Lynn Spencer spreads misinformation on Delta 1989

Why indeed was Delta 1989 considered a hijack? I have posed this question repeatedly, but there is still no satisfying answer, to put it mildly. Here's Lynn Spencer's version ("Touching History", p. 167):

In the distraction of the emergency ((with regard to United 93)), the crew of Delta 1989 misses the hand-off to the new frequency. The new sector controller for Delta 1989 calls out to the plane several times and gets no response.

News travels fast. Soon, word on the FAA's open teleconference call is that a fifth aircraft is out of radio contact: Delta 1989, a Boeing 767 en route from Boston to Los Angeles, and the flight is added to the list of suspect aircraft.

Now an ACARS message arrives in the cockpit from Delta's Dispatch: "Land immediately in Cleveland." They've already passed Cleveland, but Captain Werener types in a quick "ok." He won't put up a fight, he just wants to get the plane on the ground.

After a couple of minutes, another message arrives in the cockpit from Delta's Dispatch: "confirm landing in Cleveland. Use correct phraseology."

Dunlap and Werner look at each other quizzically. What the hell is that about? There's such a thing as correct phraseology on the radio, but there is no such thing when typing back and forth with Dispatch on ACARS. Those messages are usually casual.

Flustered, the captain does his best to figure out what "correct phraseology" Dispatch is looking for. He carefully types a response: "Roger. Affirmative. Delta 1989 is diverting to Cleveland."

Dunlap is starting to really worry now. They think something is going to happen to this plane, he thinks to himself. They're trying to figure out if we're still in control!

Meanwhile, the captain calls up the Center controller to request an immediate diversion to Cleveland, and then starts inputting the new destination into the flight computer. Dunlap rolls the 767 into a 30-degree bank back toward the airport and pulls out his approach charts.

The Cleveland Center controllers are not happy that Delta 1989, which was out of radio contact for several minutes, has now made a turn toward the large city. They didn't initiate the diversion and they don't know that Delta Dispatch has done so. An abrupt change of course for a transcontintental B767 out of Boston raises further suspicion, and a supervisor announces the new development on the FAA teleconference.

To sum up this passage:

First, Delta 1989 misses the transfer to the next sector because of the turmoil caused by UA 93. At this time (about 9:40) this must be the hand-off from Lorain sector to Bluffton sector, the super-high sector of Cleveland Center which is adjacent to (west of) Lorain sector. As a result, Delta 1989 is not in radio contact with Bluffton sector for several minutes.

Then, the Delta 1989 pilots get a message from Delta Airlines to land in Cleveland immediately.

Then, the captain of Delta 1989 requests an immediate diversion to Cleveland, being back on the frequency.

At last, Cleveland Center, surprised by the request and unaware that Delta Airlines has ordered the captain to do so, gets suspicious of the flight.

This "Lynn Spencer version" of the diversion of Delta 1989 is completely wrong in terms of chronology and facts and easily disproven by the best imaginable source: the radio transmissions between Cleveland Center and Delta 1989.

9:38:52 (Lorain Radar) roger delta nineteen eighty nine there's traffic for you at eleven o'clock and fifteen miles southbound fourty one climbing looks like he's turning east fly heading three six zero

9:39:00 (Lorain Radar) okay thanks delta nineteen eighty nine

9:40:57 (Lorain Radar) delta nineteen eighty nine fly heading two eight five

9:41:00 (Delta 1989) two eight five delta nineteen eighty nine

9:43:56 (Delta 1989) cleveland center delta nineteen eighty nine

9:44:09 (Delta 1989) cleveland delta eighty nine

9:44:10 (Lorain Radar) delta nineteen eighty nine

9:44:12 (Delta 1989) company wants us on the ground in cleveland

9:44:12 (Lorain Radar) say again

9:44:16 (Delta 1989) the company wants us to divert to land at cleveland

9:44:19 (Lorain Radar) delta nineteen eighty niner roger fly your present heading descend and maintain flight level three three zero expect further vectoring for cleveland

9:44:24 (Delta 1989) delta nineteen eighty nine three three zero present heading

9:44:27 (Lorain Radar) delta nineteen eighty nine roger and contact cleveland one one niner point three two

9:44:31 (Delta 1989) nineteen thirty two

http://aal77.com/faa/faa_atc/zob/2%20AWA%202%20Accident%20Package%20ZOB-ARTCC-287%20UAL93%20REDACT.pdf

With this transcript at hand, it is easy to show up Ms. Spencer's grave errors:

1 - Delta 1989 does not miss the hand-off to the new frequency. It affirms the Lorain controller's request to change the frequency to 110.32, which is Bluffton sector.

