Delta 89, Code 7112: The Faker Hijack Exercise

The NORAD tapes are proof: Delta 89 was not Delta 1989.

Three minutes after the Pentagon was hit, a strange aircraft with call sign "Delta 89" popped up on the radar screens of air defense commander Kevin Nasypany's crew. It signaled a hijacking and was tracked by NEADS for three minutes before it suddenly disappeared again.

In the official story, Delta 89 doesn't exist. Better to say, for the 9/11 Commission as well as authors Michael Bronner and Lynn Spencer ("Touching History"), the plane tracked by NEADS as Delta 89 was in fact Delta 1989, i.e. a case of sloppy communication.

This, however, is impossible. It is easy to show that, apart from the different call sign, Delta 89's transponder code, flight plan and flight path differed from Delta 1989. The evidence is present on the NORAD tapes, a source of impeccable authenticity because you can virtually look over the shoulder of NEADS technicians while they're tracking Delta 89 on their displays.

To demonstrate why Delta 89 was not identical with Delta 1989, I will go through the NORAD tapes step by step and comment on them. But before starting the analysis, we need to get a rough understanding how NEADS radar works - it's quite different from the FAA radar. Lynn Spencer explains in her book "Touching History" (p.32):

Slow and cumbersome, and not nearly as user friendly as more modern equipment, the NEADS monochromic radar displays are not designed to take internal FAA radar data or to identify radar tracks originating from inside the United States. The system offers little, if any, such low-level coverage over the country.
...
Their radar scopes are filled with hundreds of radar returns not just from aircraft but from weather systems, ground interference. and what's called anomalous propagation - false returns caused by conditions in the atmosphere, or by such obstruction as flocks of birds.

So the NEADS radar screen is filled with countless radar blips from planes - without the identifying data block common to FAA radar, however - as well as irregular radar returns. Only on special occasions like emergency cases, a plane's blip is highlighted and provided with a data tag. Lynn Spencer (p. 25/26):

Pilots have three special transponder codes that they can dial in: 7500 for hijacking, 7600 for loss of radio, and 7700 for other emergencies. Any of them will cause the airplane's tag to light up on his radar screen, but he doesn't see any such tag.

Now we are ready to start with the analysis. The complete transcripts are here. It is highly recommended to listen to the original audio file of the following channels (scroll forward to the respective time):

Channel 4, 1:14:00

Channel 7, 1:09:00

Channel 21, 1:09:00

(Channel 7)

9:39:31 Colin Scoggins, Boston Center military. Hijacked aircraft Delta nineteen eighty-nine. I give you the code 1304, presently due south of Cleveland, heading westbound, destination Las Vegas. And is this one a hijack, Sir? We believe it is. Didn't it squawk hijack? We don't umm...I don't know - it's squawking 1304 if you want to crank him up. 767, altitude 350. Where did it take off? Out of Boston. We're trying to get a tail number on that if you want to get someone up.

90 seconds before Delta 89 appears on stage, NEADS receives a verbal message from Colin Scoggins, the military liaison controller at Boston Center, regarding Delta 1989. The message is affirmed with professional calm. NEADS knows now that one of the many anonymous radar blips near Cleveland is a possible hijack. Note that Scoggins is wrong on the destination of Delta 1989: that was Los Angeles, not Las Vegas.

(Channel 4)

9:41:00 Delta 89 is a hijack, they think it's a hijack, south of Cleveland, we have a code on him now

9:41:05 Good! Pick it up! Find it!

9:41:05 Another one. I hear someone going from Boston going to Las Vegas - another one

9:41:13 Eight-nine. Boeing 767 Boston-Las Vegas. Another one - same place - Las Vegas

In striking contrast to Delta 1989, the appearance of Delta 89 causes big excitement among the NEADS crew. It is echoed through all of the channels. Lynn Spencer interprets this passage as a prompt reaction to Scoggins's message, but there are several reasons why this cannot be the case:

- the different call sign: needless to say, transmitting the correct call sign of an aircraft is an absolute must in aeronautic communication. No air traffic controller would ever get the idea to abbreviate a flight number by omitting the first two digits because that will automatically lead to massive confusion.

- "we have a code on him now" - obviously, the plane has squawked a special emergency code that causes its blip to lighten up on the NEADS radar displays - just as explained above. This is immediately noticed by the NEADS crew and leads to their excited reactions. The data tag informs them about the call sign (Delta 89), the flight plan (Boston-Las Vegas), the type of the plane (Boeing 767) and the cause of the emergency: a hijacking.

- "Another one - same place - Las Vegas" - NEADS is already aware of Delta 1989 which was reported 90 seconds ago by Colin Scoggins. Now Delta 89 - "another one" - appears in the same vicinity. So NEADS does not identify Delta 89 with Delta 1989, but views it as a different plane.

Bottom line: Delta 89's blip suddenly flashes on the NEADS screens - making it easy to follow - and indicates a hijacking. In contrast, Delta 1989's blip is not spotted yet.

(Channel 21)

9:41:05 Another one. I hear someone going from Boston going to Las Vegas - another one

9:41:30 As before is one missing. Start a search. Range 53

9:41:35 288 for 92 miles search only

9:41:46 I have a 280 for 97

9:41:58 I have a 287 for 97

9:42:23 The two really close together. One used - one has a code of 7112 - the one we are next to him

To understand what's going on here, I cite Lynn Spencer again (p. 32):

To identify American 11, the surveillance and ID techs must go through a grueling process. (...) The technicians must first determine which radar data on their screens is for aircraft, which they do by monitoring its movement, which is distinctive for planes. The technician must observe for at least 36 seconds to a minute just to confirm that a blip is in fact an aircraft track. The tech must attach what's called a tactical display number to it, which tells the computer to start tracking and identifying the target. If the target is in fact a plane, then over a period of 12-20 seconds, the computer will start to generate information on the track: heading, speed, latitude, longitude, and the identifying information being transmitted by the transponder.

The NEADS technicians start a "search" for Delta 89, described by Lynn Spencer as a grueling process. But in contrast to American 11, which had turned the transponder off, Delta 89 is tagged, enabling them to curtail the procedure. In the course of the search, they detect two planes "really close together" - Delta 89 and Delta 1989 -, and obtain the squawk code of one of them: 7112. This is not Delta 1989's code, which is 1304, so it must be the code of Delta 89. The first digit "7" indicates that it's not the ID code of an usual civilian airliner - they never begin with a 7. Instead, the 7 is reserved for emergency cases like 7500, 7600, or 7700. By squawking 7112, Delta 89 manages to pop up on the NEADS radar screens and signals a hijacking.

(Channel 4)

9:42:43 Indy Center? Indianapolis Center: Delta eight-nine have you information on that aircraft? I want to give you a heads-up. This is another hijacked aircraft, Boston to Las Vegas with a Mode 3 of 1304. We do have contact. ((repeats informations)) .

