 when an unidentified plane was heading towards Washington causing Cheney to issue a "shootdown" order (actually, an engagement order).

This is a clear contradiction to the 9/11 Commission timeline. According to this, Cheney entered the PEOC not before 9:55.

Many writers take this contradiction as proof that the timeline of the official story, as laid down in the 9/11 Commission report, is completely fabricated, and that Cheney deliberately didn't prevent the attack on the Pentagon.

This "LIHOP" version of the contradiction is a daring conclusion, however, because it neglects the broad evidence that Cheney was still in his office at 9:25, was taken to a connecting bunker at about 9:37 and finally got to the PEOC at 9:55.This timeline is supported by statements of Lynn Cheney, staff from the White House, and several documents. Here's a quote from the 9/11 report:

American 77 began turning south, away from the White House, at 9:34. It continued heading south for roughly a minute, before turning west and beginning to circle back. This news prompted the Secret Service to order the immediate evacuation of the Vice President just before 9:36. Agents propelled him out of his chair and told him he had to get to the bunker. The Vice President entered the underground tunnel leading to the shelter at 9:37.209

Once inside, Vice President Cheney and the agents paused in an area of the tunnel that had a secure phone, a bench, and television. The Vice President asked to speak to the President, but it took time for the call to be connected. He learned in the tunnel that the Pentagon had been hit, and he saw television coverage of smoke coming from the building.210

The Secret Service logged Mrs. Cheney's arrival at the White House at 9:52, and she joined her husband in the tunnel. According to contemporaneous notes, at 9:55 the Vice President was still on the phone with the President advising that three planes were missing and one had hit the Pentagon. We believe this is the same call in which the Vice President urged the President not to return to Washington. After the call ended, Mrs. Cheney and the Vice President moved from the tunnel to the shelter conference room.211

So the LIHOP version implies that Lynn Cheney and the White House staff are flatly lying and that the following documents are completely faked (take a look at footnotes 208-216 of Chapter I):

- White House transcript
- White House notes
- White House record, PEOC Shelter Log, Sept. 11, 2001
- USSS report, "Executive Summary: U.S. Secret Service Timeline of Events" Oct. 3, 2001
- USSS memo, OVP 9/11 Timeline, Nov. 17, 2001

Not that I think that Lynn Cheney and the other people are not capable of lying. However, if they are lying, their lies are astonishingly consistent (the only contradiction being the Mineta testimony). Occam's razor has often been applicated wrong, but in this case we have at least to consider the possibility that the 9/11 report timeline is wright and Mineta is wrong, for whatever reason.

So let's compare: if Mineta's statement is 100 percent true, this means that a lot of people from the White House are spreading massive lies, and that the corresponding documents are faked.

If however, Mineta is wrong - why doesn't he tell the truth, and where was he at 9:25?

A look at the 9/11 report, Chapter I.3, section "United 93 and the shootdown order" suggests an elegant solution to the problem. Mineta made only one little mistake - he got the time wrong. Make his "9:25" a "10:25", and a completely new view emerges: Mineta was indeed talking about a plane approaching the Pentagon, but it was not Flight 77 at 9:25, but the "phantom flight 93" at 10:25. Here's a quote from the 9/11 report:

At 10:02, the communicators in the shelter began receiving reports from the Secret Service of an inbound aircraft-presumably hijacked-heading toward Washington. That aircraft was United 93.The Secret Service was getting this information directly from the FAA. The FAA may have been tracking the progress of United 93 on a display that showed its projected path to Washington, not its actual radar return. Thus, the Secret Service was relying on projections and was not aware the plane was already down in Pennsylvania.217

At some time between 10:10 and 10:15, a military aide told the Vice President and others that the aircraft was 80 miles out. Vice President Cheney was asked for authority to engage the aircraft.218 His reaction was described by Scooter Libby as quick and decisive, "in about the time it takes a batter to decide to swing." The Vice President authorized fighter aircraft to engage the inbound plane. He told us he based this authorization on his earlier conversation with the President. The military aide returned a few minutes later, probably between 10:12 and 10:18, and said the aircraft was 60 miles out. He again asked for authorization to engage. The Vice President again said yes.219

Here the 9/11 commission commits to the breathtaking theory that the FAA reported a not-existing "phantom" flight 93 on its way to Washington.