2 - The message of Delta Airlines to land in Cleveland arrives before Delta 1989 shifts to the new sector, not afterwards.

3 - The controllers of Cleveland Center are well aware that it was Delta Airlines who ordered the pilots to land in Cleveland - simply because the pilot told them.

Unfortunately, the source for the misinformation in Spencer's book is not clear. It is absolutely clear, however, that Delta Airlines' diversion order was well known among controllers and not the reason they surmised it to be a hijacking. Therefore, we can also throw another account onto the dustbin of history:

The Delta flight wants to land in Cleveland? And the captain's request comes before he can know that the FAA wants every flight down. On this day, the fact that the pilot requests to be rerouted before he is ordered to land seems suspicious. Why the urgency?

Controllers don't know that Delta officials, also concerned about the flight, have ordered Werner to land in Cleveland. They continue to send messages to Werner. In code, they ask him if all is OK. Yes, he responds time and again. He doesn't know why they're so worried.

http://www.usatoday.com/news/sept11/2002-08-12-hijacker-daytwo_x.htm

Like Lynn Spencer, USA Today is flatly wrong. Controllers were well aware that Delta officials had ordered the pilot to land in Cleveland.

So the question is still pending: Why indeed was Delta 1989 considered a hijack? Why is there so much misinformation going around on this matter?

NEADS transcript on Delta 89

This is a transcript of all NEADS radio messages related to Delta 89 between 9:39 a.m and 9:46 a.m. Channels 4 and 21 are the most important ones, Channels 7, 2 and 3 give additional information. I have put all the channels in a chronological order at the end ("Channels omni") together with the radio talk between Cleveland Center and Delta 1989).

Extern callers, like Colin Scoggins and Indianapolis Center, are shown in italic. The times should be accurate within +-5 seconds. I skipped repetitions and redundant utterances (like "oops" etc). Everyone is invited to check the audio tapes and verify the transcript here:

http://www.erpn.org/NORAD-911.htm

A transcript of the Cleveland Center/Delta 1989 talk is here:

http://aal77.com/faa/faa_atc/zob/2%20AWA%202%20Accident%20Package%20ZOB-ARTCC-287%20UAL93%20REDACT.pdf

In a forthcoming blog entry, I will deliver an interpretation of these radio talks, put them into context and show up their historical relevance.





Channel 4



9:41:00 Delta 89 is a hijack, they think it's a hijack, south of Cleveland, we have a code on him now

9:41:05 Good! Pick it up! Find it!

9:41:13 Eight-nine. Boeing 767 Boston-Las Vegas. Another one - same place - Las Vegas

9:41:23 Okay what's the special number? What do you've got in on?

9:41:30 Bravo zero-eight-nine is our Delta eight-nine

9:41:42 That's another hijack. Delta eight-nine. Bravo zero-eight-nine is the track. Make that a special fifteen and (unintelligible)

9:42:18 Do you have a possible destination of that Delta eight-nine? It's headed to Las Vegas. Okay.

9:42:43 Indy Center? Indianapolis Center: Delta eight-nine have you information on that aircraft? I want to give you a heads-up. This is another hijacked aircraft, Boston to Las Vegas with a Mode 3 of 1304. We do have contact. ((repeats informations))

9:43:04 I give you a latlong if you need that. Go ahead. 4121 North 08215 West. I'll give you a heads-up that's all we have right now, but he's a confirmed hijack

9:43:16 (Indianapolis Center) We don't show him in our system at this point - you are tracking him, you say? We have him on the radar, Sir - he's headed your way. He's headed our way, okay.