9:43:04 I give you a latlong if you need that. Go ahead. 4121 North 08215 West. I'll give you a heads-up that's all we have right now, but he's a confirmed hijack

9:43:16 (Indianapolis Center) We don't show him in our system at this point - you are tracking him, you say? We have him on the radar, Sir - he's headed your way. He's headed our way, okay.

9:43:35 (Indianapolis Center) Boston to L-A-S, right? L-A-X. L-A-X? I've got Vegas, Sir, whatever Vegas says. L-A-S, okay, Las Vegas. Okay, cause we don't show him in the system anywhere. Do you have Mode 3 capability or anything? He's on a 1304 code? Okay, we bring that up.

Now NEADS contacts Indianapolis Center to inform them that Delta 89 is heading for their airspace. This is evidence that Delta 89 is flying southwest- or southbound at that point because the boundary to Indianapolis Center runs 40 miles south of Cleveland. In contrast, Delta 1989 never goes south, and especially at 9:43, it is flying westbound (direction 285) according to the Cleveland Center/Delta 1989 transcript:

9:40:57 (Lorain Radar) delta nineteen eighty nine fly heading two eight five

9:41:00 (Delta 1989) two eight five delta nineteen eighty nine

The next radio transmission between Cleveland Center and Delta 1989 occurs at 9:44. In between, there is no order to change the direction, which is proof that Delta 1989 is not heading towards Indianapolis Center at 9:43 like Delta 89 (according to Stacia Rountree from NEADS).

Back to NEADS:

(Channel 4)

9:44:03 Where did it go? Somebody dropped the aircraft. Who dropped the aircraft? I DON'T KNOW!

(Channel 21)

9:46:25 (?)52 on a 49 for 59 miles searching. We got a 1304 squawk this time

9:46:53 The 1304 guy. That's not the guy then

At 9:44, Delta 89 is suddenly "lost". NEADS doesn't know where it's gone and is unable to track it. Obviously the pilot has turned off the transponder, making himself virtually invisible. The radar technicians resume the search. At 9:46:25, they are able to identify an eligible blip, but it's Delta 1989 this time. Their comment: "that's not the guy then" - the 7112 guy they lost and were looking for.

Now it's time to sum up the data:

Call sign.................Delta 1989.......................Delta 89

Flight plan..............Boston-Los Angeles.........Boston-Las Vegas

Squawk code..........1304.................................7112

Direction at 9:43......westbound......................southwest/southbound

Transponder............continously working..........turned off at 9:44

Did the 9/11 Commission overlook these discrepancies? Unlikely. Did Commission staffers not check Channel 21 with the "code 7112" message? Oh yes, they did! On January 23, 2004, Miles Kara, Kevin Schaeffer, and Geoffrey Brown interviewed Sgt. Susan Marie Rose, whose voice is recorded on Channel 21 as she spots "code 7112":

Commission staff asked Rose is she recalled details on tracking Delta Airlines Flight 1989 or United Airlines Flight 93 (UAL 93). She replied that she and LaMarche tracked a specific suspected hijack that they believe was flight planned from Boston to Las Vegas through Cleveland and Minneapolis Center airspace. This flight, she believed, was headed to a specific airport, and he was maneuvering to turn into the airport to land.

Rose noted that she is uncertain whether the aircraft reflected in Commision staff's recording was one that was search only or one that was a mode three. She surmised there being two aircraft that they followed based on listening to the tapes in which she pointed out a mode three squawking code 1304.

The "surmise" of Susan Marie Rose is certainly correct, but squawk code 7112, evidence for a second plane, is simply omitted in the report. Miles Kara and his colleagues don't seem to be interested in this other aircraft, despite the strange code and the fact that it was considered a hijacking. Code 7112 and Delta 89 were simply glossed over.

The NORAD tapes belong to the most authentic sources for the events of 9/11, and they are certainly not faked, as everyone will attest who has listened to them. As matters stand, the tapes provide watertight proof that Delta 89 was NOT Delta 1989, Delta 89 being defined as the aircraft that was tracked by NEADS between 9:41 and 9:44.

The analysis must not stop at this point. What kind of plane was this Delta 89? Discarding exotic scenarios like a drunken pilot or a foreign intruder playing games with the air defense, the plane's known attributes allow only one reasonable explanation - Delta 89 was a simulated hijacking as part of a military exercise:

- "Delta 89" was a fake call sign. The regular Delta Airlines Flight 89 was sitting at JFK airport and scheduled to depart for Los Angeles at 3:00 p.m.

- The behavior of Delta 89 reminds of a hide-and-seek game. To facilitate the catcher's job, it left its cover and "cuckooed" for three minutes before disappearing in the dark again. Note that military exercises are often termed "war games".

- Delta 89 didn't squawk 7500, the emergency code for a "real world" hijacking, but another irregular code - 7112 - that was immediately interpreted as a hijacking by NEADS technicians.

- According to FAA directive 7110.65, certain beacon codes are regularly assigned to planes taking part in NORAD exercises - "7112" seems to have been one of them:

NORAD will ensure exercise FAKER aircraft flight plans are filed containing discrete beacon codes from the Department of Defense code allocation specified in FAAO 7610.4, Special Military Operations, Appendix 8.

Source

Delta 89 fulfills all conditions for an "exercise faker aircraft" whose job was to simulate a hijacking. Alternative explanations are hard to imagine. Therefore it's time now to establish the central thesis of this text: Delta 89 was a faker hijack exercise.

So what - the interested reader might ask - what impact has this insight on the official story of the 9/11 attacks? Indeed, Michael Ruppert has already pointed out the existence of at least one "live-fly exercise" (with real aircraft involved) in his book Crossing the Rubicon. Lynn Spencer notes: "Today's training exercise runs a number of scenarios, including a simulated hijacking in which the perpetrators overtake an aircraft for political purposes, directing it to an island in order to seek asylum". (p.24) So is the case of "Exercise Delta 89" important at all?

Yes, it is, because of Delta 1989, which was kind of a "doppelganger" plane with nearly identical call sign (promptly leading to confusion), identical aircraft type (Boeing 767), identical origin airport (Boston), and flying in close vicinity when Delta 89 exposed itself at 9:41. Clearly the designation "Delta 89" was carefully chosen by the wargame designers to create a mix-up with Delta 1989. This is the first indication that the ongoing exercises interfered with regular civilian air traffic.

In other words: Delta 1989, in spite of being a regular airliner, played a peripheral role in the exercise. It served as a cover-up for Delta 89. At first, NEADS was alerted by Delta 89, and when this plane stopped squawking and disappeared, the attention shifted to Delta 1989, which was closely observed until its landing in Cleveland.

Half an hour after Delta 1989, another mysterious airliner in distress landed at Cleveland Airport. Just like Delta 89, its existence seems to have been covered up through "merging" it with Delta 1989 - a doppelganger case again. This naturally leads to the question whether the eerie Cleveland plane was identical to Delta 89. Indeed, there are surprising congruences:

- Both planes were reportedly a 767
- Both planes were reportedly coming from Boston
- Both planes were suspected of being hijacked
- Both planes were covered up by Delta 1989

These coincidences allow the formulation of the working hypothesis that Delta 89 and the Cleveland mystery plane are identical. Confirmation pending.