I don't subscribe to this phantom flight theory. This so-called phantom was a real plane, it was the mysterious fifth plane reported by all broadcast media in the morning of 9/11 (only to vanish quickly). It landed in Cleveland, as reported in this email (which is also quoted in Loose Change):

I'm sure there was a fifth plane involved that was headed toward Camp David; however, that plane was forced (yes forced, militarily) to land in Cleveland. I thought the target could also have be NASA's Glen/Lewis Research Center that is right next to the Cleveland Airport. The news reported that the plane landed because of a suspected bomb on board but they haven't released anyone that was on that plane.
The closed NASA and transported everyone that was on the plane there for questioning. They are going through the plane and luggage with a fine toothed comb. The original flight plan was from Boston to LA.They closed all exits from the freeway to get into the airport and even bus drivers were told that if they attempted to exit, they would be shot. People that were already at the airport were forced to walk for miles to get transportation home because they were not even allowed to remove their cars from the parking lots.

http://www.911da.org/email/details/503

So this MIHOP interpretation of the Mineta testimony needs no lying White House staff and no faked documents, it needs just a little, probably deliberate mistake of Norman Mineta. Occam would surely have preferred the MIHOP version. Further confirmation arises from the fact that Mineta's statement matches the section "united 93 and the shootdown order" splendidly (leaving aside the little time error). Remember the young man who comes in and asks if the order still stands?

For more information, please read "The Secret Hijacking":

http://de.geocities.com/woody_box2000/secrethijacking.html

The Mineta testimony can be viewed as further evidence for the scenario presented in this article.

The Cleveland Airport Mystery

2007-02-08T20:29:00.000Z

Second Edition: A wargame codenamed "Delta 89" - by Woody Box

--- Now, just to deal with the possibility of the missing United Airlines flight, the mayor of Cleveland, Michael White, says that a Boeing 767 out of Boston has made an emergency landing at Cleveland Hopkins International Airport because of concerns that it may have a bomb aboard. There is some possibility that may be the missing United flight, but we do not know. --- Peter Jennings, ABC News, 11:50 am, 9/11/2001

Introduction

The first version of "The Cleveland Airport mystery" (CAM) was published in May 2004 on the independent news website globalfreepress.com. Despite the title, the text is a sober analysis of all reports, messages and personal accounts regarding the events occuring at Hopkins Airport in the morning of 9/11. It makes the case for the emergency landing of an airliner with unknown identity, but determined by several clear characteristics. Its existence was covered up by another plane in emergency - Delta Flight 1989 - which landed at about the same time. I named the mystery airliner "Flight X".

The article quickly gained attention among the 9/11 research community, was referred to in books by Michael Ruppert, Webster Tarpley and Ian Henshall/Rowland Morgan before enjoying extensive coverage in Dylan Avery's documentary "Loose Change". For someone who wants to know what happened at the airport, it is the most complete survey of the available information on the incident, underlining its relevance. Nevertheless, it has remained controversial, with the judgments ranging from "hoax" (Jim Hoffman) to "excellent research" (Ruppert).

2 1/2 years later, the core statement still stands. There is nothing to retract. This second edition will, after clarifying some misunderstandings and adressing the most recent attacks, examine the role of Delta 1989. This will lead to the surprising detection of a hitherto unknown flight - Delta 89 - which looks like a dark doppelganger of Delta 1989 and bears all attributes of a military exercise, showing how deep the 9/11 attacks were entangled with the ongoing wargames.