9:43:35 Boston to L-A-S, right? L-A-X. L-A-X? I've got Vegas, Sir, whatever Vegas says. L-A-S, okay, Las Vegas. Okay, cause we don't show him in the system anywhere. Do you have Mode 3 capability or anything? He's on a 1304 code? Okay, we bring that up.

9:44:02 Where did it go? Somebody dropped the aircraft. Who dropped the aircraft? I DON'T KNOW!



Channel 21


9:41:05 Another one. I hear someone going from Boston going to Las Vegas - another one

9:41:30 As before is one missing. Start a search

9:41:35 288 for 92 miles search only

9:41:46 I have a 280 for 97

9:41:58 I have a 287 for 97

9:42:23 The two real close together. One used - one has a code of 7112 - the one we are next to 'em

9:43:55 (Background) What the hell is that?

9:46:03 just watch a track (unintelligible).

9:46:13 What's the special at Cleveland? That's what we're all tracking - special fifteen

9:46:25 (?)52 on a 49 for 59 miles searching. We got a 1304 squawk this time

9:46:53 The 1304 guy. That's not the guy then




Channel 7


9:39:31 Colin Scoggins, Boston Center military. Hijacked aircraft Delta nineteen eightynine. I give you the code 1304, presently due south of Cleveland, heading westbound, destination Las Vegas. And is this one a hijack, Sir? We believe it is. Didn't it squawk hijack? We don't umm...I don't know - it's squawking 1304 if you want to crank him up. 767, altitude 350. Where did it take off? Out of Boston. We're trying to get a tail number on that if you want to get someone up

9:42:52 Scoggins, military. We believe that aircraft is a hijack. The Delta Airlines 1989? Yes. We have a tail number for you: N189DL.

9:45:20 Delta 1989 - He has acknowledged he would land in Cleveland, so he might not be a hijack



Channel 2


9:43:45 did you get the word I got a Delta eight-niner south - excuse me - south-south-east of Toledo



Channel 3


9:41:55 southeast of Toledo approximately 75 miles - Bravo zero-eight-nine



Channels omni

(NEADS Channels 2, 3, 4, 7, 21 + Cleveland Center/Delta 1989 radio talk)


..........9:37:54 (Lorain Radar) delta nineteen eighty nine cleveland

..........9:37:56 (Delta 1989) go ahead sir

..........9:37:57 (Lorain Radar) delta nineteen eighty nine turn right now to a heading of three one five

..........9:38:01 (Delta 1989) three one five delta nineteen eighty nine

..........9:38:52 (Lorain Radar) roger delta nineteen eighty nine there's traffic for you at eleven o'clock and fifteen miles southbound fourty one climbing looks like he's turning east fly heading three six zero

..........9:39:00 (Lorain Radar) okay thanks delta nineteen eighty nine

9:39:31 Colin Scoggins, Boston Center military. Hijacked aircraft Delta nineteen eightynine. I give you the code 1304, presently due south of Cleveland, heading westbound, destination Las Vegas. And is this one a hijack, Sir? We believe it is. Didn't it squawk hijack? We don't umm...I don't know - it's squawking 1304 if you want to crank him up. 767, altitude 350. Where did it take off? Out of Boston. We're trying to get a tail number on that if you want to get someone up

..........9:40:57 (Lorain Radar) delta nineteen eighty nine fly heading two eight five

..........9:41:00 (Delta 1989) two eight five delta nineteen eighty nine

9:41:00 Delta 89 is a hijack, they think it's a hijack, south of Cleveland, we have a code on him now

9:41:05 Good! Pick it up! Find it!

9:41:05 Another one. I hear someone going from Boston going to Las Vegas - another one

9:41:13 Eight-nine. Boeing 767 Boston-Las Vegas. Another one - same place - Las Vegas

9:41:23 Okay what's the special number? What do you've got in on?