Lynn Spencer spreads misinformation on Delta 1989

Why indeed was Delta 1989 considered a hijack? I have posed this question repeatedly, but there is still no satisfying answer, to put it mildly. Here's Lynn Spencer's version ("Touching History", p. 167):

In the distraction of the emergency ((with regard to United 93)), the crew of Delta 1989 misses the hand-off to the new frequency. The new sector controller for Delta 1989 calls out to the plane several times and gets no response.

News travels fast. Soon, word on the FAA's open teleconference call is that a fifth aircraft is out of radio contact: Delta 1989, a Boeing 767 en route from Boston to Los Angeles, and the flight is added to the list of suspect aircraft.

Now an ACARS message arrives in the cockpit from Delta's Dispatch: "Land immediately in Cleveland." They've already passed Cleveland, but Captain Werener types in a quick "ok." He won't put up a fight, he just wants to get the plane on the ground.

After a couple of minutes, another message arrives in the cockpit from Delta's Dispatch: "confirm landing in Cleveland. Use correct phraseology."

Dunlap and Werner look at each other quizzically. What the hell is that about? There's such a thing as correct phraseology on the radio, but there is no such thing when typing back and forth with Dispatch on ACARS. Those messages are usually casual.

Flustered, the captain does his best to figure out what "correct phraseology" Dispatch is looking for. He carefully types a response: "Roger. Affirmative. Delta 1989 is diverting to Cleveland."

Dunlap is starting to really worry now. They think something is going to happen to this plane, he thinks to himself. They're trying to figure out if we're still in control!

Meanwhile, the captain calls up the Center controller to request an immediate diversion to Cleveland, and then starts inputting the new destination into the flight computer. Dunlap rolls the 767 into a 30-degree bank back toward the airport and pulls out his approach charts.

The Cleveland Center controllers are not happy that Delta 1989, which was out of radio contact for several minutes, has now made a turn toward the large city. They didn't initiate the diversion and they don't know that Delta Dispatch has done so. An abrupt change of course for a transcontintental B767 out of Boston raises further suspicion, and a supervisor announces the new development on the FAA teleconference.

To sum up this passage:

First, Delta 1989 misses the transfer to the next sector because of the turmoil caused by UA 93. At this time (about 9:40) this must be the hand-off from Lorain sector to Bluffton sector, the super-high sector of Cleveland Center which is adjacent to (west of) Lorain sector. As a result, Delta 1989 is not in radio contact with Bluffton sector for several minutes.

Then, the Delta 1989 pilots get a message from Delta Airlines to land in Cleveland immediately.

Then, the captain of Delta 1989 requests an immediate diversion to Cleveland, being back on the frequency.

At last, Cleveland Center, surprised by the request and unaware that Delta Airlines has ordered the captain to do so, gets suspicious of the flight.

This "Lynn Spencer version" of the diversion of Delta 1989 is completely wrong in terms of chronology and facts and easily disproven by the best imaginable source: the radio transmissions between Cleveland Center and Delta 1989.

9:38:52 (Lorain Radar) roger delta nineteen eighty nine there's traffic for you at eleven o'clock and fifteen miles southbound fourty one climbing looks like he's turning east fly heading three six zero

9:39:00 (Lorain Radar) okay thanks delta nineteen eighty nine

9:40:57 (Lorain Radar) delta nineteen eighty nine fly heading two eight five

9:41:00 (Delta 1989) two eight five delta nineteen eighty nine

9:43:56 (Delta 1989) cleveland center delta nineteen eighty nine

9:44:09 (Delta 1989) cleveland delta eighty nine

9:44:10 (Lorain Radar) delta nineteen eighty nine

9:44:12 (Delta 1989) company wants us on the ground in cleveland

9:44:12 (Lorain Radar) say again

9:44:16 (Delta 1989) the company wants us to divert to land at cleveland

9:44:19 (Lorain Radar) delta nineteen eighty niner roger fly your present heading descend and maintain flight level three three zero expect further vectoring for cleveland

9:44:24 (Delta 1989) delta nineteen eighty nine three three zero present heading

9:44:27 (Lorain Radar) delta nineteen eighty nine roger and contact cleveland one one niner point three two

9:44:31 (Delta 1989) nineteen thirty two

http://aal77.com/faa/faa_atc/zob/2%20AWA%202%20Accident%20Package%20ZOB-ARTCC-287%20UAL93%20REDACT.pdf

With this transcript at hand, it is easy to show up Ms. Spencer's grave errors:

1 - Delta 1989 does not miss the hand-off to the new frequency. It affirms the Lorain controller's request to change the frequency to 110.32, which is Bluffton sector.

2 - The message of Delta Airlines to land in Cleveland arrives before Delta 1989 shifts to the new sector, not afterwards.

3 - The controllers of Cleveland Center are well aware that it was Delta Airlines who ordered the pilots to land in Cleveland - simply because the pilot told them.

Unfortunately, the source for the misinformation in Spencer's book is not clear. It is absolutely clear, however, that Delta Airlines' diversion order was well known among controllers and not the reason they surmised it to be a hijacking. Therefore, we can also throw another account onto the dustbin of history:

The Delta flight wants to land in Cleveland? And the captain's request comes before he can know that the FAA wants every flight down. On this day, the fact that the pilot requests to be rerouted before he is ordered to land seems suspicious. Why the urgency?

Controllers don't know that Delta officials, also concerned about the flight, have ordered Werner to land in Cleveland. They continue to send messages to Werner. In code, they ask him if all is OK. Yes, he responds time and again. He doesn't know why they're so worried.

http://www.usatoday.com/news/sept11/2002-08-12-hijacker-daytwo_x.htm

Like Lynn Spencer, USA Today is flatly wrong. Controllers were well aware that Delta officials had ordered the pilot to land in Cleveland.

So the question is still pending: Why indeed was Delta 1989 considered a hijack? Why is there so much misinformation going around on this matter?

NEADS transcript on Delta 89

This is a transcript of all NEADS radio messages related to Delta 89 between 9:39 a.m and 9:46 a.m. Channels 4 and 21 are the most important ones, Channels 7, 2 and 3 give additional information. I have put all the channels in a chronological order at the end ("Channels omni") together with the radio talk between Cleveland Center and Delta 1989).

Extern callers, like Colin Scoggins and Indianapolis Center, are shown in italic. The times should be accurate within +-5 seconds. I skipped repetitions and redundant utterances (like "oops" etc). Everyone is invited to check the audio tapes and verify the transcript here:

http://www.erpn.org/NORAD-911.htm

A transcript of the Cleveland Center/Delta 1989 talk is here:

http://aal77.com/faa/faa_atc/zob/2%20AWA%202%20Accident%20Package%20ZOB-ARTCC-287%20UAL93%20REDACT.pdf

In a forthcoming blog entry, I will deliver an interpretation of these radio talks, put them into context and show up their historical relevance.