The statement

The emergency landing of Delta Flight 1989 is undisputed and determined by the following characteristics:

- Landing at 10:10
- Begin of evacuation at 12:30
- 69 passengers on board
- Passengers were evacuated to FAA Headquarters
- Plane was sitting on a runway near the I-X Center

Local media and eyewitnesses however distinctly report a different plane with different characteristics ("Flight X"):

- Landing at 10:45
- Begin of evacuation at 11:15
- 200 passengers on board
- Passengers were evacuated to the NASA Glenn Research Center
- Plane was sitting on a runway near the NASA Center

All of the ten data are supported by two or more independent sources which are compiled in the original version.

There is a sixth discrepancy. As reported by Cleveland Mayor Michael White, controllers could hear screams and yelling from the emergency plane. Neither Delta 1989 pilots, nor any passengers, nor any controllers remember anything like that happening. White retracted his remarks later, and Cleveland FAA official Jerry Crady wondered "where he got that". But a FAA employee at Hopkins confirms White's first version:

Elaine went to work at the Cleveland Hopkins Airport office of the Federal Aviation Administration. A little before 9:00 a.m. my boss said he heard something on the news about an airplane hitting a building in New York. There was a television on downstairs. We went to the basement and watched the terrible news. About 10:30 Elaine came in and told me there was an airplane sixty miles away headed toward Cleveland. The air traffic controllers in the Hopkins tower could hear yelling and fighting on the cockpit. Elaine's boss had told her to go home.

So we can add the screams as a sixth difference, and en passant we learn from Elaine that the suspicious plane landed after 10:30. Another proof that this airliner was not Delta 1989.

Two recent debunking attempts

Over the time, CAM has experienced various attacks from various corners. All attacks have failed to clarify the identity of the mysterious plane. All attacks suffer from not-existent or poor source analysis and rely on a small subset of the sources of CAM, to put it mathematically. What the attackers should have considered: A failed debunking attempt tends to strengthen the attacked claim, and if it fails pitiful, it strengthens the claim heavily.

The "debunkings" will be adressed in coming blog entrys because this task requires extensive text analysis which would bust the scope of this 2nd edition. I just want to outline shortly the failures of the two most recent hit pieces:

James Renner of the Cleveland Free Times claims to have identified the mysterious airliner. Vernon Wessel, a NASA official, told him about a KC-135, an experimental NASA plane with several scientists on board that landed in Cleveland. However, Renner didn't bother to check if this plane KC-135 was in fact identical to Flight X. It is not:

- Wessel himself says that the scientists were taken to hotels - but the Flight X passengers were taken to the evacuated NASA Center;

- Renner didn't check the passenger capacity of a KC-135. It is about 80 people max - but there were 200 people aboard Flight X.

- Renner missed to ask Wessel for the landing time of the KC-135. That was 10:08, according to FAA records- but Flight X landed at 10:45.

It is possible - if not sure - from Wessel's account that the KC-135 was, just like Flight X, sitting near the NASA Center when unloading the passengers, but this was at a different time. It is certainly not sufficient to choose an arbitrary plane and declare it to be the airliner in question if there are so many discrepancies left. This is simply poor journalism.

In another piece, Dave McGowan has picked up one sentence of the original text: "each version is supported by at least two independent sources" and complains (rather than trying to disprove the sources themselves) that they are not independent because they are all based on White's news conference.

McGowan is simply wrong. While some sources indeed refer to White and are not "independent" in this sense, there are still at least two independent sources for each datum, for instance: airport officials; airline spokesmen; FBI agents. McGowan doesn't seem to know the difference between necessary and sufficient condition. I suggest a crash course in formal logic. The interested reader is advised to check this blog in the coming weeks for a detailed refutation.