9:41:30 Bravo zero-eight-nine is our Delta eight-nine

9:41:30 As before is one missing. Start a search

9:41:35 288 for 92 miles search only

9:41:42 That's another hijack. Delta eight-nine. Bravo zero-eight-nine is the track. Make that a special fifteen and (unintelligible)

9:41:46 I have a 280 for 97

9:41:55 southeast of Toledo approximately 75 miles - Bravo zero-eight-nine

9:41:58 I have a 287 for 97

9:42:23 The two real close together. One used - one has a code of 7112 - the one we are next to 'em

9:42:43 Indy Center? Indianapolis Center: Delta eight-nine have you information on that aircraft? I want to give you a heads-up. This is another hijacked aircraft, Boston to Las Vegas with a Mode 3 of 1304. We do have contact. ((repeats informations))

9:42:52 Scoggins, military. We believe that aircraft is a hijack. The Delta Airlines 1989? Yes. We have a tail number for you: N189DL.

9:43:04 I give you a latlong if you need that. Go ahead. 4121 North 08215 West. I'll give you a heads-up that's all we have right now, but he's a confirmed hijack

9:43:16 (Indianapolis Center) We don't show him in our system at this point - you are tracking him, you say? We have him on the radar, Sir - he's headed your way. He's headed our way, okay.

9:43:35 (Indianapolis Center) Boston to L-A-S, right? L-A-X. L-A-X? I've got Vegas, Sir, whatever Vegas says. L-A-S, okay, Las Vegas. Okay, cause when I sow him in the system anywhere. Do you have Mode 3 capability or anything? He's on a 1304 code? Okay, we bring that up.

9:43:45 did you get the word I got a Delta eight-niner south - excuse me - south-south-east of Toledo

9:43:55 (Background) What the hell is that?

..........9:43:56 (Delta 1989) cleveland center delta nineteen eighty nine

9:44:03 Where did it go? Somebody dropped the aircraft. Who dropped the aircraft? I DON'T KNOW!

..........9:44:09 (Delta 1989) cleveland delta eighty nine

..........9:44:10 (Lorain Radar) delta nineteen eighty nine

..........9:44:12 (Delta 1989) company wants us on the ground in cleveland

..........9:44:12 (Lorain Radar) say again

..........9:44:16 (Delta 1989) the company wants us to divert to land at cleveland

..........9:44:19 (Lorain Radar) delta nineteen eighty niner roger fly your present heading descend and maintain flight level three three zero expect further vectoring for cleveland

..........9:44:24 (Delta 1989) delta nineteen eighty nine three three zero present heading

..........9:44:27 (Lorain Radar) delta nineteen eighty nine roger and contact cleveland one one niner point three two

..........9:44:31 (Delta 1989) nineteen thirty two

9:45:20 (Scoggins) Delta 1989 - He has acknowledged he would land in Cleveland, so he might not be a hijack

9:46:03 just watch a track (unintelligible).

9:46:13 What's the special at Cleveland? That's what we're all tracking - special fifteen

9:46:25 (?)52 on a 49 for 59 miles searching. We got a 1304 squawk this time

9:46:53 The 1304 guy. That's not the guy then

The Cessna witness, the WTC North Tower, and the missing page 2

On Nov. 6, 2001, FBI special agent Joan-Marie Turchiano sent a fax to FAA investigator Douglas Gould. The fax consisted of three pages (the page number is in the upper right corner).

Page 1 is the cover sheet with general information.

Page 2 is missing, for whatever reason.

On Page 3, we jump right into an eyewitness statement:

that if the Cessna's transponder was turned off then he would believe that this Cessna was involved in the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center.

#########s advised that he was informed by other tenants in the apartment building that they also observed this Cessna. ########### advised that he will contact ############## with witness contact information.

http://www.911workinggroup.org/foia/911%20COMMISSION%20REPORT%20DATA%20(redact)/5%20AWA%20755%20Package%20Docs%20on%20AAT-200%20LAN%2091101%20Subfolder%20REDACT.pdf

(scroll down to page 12/13)

Page 2 would certainly reveal more interesting information about the circumstances when and where this eyewitness spotted the Cessna. But unbelievably, Page 2 is missing.

Where is Page 2?

United 1898 - the Cleveland Airport mystery plane identified!?

Another interesting find from the http://www.911workinggroup.org files.