Channel 4



9:41:00 Delta 89 is a hijack, they think it's a hijack, south of Cleveland, we have a code on him now

9:41:05 Good! Pick it up! Find it!

9:41:13 Eight-nine. Boeing 767 Boston-Las Vegas. Another one - same place - Las Vegas

9:41:23 Okay what's the special number? What do you've got in on?

9:41:30 Bravo zero-eight-nine is our Delta eight-nine

9:41:42 That's another hijack. Delta eight-nine. Bravo zero-eight-nine is the track. Make that a special fifteen and (unintelligible)

9:42:18 Do you have a possible destination of that Delta eight-nine? It's headed to Las Vegas. Okay.

9:42:43 Indy Center? Indianapolis Center: Delta eight-nine have you information on that aircraft? I want to give you a heads-up. This is another hijacked aircraft, Boston to Las Vegas with a Mode 3 of 1304. We do have contact. ((repeats informations))

9:43:04 I give you a latlong if you need that. Go ahead. 4121 North 08215 West. I'll give you a heads-up that's all we have right now, but he's a confirmed hijack

9:43:16 (Indianapolis Center) We don't show him in our system at this point - you are tracking him, you say? We have him on the radar, Sir - he's headed your way. He's headed our way, okay.

9:43:35 Boston to L-A-S, right? L-A-X. L-A-X? I've got Vegas, Sir, whatever Vegas says. L-A-S, okay, Las Vegas. Okay, cause we don't show him in the system anywhere. Do you have Mode 3 capability or anything? He's on a 1304 code? Okay, we bring that up.

9:44:02 Where did it go? Somebody dropped the aircraft. Who dropped the aircraft? I DON'T KNOW!



Channel 21


9:41:05 Another one. I hear someone going from Boston going to Las Vegas - another one

9:41:30 As before is one missing. Start a search. Range 53

9:41:35 288 for 92 miles search only

9:41:46 I have a 280 for 97

9:41:58 I have a 287 for 97

9:42:23 The two real close together. One used - one has a code of 7112 - the one we are next to 'em

9:43:55 (Background) What the hell is that?

9:46:03 just watch a track (unintelligible).

9:46:13 What's the special at Cleveland? That's what we're all tracking - special fifteen

9:46:25 (?)52 on a 49 for 59 miles searching. We got a 1304 squawk this time

9:46:53 The 1304 guy. That's not the guy then




Channel 7


9:39:31 Colin Scoggins, Boston Center military. Hijacked aircraft Delta nineteen eightynine. I give you the code 1304, presently due south of Cleveland, heading westbound, destination Las Vegas. And is this one a hijack, Sir? We believe it is. Didn't it squawk hijack? We don't umm...I don't know - it's squawking 1304 if you want to crank him up. 767, altitude 350. Where did it take off? Out of Boston. We're trying to get a tail number on that if you want to get someone up

9:42:52 Scoggins, military. We believe that aircraft is a hijack. The Delta Airlines 1989? Yes. We have a tail number for you: N189DL.

9:45:20 Delta 1989 - He has acknowledged he would land in Cleveland, so he might not be a hijack



Channel 2


9:43:45 did you get the word I got a Delta eight-niner south - excuse me - south-south-east of Toledo



Channel 3


9:41:55 southeast of Toledo approximately 75 miles - Bravo zero-eight-nine



Channels omni

(NEADS Channels 2, 3, 4, 7, 21 + Cleveland Center/Delta 1989 radio talk)


..........9:37:54 (Lorain Radar) delta nineteen eighty nine cleveland

..........9:37:56 (Delta 1989) go ahead sir

..........9:37:57 (Lorain Radar) delta nineteen eighty nine turn right now to a heading of three one five

..........9:38:01 (Delta 1989) three one five delta nineteen eighty nine

..........9:38:52 (Lorain Radar) roger delta nineteen eighty nine there's traffic for you at eleven o'clock and fifteen miles southbound fourty one climbing looks like he's turning east fly heading three six zero

..........9:39:00 (Lorain Radar) okay thanks delta nineteen eighty nine

9:39:31 Colin Scoggins, Boston Center military. Hijacked aircraft Delta nineteen eightynine. I give you the code 1304, presently due south of Cleveland, heading westbound, destination Las Vegas. And is this one a hijack, Sir? We believe it is. Didn't it squawk hijack? We don't umm...I don't know - it's squawking 1304 if you want to crank him up. 767, altitude 350. Where did it take off? Out of Boston. We're trying to get a tail number on that if you want to get someone up

..........9:40:57 (Lorain Radar) delta nineteen eighty nine fly heading two eight five

..........9:41:00 (Delta 1989) two eight five delta nineteen eighty nine

9:41:00 Delta 89 is a hijack, they think it's a hijack, south of Cleveland, we have a code on him now

9:41:05 Good! Pick it up! Find it!

9:41:05 Another one. I hear someone going from Boston going to Las Vegas - another one

9:41:13 Eight-nine. Boeing 767 Boston-Las Vegas. Another one - same place - Las Vegas

9:41:23 Okay what's the special number? What do you've got in on?

9:41:30 Bravo zero-eight-nine is our Delta eight-nine

9:41:30 As before is one missing. Start a search. Range 53

9:41:35 288 for 92 miles search only

9:41:42 That's another hijack. Delta eight-nine. Bravo zero-eight-nine is the track. Make that a special fifteen and (unintelligible)

9:41:46 I have a 280 for 97

9:41:55 southeast of Toledo approximately 75 miles - Bravo zero-eight-nine

9:41:58 I have a 287 for 97

9:42:23 The two real close together. One used - one has a code of 7112 - the one we are next to 'em

9:42:43 Indy Center? Indianapolis Center: Delta eight-nine have you information on that aircraft? I want to give you a heads-up. This is another hijacked aircraft, Boston to Las Vegas with a Mode 3 of 1304. We do have contact. ((repeats informations))

9:42:52 Scoggins, military. We believe that aircraft is a hijack. The Delta Airlines 1989? Yes. We have a tail number for you: N189DL.

9:43:04 I give you a latlong if you need that. Go ahead. 4121 North 08215 West. I'll give you a heads-up that's all we have right now, but he's a confirmed hijack

9:43:16 (Indianapolis Center) We don't show him in our system at this point - you are tracking him, you say? We have him on the radar, Sir - he's headed your way. He's headed our way, okay.

9:43:35 (Indianapolis Center) Boston to L-A-S, right? L-A-X. L-A-X? I've got Vegas, Sir, whatever Vegas says. L-A-S, okay, Las Vegas. Okay, cause when I sow him in the system anywhere. Do you have Mode 3 capability or anything? He's on a 1304 code? Okay, we bring that up.

9:43:45 did you get the word I got a Delta eight-niner south - excuse me - south-south-east of Toledo

9:43:55 (Background) What the hell is that?