Flight 93 and the rise and fall of the WCPO message

CAM does not state that Flight 93 landed in Cleveland. This is a common misunderstanding, and I would like to clear it up now and forever. WCPO, a local Ohio radio station, had posted a short message on its website that Flight 93 had landed in Cleveland. This piece has become most popular among the 9/11 research community, probably more popular than CAM. Here's its history:

After sleeping well for 2 1/2 years, The WCPO story experienced its re-birth in CAM. It was discovered by a befriended researcher of mine with nickname Kesha. Interesting as the Flight 93 info was, I considered it to be of minor relevance for the mystery, particularly because I was not able to find confirmation. But it was worth mentioning, anyway.

A few weeks after releasing CAM, someone picked up the story, isolated it from the article and spread it across diverse websites where it soon got huge attention. People contacted WCPO to learn more, so many that WCPO felt impelled to retract the story and delete it from their site (to be exact, they substituted the story by a disclaimer). However, the original story had been downloaded and mirrored by several researchers already. It was still an embarassment for WCPO.

After the release of "Loose Change"/2ed, WCPO was bombarded with inquiring calls and emails. At February 8, 2006, Liz Foreman, who was in charge for the website on 9/11, published a clarifying comment. Foreman stated that the story was not a genuine WCPO piece, but based on an erroneous AP press release.

My own research has yielded something different. On 11:17, United Airlines published a bulletin regarding Flight 93 and Flight 175 on their website. The crash of Flight 93 in Pennsylvania was confirmed, but Flight 175 was still unaccounted for. A quick comparison reveals that one half of the WCPO story (released at 11:43) was based on this bulletin. The source for the other half was obviously Mayor White's news conference.

Whoever wrote the WCPO story was aware of the United message, so he must have read about Flight 93's crash, too. He pasted together the two sources and obviously overlooked or forgot that Flight 93 was already reported down in Pennsylvania, thus misinterpretating the bulletin.

Despite this "debunking" of the WCPO message there are hints that Flight X was a United plane. At about 11:45, Peter Jennings/ABC News reported the suspicious Cleveland plane in reference to White, and speculated that it might be a "missing United flight". It is not clear, however, if it was Jennings' personal speculation that the plane belonged to United Airlines or if White mentioned the airline in his speech. Someone who was scanning TV and radio stations during the morning of 9/11 has picked up this message:

Confirmed by FAA: United flight (unknown #) diverted to Cleveland (?) with possible bomb-threat on board.

Unfortunately, he doesn't say which station he got this information from. So the evidence for Flight X being a United plane is existent, but still thin.

Why indeed was Delta 1989 considered a hijack?

Considering the way how Delta 1989 and Flight X were "merged" to a single plane in media reports, the conclusion that Delta 1989 served as a cover-up to hide the other plane is not far away. Henshall and Morgan have already noted "curiously conflicting reasons" for its emergency landing and name three sources with three different versions. A closer look reveals even more curiosities.

According to Dave Dunlap, pilot of Delta 1989, he got an order from the airline to land in Cleveland immediately. Several sources confirm this order, but Delta spokeswoman Cindy Kurzweski "declined comment". Delta 1989 was allegedly considered a possible terrorist target because it matched the "pattern" defined by Flight 11 and Flight 175: a Boeing 767 from Boston bound for the West Coast. This explanation is problematic, however, because at this time (9:40) it was not established yet that Flight 11 hit the North Tower, nor was the hijacking of Flight 175, and the identity of the plane that hit the South Tower was entirely unknown. Therefore the "pattern" explanation doesn't work.

An anonymous Delta 1989 passenger reports that another fractious passenger who refused to stop using his cellphone caused the pilot to make the emergency landing. The troublemaker is not reported by any newspaper, but according to all sources, the pilot asked controllers to get permission to land in Cleveland. Because his request came in before the general FAA grounding order of 9:45, controllers allegedly became worried if something was not in order with the plane. But radio contact was never lost, nor the transponder data.