"AAT-200" is a special investigation agency inside the FAA and deals with aircraft accidents, emergency cases, near mid-air collisions, and other irregular incidents. As soon as an accident occurs, the involved controllers are obligated to submit a report to AAT-200:

http://www.faa.gov/airports_airtraffic/air_traffic/publications/atpubs/atq/APNDX%2010.htm#_ftn1

The information flow is: local FAA facility -> Regional Operations Center (ROC) -> Washington Operations Center (WOC) -> AAT-200. Example: if an accident occurs in the skies over Ohio, Cleveland Center controllers (responsible for Ohio) send their reports to the Great Lakes Regional Operations Center where it is passed on to the WOC and finally the AAT-200.

On 9/11/2001 at 7:30 p.m. AAT-200 updated a request list from the facilities involved in the attacks:

AEA - Voice and CDR data in RAPTOR format from:

New York TRACON Time 0930-1015ET........................ Received
Washington National - Pentagon................................... Received
Dulles - Both Pentagon and Camp David incidents..........received
Pittsburgh - Camp David incident....................................Received
Washington Center radar for AAL77................................Received
Washington Center voice..................................................Received
New York Center radar....................................................Received
New York Center voice replay.........................................Received
Voice tape Millville AFSS..................................................Waiting

AGL - Voice and CRD in RAPTOR format:

Cleveland for UAL1898................................................Waiting
Cleveland Center radar for AAL77..................................Received
Cleveland Center voice replay for AAL11......................Received
Indianapolis Center radar................................................Received
Indianapolis voice tape via telephone.............................Received
Cleveland Center radar for DAL1989.............................Waiting
Cleveland Center voice for DAL1989..............................Waiting

ANE - Boston Center radar and voice replay................Received

( Source:
http://www.911workinggroup.org/foia/911%20COMMISSION%20REPORT%20DATA%20(redact)/5%20AWA%20755%20Package%20Docs%20on%20AAT-200%20LAN%2091101%20Subfolder%20REDACT.pdf )

The list addresses FAA en-route centers (identifiable by the affix "Center") and airports. In the latter cases, the affix "airport" is obviously seen as redundant and omitted (Washington National = Washington National Airport).

I have highlighted the most interesting entry. "Cleveland" stands for Cleveland Hopkins Airport (as distinct from Cleveland Center). This means that controllers at Hopkins had reported an incident (emergency landing or the like) involving United 1898. They reported it to AAT-200 via the Great Lakes Regional Operations Center (AGL). And AAT-200 was still waiting for voice and CRD data.

However, the BTS database ( http://www.bts.gov ) reveals that United Airlines operated no aircraft with flight number 1898 on 9/11. In plane language: There was no United 1898. So what airliner was being reported by the controllers of Cleveland Hopkins?

In the light of Cleveland mayor Michael White's famous news conference and ample additional evidence that an airliner with unknown identity made an emergency landing at Hopkins "United 1898" looks like an excellent candidate for this mystery plane:

http://911woodybox.blogspot.com/2007/02/cleveland-airport-mystery.html

http://911review.org/inn.globalfreepress/Cleveland_Airport_Mystery.html

Interestingly, Delta 1989, the plane that also landed at Hopkins and apparently functioned as a cover-up for the mysterious emergency landing, was not reported by Cleveland Airport, but Cleveland Center. This means that Delta 1989 was not seen as an emergency case by airport controllers and therefore not reported to AAT-200. The reason why it was reported by en-route controllers remains to be investigated.

More interestingly, the flight numbers of the two airliners - 1989 and 1898 - are very similar and easy to confound, a curiosity amplifying the impression that Delta 1989 was used as camouflage to send the other plane into oblivion.

Most interestingly, the airline of the mysterious plane seems to be United. The controllers were maybe not able to check if the flight number 1898 was operational , but they were certainly able to recognize the United markings.

The most authentic report on the incident was delivered by the Akron Beacon Journal http://911review.org/brad.com/Woodybox/JET-93_land-Ohio.html ):

Cleveland Mayor Michael White said at a news conference this morning that a Boeing 767 out of Boston made an emergency landing at Cleveland Hopkins International Airport because of fears a bomb was aboard.

Combining this newspaper report with the AAT-200 paper results in the conclusion that a United Boeing 767 from Boston landed in emergency at Cleveland Hopkins.

The number of the United Boeing 767's departing from Boston is so small that it should narrow down the search for the identity of the mysterious plane considerably.