..........9:43:56 (Delta 1989) cleveland center delta nineteen eighty nine

9:44:03 Where did it go? Somebody dropped the aircraft. Who dropped the aircraft? I DON'T KNOW!

..........9:44:09 (Delta 1989) cleveland delta nineteen eighty nine

..........9:44:10 (Lorain Radar) delta nineteen eighty nine

..........9:44:12 (Delta 1989) company wants us on the ground in cleveland

..........9:44:12 (Lorain Radar) say again

..........9:44:16 (Delta 1989) the company wants us to divert to land at cleveland

..........9:44:19 (Lorain Radar) delta nineteen eighty niner roger fly your present heading descend and maintain flight level three three zero expect further vectoring for cleveland

..........9:44:24 (Delta 1989) delta nineteen eighty nine three three zero present heading

..........9:44:27 (Lorain Radar) delta nineteen eighty nine roger and contact cleveland one one niner point three two

..........9:44:31 (Delta 1989) nineteen thirty two

9:45:20 (Scoggins) Delta 1989 - He has acknowledged he would land in Cleveland, so he might not be a hijack

9:46:03 just watch a track (unintelligible).

9:46:13 What's the special at Cleveland? That's what we're all tracking - special fifteen

9:46:25 (?)52 on a 49 for 59 miles searching. We got a 1304 squawk this time

9:46:53 The 1304 guy. That's not the guy then

The Cessna witness, the WTC North Tower, and the missing page 2

On Nov. 6, 2001, FBI special agent Joan-Marie Turchiano sent a fax to FAA investigator Douglas Gould. The fax consisted of three pages (the page number is in the upper right corner).

Page 1 is the cover sheet with general information.

Page 2 is missing, for whatever reason.

On Page 3, we jump right into an eyewitness statement:

that if the Cessna's transponder was turned off then he would believe that this Cessna was involved in the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center.

#########s advised that he was informed by other tenants in the apartment building that they also observed this Cessna. ########### advised that he will contact ############## with witness contact information.

http://www.911workinggroup.org/foia/911%20COMMISSION%20REPORT%20DATA%20(redact)/5%20AWA%20755%20Package%20Docs%20on%20AAT-200%20LAN%2091101%20Subfolder%20REDACT.pdf

(scroll down to page 12/13)

Page 2 would certainly reveal more interesting information about the circumstances when and where this eyewitness spotted the Cessna. But unbelievably, Page 2 is missing.

Where is Page 2?

United 1898 - the Cleveland Airport mystery plane identified!?

Another interesting find from the http://www.911workinggroup.org files.

"AAT-200" is a special investigation agency inside the FAA and deals with aircraft accidents, emergency cases, near mid-air collisions, and other irregular incidents. As soon as an accident occurs, the involved controllers are obligated to submit a report to AAT-200:

http://www.faa.gov/airports_airtraffic/air_traffic/publications/atpubs/atq/APNDX%2010.htm#_ftn1

The information flow is: local FAA facility -> Regional Operations Center (ROC) -> Washington Operations Center (WOC) -> AAT-200. Example: if an accident occurs in the skies over Ohio, Cleveland Center controllers (responsible for Ohio) send their reports to the Great Lakes Regional Operations Center where it is passed on to the WOC and finally the AAT-200.

On 9/11/2001 at 7:30 p.m. AAT-200 updated a request list from the facilities involved in the attacks:

AEA - Voice and CDR data in RAPTOR format from:

New York TRACON Time 0930-1015ET........................ Received
Washington National - Pentagon................................... Received
Dulles - Both Pentagon and Camp David incidents..........received
Pittsburgh - Camp David incident....................................Received
Washington Center radar for AAL77................................Received
Washington Center voice..................................................Received
New York Center radar....................................................Received
New York Center voice replay.........................................Received
Voice tape Millville AFSS..................................................Waiting

AGL - Voice and CRD in RAPTOR format:

Cleveland for UAL1898................................................Waiting
Cleveland Center radar for AAL77..................................Received
Cleveland Center voice replay for AAL11......................Received
Indianapolis Center radar................................................Received
Indianapolis voice tape via telephone.............................Received
Cleveland Center radar for DAL1989.............................Waiting
Cleveland Center voice for DAL1989..............................Waiting

ANE - Boston Center radar and voice replay................Received


http://woodybox.info/5 AWA 755 Package Docs on AAT-200 LAN 91101 Subfolder REDACT.pdf

The list addresses FAA en-route centers (identifiable by the affix "Center") and airports. In the latter cases, the affix "airport" is obviously seen as redundant and omitted (Washington National = Washington National Airport).

I have highlighted the most interesting entry. "Cleveland" stands for Cleveland Hopkins Airport (as distinct from Cleveland Center). This means that controllers at Hopkins had reported an incident (emergency landing or the like) involving United 1898. They reported it to AAT-200 via the Great Lakes Regional Operations Center (AGL). And AAT-200 was still waiting for voice and CRD data.

However, the BTS database ( http://www.bts.gov ) reveals that United Airlines operated no aircraft with flight number 1898 on 9/11. In plane language: There was no United 1898. So what airliner was being reported by the controllers of Cleveland Hopkins?

In the light of Cleveland mayor Michael White's famous news conference and ample additional evidence that an airliner with unknown identity made an emergency landing at Hopkins "United 1898" looks like an excellent candidate for this mystery plane:

http://911woodybox.blogspot.com/2007/02/cleveland-airport-mystery.html

http://911review.org/inn.globalfreepress/Cleveland_Airport_Mystery.html

Interestingly, Delta 1989, the plane that also landed at Hopkins and apparently functioned as a cover-up for the mysterious emergency landing, was not reported by Cleveland Airport, but Cleveland Center. This means that Delta 1989 was not seen as an emergency case by airport controllers and therefore not reported to AAT-200. The reason why it was reported by en-route controllers remains to be investigated.

More interestingly, the flight numbers of the two airliners - 1989 and 1898 - are very similar and easy to confound, a curiosity amplifying the impression that Delta 1989 was used as camouflage to send the other plane into oblivion.

Most interestingly, the airline of the mysterious plane seems to be United. The controllers were maybe not able to check if the flight number 1898 was operational , but they were certainly able to recognize the United markings.

The most authentic report on the incident was delivered by the Akron Beacon Journal http://911review.org/brad.com/Woodybox/JET-93_land-Ohio.html ):

Cleveland Mayor Michael White said at a news conference this morning that a Boeing 767 out of Boston made an emergency landing at Cleveland Hopkins International Airport because of fears a bomb was aboard.

Combining this newspaper report with the AAT-200 paper results in the conclusion that a United Boeing 767 from Boston landed in emergency at Cleveland Hopkins.

The number of the United Boeing 767's departing from Boston is so small that it should narrow down the search for the identity of the mysterious plane considerably.

The Flight 77 loop - circular, triangular, multiangular or what?

The above picture illustrates the final loop of Flight 77 according to the National Transportation & Safety Board (NTSB), which allegedly relies on military (RADES) radar data.