Considering these facts, it is absolutely incomprehensible how the rumours came up that Delta was a hijack or carried a bomb - and why they led to the scary Orwellian measures on the ground: people at the airport were not allowed to take their car, bus drivers were threatened with death if they left the airport, and the adjacent NASA Center with 3500 employees was evacuated.

"Delta 89" - the dark doppelganger of Delta 1989

The sources featured in the previous section at least agree that the landing order came from Delta headquarters. But the 9/11 Commission and others present a completely different version: they identify Boston Center as the origin.

After the second World Trade Center crash, Boston Center managers recognized that both aircraft were transcontinental 767 jetliners that had departed Logan Airport. Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked. Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. NEADS warned the FAA's Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989. The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it, too. (p. 28)

Interestingly, the Commissioners fail to mention the statement of NORAD officer Alan Scott who presented a detailed timeline to them (the underlying video footage is here):

9:27, Boston FAA reports a fifth aircraft missing, Delta Flight 89 -- and many people have never heard of Delta Flight 89. We call that the first red herring of the day, because there were a number of reported possible hijackings that unfolded over the hours immediately following the actual attacks. Delta 89 was not hijacked, enters the system, increases the fog and friction if you will, as we begin to look for that. But he lands about seven of eight minutes later and clears
out of the system.
...
At 9:49, FAA reports that Delta 89, which had been reported as missing, is now reported as a possible hijacking. So again he is --

MR.: That's 9:41, sir.

MR. SCOTT: I'm sorry, 9:41. Again, he is in the system. He is kind of a red herring for us.
...
Getting toward the end now, 9:47 is when Delta 89 clears the system by landing in Cleveland. So he is not a hijack.

This account contains three most remarkable details:

- Scott talks about Delta 89, not Delta 1989. The video shows that he relies on a prepared paper, so this oddity cannot be explained through his bad memory.

- In their final report, The 9/11 Commissioners concealed Scott's remark that Delta 89 was reported missing at 9:27. According to the pilots and controllers however, Delta 1989 was never missing or lost radio contact with ATC.

- At 9:27 Boston Center was not responsible for Delta 1989 anymore; the plane was in the airspace of Cleveland Center since about 9:00, when it was passing Syracuse. (This estimation is easy to do knowing that the plane took off from Boston at 8:25 and was over Cleveland at 9:40.)

Let's turn back to the 9/11 Commission report. It cites a NEADS technician as the source for the 9:41 warning (footnote 155, Chapter I). Luckily, a Vanity Fair article provides us with her name and the exact wording of the message:

9:40:57 ROUNTREE: Delta 89, that's the hijack. They think it's possible hijack.
DOOLEY: Fuck!
ROUNTREE: South of Cleveland. We have a code on him now.
DOOLEY: Good. Pick it up! Find it!
MALE TECH: Delta what?
ROUNTREE: Eight nine - a Boeing 767.
DOOLEY: Fuck, another one -

Surprisingly, we meet Delta 89 again here, so, as already said, we can't blame Col. Scott for the 89/1989 confusion. Can we blame Rountree? Unlikely. Every cab driver, every policeman and every pilot knows that confirming a radioed message is essential for doing the job. If there is only a tiny doubt that the information came through properly, it must be confirmed again. Furthermore, it is hard to see how "nineteen eighty-nine" can be misheard as "eighty-nine" even over a radio channel with poor audio quality. It is absolutely unconceivable that Rountree botched up the message from Boston Center.

The fact that "Delta 89" found its way into NEADS transcripts and timelines and was quoted by Scott 1 1/2 years later confirms that it was no temporary error that was corrected immediately; just to the contrary, we know now that the "wrong" number 89 was transmitted at 9:27 the first time and at least once again at 9:41, but probably everytime when Boston Center contacted NEADS for that matter. And additionally, the "wrong" destination (Las Vegas) was radioed alongside the "wrong" number - Delta 1989's destination was Los Angeles.