The Flight 77 loop - circular, triangular, multiangular or what?

The above picture illustrates the final loop of Flight 77 according to the National Transportation & Safety Board (NTSB), which allegedly relies on military (RADES) radar data.

The statements of nine controllers from Dulles Airport (TRACON), published on my last blog entry

http://911woodybox.blogspot.com/2009/03/dulles-airport-controllers-on-loop-of.html

are still pending interpretation, which I'm going to deliver here. Needless to say, if the official Flight 77 loop is correct, it should match the controllers' accounts.

Here are the key results of my analysis:


1 - None of the controllers mentions the striking circular shape of the NTSB loop. You would expect the word "circle" or "circular" somewhere, but nil return. Quite the contrary, according to some controllers, the radar target was moving along a polygonal path, with corners and straight segments between the corners.

Robert Utley describes a triangular path with two sharp corners: "I observed a primary target approximately 7 miles east of AML, heading eastbound, when the target was about 1 mile west of DCA it made a right turn heading southwestbound. When it was about 3 miles north of DAA it made a sharp turn northbound, when it was about 10 miles east of AML it made a sharp turn eastbound, the target then dropped out of radar about 3 miles west of DCA. Equipment configuration was unknown to me."

James E. Walsh's path is a slight variation to Utley's, adding a corner and thus generating a quadrangle: The target proceeded to a point 1 mile west of Chrystal City and turned southwest to a point 5 miles northeast of DAA. It then made a right turn, 2 miles north of DAA, and proceeded northbound. 3 miles later the target turned northeastbound and shortly thereafter radar contact was lost.

William T. Howell also mentions a sharp turn: "The target went a few miles south of DCA and then made a sharp turn northbound, back in the direction of DCA."

Robert Devery mentions several turns, too, and stresses that, after turning south, "for a few miles, it continued south.", implying that the target moved straight south for a while.


2 - The position data of some accounts are absolutely incompatible with the NTSB loop:

Todd Lewis locates the target east of the Potomac: "The target went just south of the White House then turned southeast and disappeared."

Robert J. Brickley: "The aircraft proceeded to a point approximately 8 miles southwest of P-56, made a right 360 degree turn". The starting point of the NTSB loop is located 4 miles (not 8) southwest of P-56.

Robert Utley claims that the target was "10 miles east of AML (Dulles Airport)" after the loop and turned sharply eastbound before dropping from radar 3 miles west of DCA; so according to him, the target approached the Pentagon from due west, not southwest, as the NTSB data imply.


3 - The statements were made on 9/12/01, one day after the attacks, as part of a routine FAA procedure to document and investigate accidents. Bad memory can therefore neither explain the huge factual discrepancies between the controllers and the NTSB nor the discrepancies between controller and controller. The Flight 77 (?) target popped up on the radar screens for at least 5 minutes, enough time to concentrate on the path and keep it in memory for a few hours. We can be sure that controllers were not conducted by carelessness when filling out the FAA form.


4 - The assumption that the NTSB loop is correct leads inevitably to the question why the controller's accounts are not compatible with it, and what have been the motives of the controllers to alter it. I can't see any reasonable motive in this scenario.

However, the correctness of the NTSB loop is being shattered by eyewitnesses who have seen the plane east of the Potomac ( http://www.thepentacon.com/ ) as well as real-time radio messages open to the public. NEADS commander Kevin Nasypany and his crew have located the target at "six miles east of the White House", a point that is far away from the official loop.

The conflicting accounts of the controllers suggest that they were told - possibly for "national security reasons" - to keep their mouth about the real loop and move it to an area exclusively west of the Potomac. The exact position and shape was obviously not specified, thus generating a logical mess.

In the light of this scenario, the NTSB flight path was probably created by someone who tried to "average" the controller's versions. This must have happened weeks, months, or years after the attacks.