The statements of nine controllers from Dulles Airport (TRACON), published on my last blog entry

http://911woodybox.blogspot.com/2009/03/dulles-airport-controllers-on-loop-of.html

are still pending interpretation, which I'm going to deliver here. Needless to say, if the official Flight 77 loop is correct, it should match the controllers' accounts.

Here are the key results of my analysis:


1 - None of the controllers mentions the striking circular shape of the NTSB loop. You would expect the word "circle" or "circular" somewhere, but nil return. Quite the contrary, according to some controllers, the radar target was moving along a polygonal path, with corners and straight segments between the corners.

Robert Utley describes a triangular path with two sharp corners: "I observed a primary target approximately 7 miles east of AML, heading eastbound, when the target was about 1 mile west of DCA it made a right turn heading southwestbound. When it was about 3 miles north of DAA it made a sharp turn northbound, when it was about 10 miles east of AML it made a sharp turn eastbound, the target then dropped out of radar about 3 miles west of DCA. Equipment configuration was unknown to me."

James E. Walsh's path is a slight variation to Utley's, adding a corner and thus generating a quadrangle: The target proceeded to a point 1 mile west of Chrystal City and turned southwest to a point 5 miles northeast of DAA. It then made a right turn, 2 miles north of DAA, and proceeded northbound. 3 miles later the target turned northeastbound and shortly thereafter radar contact was lost.

William T. Howell also mentions a sharp turn: "The target went a few miles south of DCA and then made a sharp turn northbound, back in the direction of DCA."

Robert Devery mentions several turns, too, and stresses that, after turning south, "for a few miles, it continued south.", implying that the target moved straight south for a while.


2 - The position data of some accounts are absolutely incompatible with the NTSB loop:

Todd Lewis locates the target east of the Potomac: "The target went just south of the White House then turned southeast and disappeared."

Robert J. Brickley: "The aircraft proceeded to a point approximately 8 miles southwest of P-56, made a right 360 degree turn". The starting point of the NTSB loop is located 4 miles (not 8) southwest of P-56.

Robert Utley claims that the target was "10 miles east of AML (Dulles Airport)" after the loop and turned sharply eastbound before dropping from radar 3 miles west of DCA; so according to him, the target approached the Pentagon from due west, not southwest, as the NTSB data imply.


3 - The statements were made on 9/12/01, one day after the attacks, as part of a routine FAA procedure to document and investigate accidents. Bad memory can therefore neither explain the huge factual discrepancies between the controllers and the NTSB nor the discrepancies between controller and controller. The Flight 77 (?) target popped up on the radar screens for at least 5 minutes, enough time to concentrate on the path and keep it in memory for a few hours. We can be sure that controllers were not conducted by carelessness when filling out the FAA form.


4 - The assumption that the NTSB loop is correct leads inevitably to the question why the controller's accounts are not compatible with it, and what have been the motives of the controllers to alter it. I can't see any reasonable motive in this scenario.

However, the correctness of the NTSB loop is being shattered by eyewitnesses who have seen the plane east of the Potomac ( http://www.thepentacon.com/ ) as well as real-time radio messages open to the public. NEADS commander Kevin Nasypany and his crew have located the target at "six miles east of the White House", a point that is far away from the official loop.

The conflicting accounts of the controllers suggest that they were told - possibly for "national security reasons" - to keep their mouth about the real loop and move it to an area exclusively west of the Potomac. The exact position and shape was obviously not specified, thus generating a logical mess.

In the light of this scenario, the NTSB flight path was probably created by someone who tried to "average" the controller's versions. This must have happened weeks, months, or years after the attacks.

Dulles Airport controllers on the "loop" of Flight 77

Here's another collection of air traffic controller statements, written on 9/11 or the day after and therefore of superb authenticity. Many thanks again to http://911workinggroup.org/ for their efforts to obtain and publish the documents. The URL of these hand-written notes is a pdf file - scroll down to page 145:

http://www.911workinggroup.org/foia/911%20COMMISSION%20REPORT%20DATA%20(redact)/5%20AWA%20928%20Documents%20and%20Data%20Douglas%20Gould%20hard%20drive%20REDACT.pdf

I have not evaluated the position data in detail yet, but the bottom line is: none of the observations match the official Flight 77 loop, some of them are absolutely incompatible with it. The reports of Todd Lewis and Rosanne McConnell, for instance, imply that the plane was east of the Potomac at one point.

Abbreviations:

AML - AML VORTAC navigoid, at Dulles Airport
DAA - Davison Army Airfield, approx. 12 miles southwest of the Pentagon
DCA - Reagan National Airport
P-56 - Restricted airspace over the White House
1330z - Zulu time, corresponds to 9:30 EDT (subtract four hours)



Todd Lewis (TL), South Departure position, 9/11/01

I was working South Departure radar postion when someone mentioned a primary target south of AML heading east at a high rate of speed. This or another controller said we need to call National Approach and warn them. This was done immediately over the handoff line. The target went just south of the White House then turned southeast and disappeared.



William T. Howell, West/South arrival, 9/12/01

I was working the West Arrival and South Arrival positions combined. Danielle O'Brien was working the final position next to me. She leaned in my direction and asked if I have a primary target on my scope just south of Dulles. I scanned the scope and observed the same target. I told her I see it, ad it appears headed eastbound. At that point I yelled for the supervisor and told him we had a target headed eastbound towards the White House. I continued to watch the target move eastbound and then turn southbound. The target went a few miles south of DCA and then made a sharp turn northbound, back in the direction of DCA. I was continuing to give position reports to the supervisor. Shortly after he turned northbound. I no longer observed the target on radar.



James E. Walsh (FM), 9/12/01

The following is a preliminary statement from FM regarding the observation of a primary target just prior to the attack on the Pentagon being reported. It was dictated to TW over the telephone at approximately 9 am on 9/12/01. It should be noted that due to this being dictated and copied inaccuracies may be present.

FM was alerted to a fast moving primary target by QZ ((Danielle O'Brien)), who was working the target 2 miles east of AML. The target proceeded to a point 1 mile west of Chrystal City and turned southwest to a point 5 miles northeast of DAA. It then made a right turn, 2 miles north of DAA, and proceeded northbound. 3 miles later the target turned northeastbound and shortly thereafter radar contact was lost.

The elapsed time of the observation was 1,5 to 2 minutes. During this time FM kept JH and Bob Birckly updated on the position of the aircraft.



Danielle O'Brien (QZ), Final West/East, 9/12/01

I was working the Final West/East position. I observed a primary target approximately ten miles northwest of the Manassas Airport, proceeding southeastbound at a high rate of speed. I adjusted the filter limits on the scope so as to display limited data blocks for altitudes higher than standard to the final control position. No transponder information was displayed for the target.

I moved to the West Arrival position located immediately to my left. I asked the West Arrival controller if he observed a primary target south of Dulles now moving eastbound at a high rate of speed. He agreed with my observation. I was suspicious because I had viewed the media video of the incidents in New York City, and I was aware an aircraft was unaccounted for with Washington ARTCC.