For someone who is not ready to believe such a level of incompentence and/or coincidence, the alternative solution is staring him in the face: "Delta 89" was not the same plane as Delta 1989. Another case of hiding a plane by duplication. Let's check if the hypothesis makes sense.

The actual Delta 89 was a normal civilian flight, scheduled to depart from JFK airport, New York, at 3:00 p.m., destination Los Angeles (Source: BTS database). How did it end up over Cleveland at 9:40 a.m.? This dilemma has only one reasonable way out: "Delta 89" was neither Delta 89 from JFK nor another civilian flight. "Delta 89" was the codename for a plane participating in the ongoing wargames. According to Michael Ruppert, there was at least one "live-fly exercise" going on during the attacks - an airliner posing as a hijacked flight.

Taking a look at the personnel in charge for "Delta 89" shows that it fits the conditions for such an exercise perfectly: according to Vanity Fair, Colin Scoggins was the controller who sent the "Delta 89" messages to Rountree. Scoggins was the "military liaison" (scroll down to the end) at Boston Center that day and as such didn't deal with civilian air traffic, but the ongoing military exercises. According to a paper from June 2001 (p. 40), his duty was to coordinate paperwork and flight data for all military exercises within Boston center airspace. Considering the scale of the exercises that day, it is hard to see why and how Scoggins was able to manage also civilian flights. The NEADS technicians Rountree and Dooley were deeply involved in the exercises, too, as the tapes reveal.

The exercise status of "Delta 89" also explains why it was tracked by Scoggins (Boston Center) when it was already deep in Cleveland Center airspace. It was not handed over between the centers like a regular flight. The curious fact that NEADS warned Cleveland Center of "Delta 89" - it should be the other way round - points into the same direction. Cleveland Center was in contact with Delta 1989, but never alerted NEADS (let alone Boston Center) that it was missing or hijacked. And last not least it should be noted that one minute after "Delta 89" was reported missing (9:27) controllers of Cleveland Center were alerted by suspicious radio transmissions sounding like a cockpit struggle. At first, they ascribed the transmissions to Delta 1989, but because Delta 1989 was fine, they "deduced" ex negativo that the struggle originated from United 93. The controllers probably witnessed the begin of a hijack wargame on board of "Delta 89".

So the hypothesis "Delta 89"=Delta 89 implies not only massive incompetence of air traffic controllers in transmitting the wrong flight number; it begs the question why Scoggins from Boston Center exceeded his sphere of competence; and it leads to an absurd information tangle between NEADS and the responsible ARTCCs. The hypothesis that "Delta 89" was not Delta 1989 however leads to the nearly compelling conclusion that it was part of an exercise, which explains all of the discrepancies between the NEADS records and the FAA records. The close similarity of names and time synchronicity suggest more sinister motives of the wargame designers.

The "Delta 89" matter should lead to a closer examination of the NORAD tapes. Michael Bronner, author of the Vanity Fair text, writes: "The fact that there was an exercise planned for the same day as the attack factors into several conspiracy theories, though the 9/11 commission dismisses this as coincidence. After plodding through dozens of hours of recordings, so do I." It would be a nice idea to publish the tapes completely, not only tiny snippets, so everyone can decide for himself if he shares Bronner's and the commission's assessments.

"Delta 89" and Flight X

The clandestine character of "Delta 89" and the Cleveland Flight X entails the question if these two planes are identical. And there is indeed indication that they are (this doesn't necessarily mean that Flight X was a Delta Flight, because "Delta 89" was just a codename). The Akron Beacon Journal from 9/11, the earliest and most authentic report on the matter, delivers all necessary data for Flight X.

- To begin with, it is striking that the first message of the missing "Delta 89" came in at 9:27 - one minute before Cleveland controllers noticed yelling and screams from an unknown plane. These screams reappeared in White's statement on Flight X.

- Flight X was also said to have departed from Boston, just like "Delta 89".

- Flight X was a Boeing 767, just like "Delta 89".