Dulles Airport controllers on the "loop" of Flight 77

Here's another collection of air traffic controller statements, written on 9/11 or the day after and therefore of superb authenticity. Many thanks again to http://911workinggroup.org/ for their efforts to obtain and publish the documents. The URL of these hand-written notes is a pdf file - scroll down to page 145:

http://www.911workinggroup.org/foia/911%20COMMISSION%20REPORT%20DATA%20(redact)/5%20AWA%20928%20Documents%20and%20Data%20Douglas%20Gould%20hard%20drive%20REDACT.pdf

I have not evaluated the position data in detail yet, but the bottom line is: none of the observations match the official Flight 77 loop, some of them are absolutely incompatible with it. The reports of Todd Lewis and Rosanne McConnell, for instance, imply that the plane was east of the Potomac at one point.

Abbreviations:

AML - AML VORTAC navigoid, at Dulles Airport
DAA - Davison Army Airfield, approx. 12 miles southwest of the Pentagon
DCA - Reagan National Airport
P-56 - Restricted airspace over the White House
1330z - Zulu time, corresponds to 9:30 EDT (subtract four hours)



Todd Lewis (TL), South Departure position, 9/11/01

I was working South Departure radar postion when someone mentioned a primary target south of AML heading east at a high rate of speed. This or another controller said we need to call National Approach and warn them. This was done immediately over the handoff line. The target went just south of the White House then turned southeast and disappeared.



William T. Howell, West/South arrival, 9/12/01

I was working the West Arrival and South Arrival positions combined. Danielle O'Brien was working the final position next to me. She leaned in my direction and asked if I have a primary target on my scope just south of Dulles. I scanned the scope and observed the same target. I told her I see it, ad it appears headed eastbound. At that point I yelled for the supervisor and told him we had a target headed eastbound towards the White House. I continued to watch the target move eastbound and then turn southbound. The target went a few miles south of DCA and then made a sharp turn northbound, back in the direction of DCA. I was continuing to give position reports to the supervisor. Shortly after he turned northbound. I no longer observed the target on radar.



James E. Walsh (FM), 9/12/01

The following is a preliminary statement from FM regarding the observation of a primary target just prior to the attack on the Pentagon being reported. It was dictated to TW over the telephone at approximately 9 am on 9/12/01. It should be noted that due to this being dictated and copied inaccuracies may be present.

FM was alerted to a fast moving primary target by QZ ((Danielle O'Brien)), who was working the target 2 miles east of AML. The target proceeded to a point 1 mile west of Chrystal City and turned southwest to a point 5 miles northeast of DAA. It then made a right turn, 2 miles north of DAA, and proceeded northbound. 3 miles later the target turned northeastbound and shortly thereafter radar contact was lost.

The elapsed time of the observation was 1,5 to 2 minutes. During this time FM kept JH and Bob Birckly updated on the position of the aircraft.



Danielle O'Brien (QZ), Final West/East, 9/12/01

I was working the Final West/East position. I observed a primary target approximately ten miles northwest of the Manassas Airport, proceeding southeastbound at a high rate of speed. I adjusted the filter limits on the scope so as to display limited data blocks for altitudes higher than standard to the final control position. No transponder information was displayed for the target.

I moved to the West Arrival position located immediately to my left. I asked the West Arrival controller if he observed a primary target south of Dulles now moving eastbound at a high rate of speed. He agreed with my observation. I was suspicious because I had viewed the media video of the incidents in New York City, and I was aware an aircraft was unaccounted for with Washington ARTCC.

I tried to gain the attention of the TRACON Operations Supervisor (OS) by yelling for him. I again adjusted my filter limits. I tried to contact Washington National's radar controllers via the 62 line. I advised the Dulles TRACON OS of the target's heading and rate of speed. I again adjusted the filter limits. I provided updates to the OS as I observed the target tracking toward the White House. I heard the OS relaying the information vial landline (ICSS) and then via the dedicated phone to the White House switchboard.

I heard Washington National state over the ladline to hold their traffic because the Pentagon had been hit. I do not recall the equipment configuration at the time of the incident.



Rosanne McConnell (RO), North Arrival, 9/12/01

While working radar on the North Arrival position I was alerted by the final controller that there was a primary target in Dulles airspace heading for the White House. I looked for the target and saw it west of the White House. It was primary only and it appeared to be traveling at a very high rate of speed. It then started a right turn and came back towards DCA and the White House. Myself and other controllers gave the supervisor up-to-the-second information as the position of the target. When the target was just west of DCA the target disappeared. Seconds later an unknown DCA c0ntroller told us that the Pentagon was hit.