I tried to gain the attention of the TRACON Operations Supervisor (OS) by yelling for him. I again adjusted my filter limits. I tried to contact Washington National's radar controllers via the 62 line. I advised the Dulles TRACON OS of the target's heading and rate of speed. I again adjusted the filter limits. I provided updates to the OS as I observed the target tracking toward the White House. I heard the OS relaying the information vial landline (ICSS) and then via the dedicated phone to the White House switchboard.

I heard Washington National state over the ladline to hold their traffic because the Pentagon had been hit. I do not recall the equipment configuration at the time of the incident.



Rosanne McConnell (RO), North Arrival, 9/12/01

While working radar on the North Arrival position I was alerted by the final controller that there was a primary target in Dulles airspace heading for the White House. I looked for the target and saw it west of the White House. It was primary only and it appeared to be traveling at a very high rate of speed. It then started a right turn and came back towards DCA and the White House. Myself and other controllers gave the supervisor up-to-the-second information as the position of the target. When the target was just west of DCA the target disappeared. Seconds later an unknown DCA c0ntroller told us that the Pentagon was hit.



Robert J. Brickley Jr. (BY), 9/12/01

I observed a primary target approximately 8 miles east of Manassas Airport moving eastbound at a high rate of speed. I advised the OS (other controllers were doing the same). The aircraft proceeded to a point approximately 8 miles southwest of P-56, made a right 360 degree turn, proceeded northeastbound and dropped from radar approximately 6 miles south-southwest of P-56.

Equipment configuration was unknown.



John Hendershot (JH), RS position, 9/12/01

Both World Trade Centers had been crashed into. There was a report that one aircraft had been hijacked and another was missing. Several controllers reported simultaneously to me that they saw a primary target moving at a high speed in DCA airspace heading for the White House. I immediately picked up the hotline to the White House and advised them that Dulles Approach observed a target closing on the White House at a high speed. The White House operator acknowleged. I then immediately advised DCA Approach of the same. I then described the movements of the aircraft on the Critical Event Eastern Region Hot Line as they were described to me by the controllers observing the primary return. I continued this for a short period of time until we lost radar contact with the aircraft. The equipment configuration is unknown.



Robert Devery (DR), North Departure, 9/12/01

I was working the North Dept position when the incident occurred. We had been advised that all departure would be stopped. I was told that I had 2 more coming to me. Both aircraft did depart, were radar identified and handed off to North High as per (SoP?). Shortly after handing off the 2nd aircraft, I heard final controller mention a primary target. The time is not fixed in my mind but it was at 1330z-1335z. The target was eastbound at a high rate of speed based on the tracking of it. I believe that I saw the target initially just to the SE of Dulles. To me it appeared as though it were heading 090 degree +- 10 degree ((east to east-north-east)). It appeared that it was heading towards P-56 where the White House is.

I called to anyone at DCA on the 62 line to advise of a primary target moving fast forward towards P-56. After the 2nd call, someone acknowledged "I see him". At that time or shortly after, someone on the 62 line confirmed "notifying P-56". Then, the aircraft (target) turned south to parallel the North final to DCA as though it was entering a west downwind for Rw((Runway)) 1 at DCA. For a few miles, it continued south. Then, it made a right turn for a moment, it appeared as though it were turning towards a DCA departure being handed off to our High Sector. At that moment, I thought it may try to hit the dept. or perhaps it may be a U.S. fighter checking the area (since the observed target movement was still very fast). However, the target continued the right turn back to a NE heading - again, aimed, in my opinion, at P-56. I think I called again on the 62 line to try to warn DC(A?). Everything was a blur at that moment. Thought someone reaffirmed contacting the White House. Target disappeared approx. 3-4 miles from P-56. Shortly after, DCA called on 62 line to advise that the target had hit the Pentagon.



Robert Utley (UY), AD/DD position, 9/12/01

I observed a primary target approximately 7 miles east of AML, heading eastbound, when the target was about 1 mile west of DCA it made a right turn heading southwestbound. When it was about 3 miles north of DAA it made a sharp turn northbound, when it was about 10 miles east of AML it made a sharp turn eastbound, the target then dropped out of radar about 3 miles west of DCA. Equipment configuration was unknown to me.

Monte Belger vs. Norman Mineta

Who's right? Norman Mineta has repeatedly claimed that he was in contact with Monte Belger (FAA deputy) since the point when Flight 77 was 50 miles out of Washington, and that Belger was tracking the plane on radar:

And a little later on, someone said, "Mr. Vice President, there's a plane 50-miles out." So I was talking to Monte Belger, the Deputy Director of the FAA, and I said, "Monte, what do you have 50-miles out?"

He said, "Well, we have a target, bogey, on the radar, but the transponder's been turned off, so we have no identification of this aircraft. We don't know who it is. We don't know what altitude it's at, speed or anything else. All we're doing is watching with the sweep of the radar, the dot moving from position to position."

So then someone came in, the same person came in and said, "Mr. Vice President, it -- the plane's 30-miles out." So I said, "Monte, can you see it, and where is it in relationship to the ground?"

He said, "Well, that's difficult to really determine. I would guess it's somewhere between Great Falls and National Airport, coming what they call the DRA, the down river approach."

And so then the person came in and said, "Mr. Vice President, the plane's ten-miles out," and so I said, "Monte, where is it?" and he said, "Well, I'm not really sure but I'd be guessing somewhere maybe between the USA Today building and, and National Airport."

And then pretty soon he said, "Oh-oh, we just lost the target." And so a few moments later, someone came in and said, "Mr. Vice President, there's been an explosion at the Pentagon."

So I said, "Monte, is there something -- can you identify it as being at the Pentagon?" He said, "No, we can't really pinpoint it like that."

http://www.msnbc.com/modules/91102/interviews/mineta.asp?0cb=-31a105678&cp1=1
(this link - a MSNBC interview from 9/11/02 - doesn't work at present; the full text can be read here:
http://911woodybox.blogspot.com/2007/10/statements-of-norman-mineta-chronology.html)

Some young man came in and said to the Vice President, "There's a plane 50 miles out coming towards D.C." So I said to Monty Belger, who is the No. 2 at FAA, I said, "Monty, what do you have on radar on this plane coming in?" He said, "Well, the transponder has been turned off, so we don't know who it is, and we don't know the altitude or speed." I said, "Well, where is it?" He said, "It's somewhere beyond Great Falls right now." Then, the young man came in and said it's 20 miles away. I'd say, "Well, Monty, where is this plane in relationship to the ground?" On radar it is hard to associate with a ground point, but they'd be able to tell you roughly the distance from wherever you are, but he couldn't tell you the speed or altitude, and then all of a sudden, as I was talking to him, he said, "Oh, I lost the bogie. Lost the target." I said, "Well, where is it?" He said, "Well, it's somewhere between Rosslyn and National Airport," and about that time someone broke into the conversation and said, "Mr. Secretary, we just had a confirmation from an Arlington County police officer saying that he saw an American Airlines plane go into the Pentagon." So then I said, "Monty, bring all the airplanes down." When you see one of something happen, it's an accident; when you see two of the same thing happening, it's a trend, something. When you see three, it's a plan. So I said, "Bring all the planes down."

http://www.achievement.org/autodoc/page/min0int-8

It is interesting to confront these accounts with two statements of Monte Belger (note that both Mineta and Belger refer to the same time interval 9:20-9:45).