- The evacuation of Cleveland Airport resembles in many points a terror drill, just like "Delta 89".

- Col. Scott himself says that "Delta 89" landed at Cleveland. But he gives the bizarre landing time of 9:47. This time doesn't match Flight X, it doesn't match Delta 1989, and it doesn't appear in the arrival data list for Cleveland Airport. Given that "Delta 89" was south of Cleveland at 9:41 and westbound, it is highly doubtable whether it managed to land at Hopkins only six minutes later. Controllers would have been forced to divert numerous other flights to enable "Delta 89" to go down rapidly - inmidst the confusion over United 93! A highly unlikely scenario, and not reported by anyone. Did Scott get the hour wrong - 9:47 instead of 10:47? This would fit the landing of Flight X neatly.

- At 9:40, "Delta 89" was in the vicinity of Cleveland. Flight X landed at 10:45. If the two planes are identical, question arise regarding the plane's whereabout in the meantime. I have sketched a solution here.

How to prove the mystery

The research for CAM has been done exclusively over the Internet, showing the power of this global network as a tool for uncovering clandestine operations. But the article is also a fruitful approach for doing field research, i.e. going to Cleveland and talking with people to get a clear picture of the events. Here are two suitable points for a thorough examination:

- The passengers of Delta 1989 were taken to the FAA headquarters. This evidence is solid as a rock, confirmed by the pilot, a passenger, and numerous reports. But in the morning of 9/11, local radio stations and newspapers reported that people were taken to the NASA Center. So it needs only a few witnesses who confirm the evacuation to NASA Center to prove the mystery beyond any doubt.

- It might be hard to find witnesses who actually have observed Flight X. There are, however, people who have observed fighter jets forcing an airliner to land at Hopkins:

I'm sure there was a fifth plane involved that was headed toward Camp David;however, that plane was forced (yes forced, militarily) to land in Cleveland. I thought the target could also have be NASA's Glen/Lewis Research Center that is right next to the Cleveland Airport. The news reported that the plane landed because of a suspected bomb on board but they haven't released anyone that was on that plane. The closed NASA and transported everyone that was on the plane there for questioning.

I have received a few emails confirming this, but can't publish them here due to privacy issues. But there are certainly people living near the airport who remember this airliner-escorted-by-fighters, maybe with additional details. This might be the final proof for the mystery, too, because Delta 1989 was never intercepted:

The 9/11 Commission tells us that NEADS sent fighters from Michigan and Ohio. But these fighters never came in contact with Delta 1989. The Ohio fighters took off at 10:17 (Source), seven minutes after the landing of Delta 1989. The Michigan fighters, despite being airborne at 9:40, landed at their home base shortly thereafter and didn't take off again the next minutes. Source

Two Mainers - stranded in Cleveland

I would like to finish this second version with something what Austrians call a "Zuckerl", an interesting little add-on.

Roger Quirion and Brian Guerrette from Maine were passengers on the same Portland-Boston commuter flight as hijackers Mohammed Atta and Abdulaziz Al-Omari. The hijackers "struck them as suspicious", so they were among the first witnesses to tell the FBI about them. In Boston, they embarked on Delta 1989, and ended up in Cleveland.

So far so good. But their story is somewhat inconclusive:

At the airport, FBI agents asked the passengers a variety of questions about the Delta flight, so Quirion and Guerrette said they never thought at the time to give them any information about the Portland flight — or any of the people who were on it.

Guerrette said he did not believe that FBI agents at the time knew of the Portland connection. And being sheltered at the airport, the passengers were unaware of exactly what was happening in the rest of the country, they said.

It was not until Quirion and Guerrette arrived at the hotel at 5 p.m. that they were able to see a television and realize the magnitude of what had happened at the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and in a wooded area in western Pennsylvania.

When they woke up the next morning and turned on the news, they learned that two terrorists had boarded a plane in Portland early Tuesday, headed for Boston. That is when they remembered the two passengers from their first flight who struck them as suspicious.

"Brian came into my room and said, 'Remember those two guys?' " Quirion said.

He said he was not sure the information they had would help FBI agents, but they decided to contact the FBI anyway. They called at 9:30 a.m. Nine agents arrived in less than an hour and interviewed them separately for about 45 minutes, they said.

So being interrogated for hours by the FBI at the airport - why didn't they tell the agents immediately about their encounter with the two strange Middle Easterners, but waited until the next day? Their claim that they didn't think the Portland flight was relevant doesn't sound convincing. Their claim that the FBI asked them about the Delta flight is incomplete - the FBI was very much interested in any "unusual or suspicious activities at Logan Airport", as reported by the other Delta 1989 passenger. Here was the perfect opportunity to tell the FBI about the Portland-Boston flight and the mysterious Middle Easterners. Why didn't they do it?

Have they really been aboard Delta 1989? Or was it "Delta 89"?

Disclaimer: I do not accuse any of the persons mentioned in this article of being criminal co-conspirators. I do believe, however, that many of them were aware of the ongoing military exercises or even participated in them. The fact that the outlined scenario doesn't need the premise that they were conspirators invalidates the argument that a huge number of conspirators on all levels was needed to perform a false-flag attack.

Many thanks to John Doe II of team8plus.org who contributed to this article.

About this blog

2007-02-08T19:59:00.000Z

About Woody Box

Musician and farmer from Germany. Being skeptical of the official story nearly from the beginning, but firmly in the LIHOP camp. Irreversibly converted from LIHOP to MIHOP in Autumn 2003 after being confronted with A.K. Dewdneys cell phone experiment, which was the first physical proof for the impossibility of the official story (long before the work of Steven Jones), fulfilling easily Karl Popper's falsifiability condition for scientific research .

About my research

The 9/11 research community is divided into two factions: journalistic researchers like Michael Ruppert or Paul Thompson and physical researchers like Dewdney and Jones, roughly corresponding the LIHOP(journalistic) /MIHOP (physical) classification.

My research doesn't fit into this pattern. It is mainly journalistic, but strongly points to MIHOP. It validates and brings together two concepts:

- the possibility of changing the identity of an airborne aircraft, at first proposed by A.K. Dewdney;
- the degeneration of military drills into deadly attacks, achieved by small modifications of the original exercises, as proposed by Webster Tarpley.

The combination of these two concepts refutes the often expressed impossibility of performing a gigantic false flag operation like the 9/11 attacks without having thousands of co-conspirators. This blog is created to show that it was indeed possible, beginning with the introduction of a secret flight that actively participated in the wargames.

My oeuvre

1 Flight 11 - The Twin Flight
2 The Cleveland Airport Mystery
3 The Secret Hijacking
4a How to steal an airliner and fake a hijacking Part I
4b How to steal an airliner and fake a hijacking Part II
5 Plane Swap over Pennsylvania

Out of these articles, ## 1, 2, and 5 avoid speculative considerations, but simply gather authentic reports about their respective subjects and show that the occuring contradictions can easily solved by postulating duplicated planes: two "Flight 11" at Boston Airport (#1), two "Delta 1989" at Cleveland Airport (#2) and two "Flight 93" in the skies over Pennsylvania (#3).

Articles ## 4 and 5 resemble the considerations of a police officer in an advanced stadium of a criminal investigation; they include conclusions based on well-founded speculations, but fall short of proof.

My motives

Like all Germans younger than 80, I am deeply influenced by American culture. Donald Duck and Huck Finn were the heroes of my youth. I spent hundreds of hours in front of my computer screen without receiving 1 (euro-)cent. I believe that the American democracy, already heavily damaged, is in big danger if the 9/11 attacks are not solved, and that a failure of solving them will have tremendous repercussions not only for the American society, but the rest of the world, too.

So I do what I have to do.