"The most frustrating after-the-fact scenario for me to understand and to explain is the communication link on that morning between the FAA operations center and the NMCC," said Monte Belger, who was the acting FAA deputy administrator when the attacks occurred. "I know how it's supposed to work, but I have to tell you it's still a little frustrating for me to understand how it actually did work on that day."

FAA and Defense officials testified during the final public hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States on Thursday. Belger said the FAA initiated a "hijacking net" at 9:20 a.m. that he thought included the NMCC.

"The hijacking net is an open communication net run by the FAA hijack coordinator, who is a senior person from the FAA security organization, for the purpose of getting the affected federal agencies together to hear information at the same time," he said. "It was my assumption that morning, as it had been for my 30 years of experience with the FAA, that the NMCC was on that net and hearing everything real time," he added. "And I can tell you I've lived through dozens of hijackings in my 30-year FAA career, as a very low entry-level inspector up through to the headquarters, and they were always there."

Belger added that after initiating the hijacking net, he turned his attention to getting airplanes that were still in the air to land safely.

http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0604/062104c1.htm

Between 9:20-9:45 there were many confusing reports about various aircraft being unaccounted for. He ((Belger) heard of a crash on the Indiana/Kentucky border that was thought to be AAL 77. By this point he believes he talked with Bob Baker and Russ Chew at AAL. Jane Garvey talked to Don Carty.

Belger doesn't recall any discussion that morning about the need to contact aircraft in the air about securing their cockpits, even though they were considering an order to land all planes.

With regard to the Primary Net, Belger said he believes that Lee Longmire was in charge. He had the impression that the military was on the line at some point and had assumed that the proper contacts had been made. He had no knowledge about the problem that Lee Longmire shared with the Commission that the NMCC was supposed to be on the Net but was in fact absent for some undetermined length of time. Belger wasn't aware of the NORAD response until after AAL 77 crashed (he subsequently learried that Boston and New York Centers had called NORAD earlier)

Belger was told about UAL 93 after it crashed. He stressed that everyone was very confused about which aircraft hit the Pentagon. UAL and AAL weren't sure what planes hit where. He said that the carriers were searching for information from the FAA not providing it. It took a long time to confirm what aircraft hit the Pentagon.

Belger believes that the "hijack coordinator" would have been the senior security person present who was Lee Longmire. (SEE FAA PROTOCOL ON "Hijack Coordinator).

Belger learned of the crash into the Pentagon shortly after it happened. He and Garvey got on the phone with Norm Mineta who decided to bring everything down (around 9:45) which was implemented. Belger continued to monitor the system as it executed this order. All aircraft were down and the system grounded by 12:15 P.M.

http://media.nara.gov/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00054.pdf

Belger mentions neither the approaching Flight 77 nor being in contact with Mineta prior to the Pentagon crash. In the interview to the Commissioners he indicates that first contact with Mineta was established after the crash. In case he was in contact with him before, this blatant omission would constitute a lie.

So who's right? Mineta or Belger?

Two "Flight 175" taking off from Boston Logan: CONFIRMED

My personal 9/11 researcher "career" started with the detection of a duplicated "Flight 11" at Boston Logan Airport: one departing from Terminal B, Gate 32, at 7:45, the other one from Terminal B, Gate 26, somewhat later because the departure was delayed:



http://911wideopen.com/mirror/twin11-1/twin-11-mod.htm

As opposed to that, the gate departure of United Airlines 175 is indisputable: 7:58 a.m., which is also confirmed by the database of the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS):

http://www.bts.gov/xml/ontimesummarystatistics/src/dstat/OntimeSummaryDepatures.xml

However, the BTS database reveals a strange discrepancy regarding the "wheels-off time" of Flight 175 - i.e. the moment when the plane lifted off from the runway. The BTS notes a wheels-off time of 8:23, which differs distinctly from the "official" wheels-off time, which is 8:14.

This 8:14 take-off is confirmed by the ATC/pilot radio transcript and various radar data. So what about the 8:23? How was this datum being generated?

The wheels-off time of is triggered automatically by a mechanical switcher when the plane loses contact to the ground. The data are sent automatically to the airline via ACARS, and the airline forwards them to the BTS on a regular base. So apparently no human failure is possible. The fact that the gate departure 7:58 coincides with the official story suggests that the data are valid.

Being familiar with the duplication of Flight 11 at Logan Airport as well as the duplication of Delta 1989 at Cleveland Hopkins Airport, I arrived at the inevitable conclusion that this was another case of a duplicated plane - i.e. a "Flight 175" taking off at 8:14 and another "Flight 175" taking off at 8:23. However, there was no independent confirmation, so I hinted at the discrepancy on occasion, but always added a question mark -here, for instance:

http://pilotsfor911truth.org/forum//index.php?showtopic=29

I am now able to proudly present an eyewitness for the 8:23 wheels-offtime of Flight 175: Steven Miller, US Airways pilot, who was next in line behind Flight 175 to take off from the runway:

On the taxi-out in Boston, they ((the pilots of US Airways 6805)) waited at the runway's hold-short line, where Miller looked up to watch a United Boeing 767 take off, United Flight 175. The final weight and balance calculations from dispatch came over the ACARS at 8:05, and with that in hand, the crew was ready to fly. Wide-body aircraft produce especially powerful wingtip vortices - horizontal, tornado-like winds off the ends of the wings - which require time to dissipate before other aircraft can take off, so he waited the required three minutes after United 175 departed before he received his takeoff clearance.

(Lynn Spencer, "Touching History", p. 58)

A quick check with the BTS database reveals that USA 6805 had a wheels-off time of 8:28. Miller explicitly describes that he waited 3 minutes before getting takeoff clearance; adding a little bit for the timespan between takeoff clearance and actual wheels-off, Flight 175 must have lifted off the runway around 8:23-8:24. It is out of the question that Miller observed a plane that took off at 8:14.

Did Miller maybe see a different United plane? Very unlikely. Searching the BTS database for other United Boeing 767's delivers no results for the relevant time. There is a very slim possibility that a non-domestic United Boeing 767 took of just then, because the BTS database lists only domestic flights. However, Miller himself says it was Flight 175; so either he overheard the flight number when taxiing out, or, as someone who was frequently flying from Logan (as he says) he was familiar with the wide-body planes departing at that time.

The BTS database also reveals that the tail number of the plane that took off at 8:23 was N612UA. This was United Airlines Flight 175. And there is no proof that the plane that took off at 8:14 was indeed N612UA, leading to the conclusion that the pilot only pretended to fly United Airlines Flight 175.