Robert J. Brickley Jr. (BY), 9/12/01

I observed a primary target approximately 8 miles east of Manassas Airport moving eastbound at a high rate of speed. I advised the OS (other controllers were doing the same). The aircraft proceeded to a point approximately 8 miles southwest of P-56, made a right 360 degree turn, proceeded northeastbound and dropped from radar approximately 6 miles south-southwest of P-56.

Equipment configuration was unknown.



John Hendershot (JH), RS position, 9/12/01

Both World Trade Centers had been crashed into. There was a report that one aircraft had been hijacked and another was missing. Several controllers reported simultaneously to me that they saw a primary target moving at a high speed in DCA airspace heading for the White House. I immediately picked up the hotline to the White House and advised them that Dulles Approach observed a target closing on the White House at a high speed. The White House operator acknowleged. I then immediately advised DCA Approach of the same. I then described the movements of the aircraft on the Critical Event Eastern Region Hot Line as they were described to me by the controllers observing the primary return. I continued this for a short period of time until we lost radar contact with the aircraft. The equipment configuration is unknown.



Robert Devery (DR), North Departure, 9/12/01

I was working the North Dept position when the incident occurred. We had been advised that all departure would be stopped. I was told that I had 2 more coming to me. Both aircraft did depart, were radar identified and handed off to North High as per (SoP?). Shortly after handing off the 2nd aircraft, I heard final controller mention a primary target. The time is not fixed in my mind but it was at 1330z-1335z. The target was eastbound at a high rate of speed based on the tracking of it. I believe that I saw the target initially just to the SE of Dulles. To me it appeared as though it were heading 090 degree +- 10 degree ((east to east-north-east)). It appeared that it was heading towards P-56 where the White House is.

I called to anyone at DCA on the 62 line to advise of a primary target moving fast forward towards P-56. After the 2nd call, someone acknowledged "I see him". At that time or shortly after, someone on the 62 line confirmed "notifying P-56". Then, the aircraft (target) turned south to parallel the North final to DCA as though it was entering a west downwind for Rw((Runway)) 1 at DCA. For a few miles, it continued south. Then, it made a right turn for a moment, it appeared as though it were turning towards a DCA departure being handed off to our High Sector. At that moment, I thought it may try to hit the dept. or perhaps it may be a U.S. fighter checking the area (since the observed target movement was still very fast). However, the target continued the right turn back to a NE heading - again, aimed, in my opinion, at P-56. I think I called again on the 62 line to try to warn DC(A?). Everything was a blur at that moment. Thought someone reaffirmed contacting the White House. Target disappeared approx. 3-4 miles from P-56. Shortly after, DCA called on 62 line to advise that the target had hit the Pentagon.



Robert Utley (UY), AD/DD position, 9/12/01

I observed a primary target approximately 7 miles east of AML, heading eastbound, when the target was about 1 mile west of DCA it made a right turn heading southwestbound. When it was about 3 miles north of DAA it made a sharp turn northbound, when it was about 10 miles east of AML it made a sharp turn eastbound, the target then dropped out of radar about 3 miles west of DCA. Equipment configuration was unknown to me.

Monte Belger vs. Norman Mineta

Who's right? Norman Mineta has repeatedly claimed that he was in contact with Monte Belger (FAA deputy) since the point when Flight 77 was 50 miles out of Washington, and that Belger was tracking the plane on radar:

And a little later on, someone said, "Mr. Vice President, there's a plane 50-miles out." So I was talking to Monte Belger, the Deputy Director of the FAA, and I said, "Monte, what do you have 50-miles out?"

He said, "Well, we have a target, bogey, on the radar, but the transponder's been turned off, so we have no identification of this aircraft. We don't know who it is. We don't know what altitude it's at, speed or anything else. All we're doing is watching with the sweep of the radar, the dot moving from position to position."

So then someone came in, the same person came in and said, "Mr. Vice President, it -- the plane's 30-miles out." So I said, "Monte, can you see it, and where is it in relationship to the ground?"

He said, "Well, that's difficult to really determine. I would guess it's somewhere between Great Falls and National Airport, coming what they call the DRA, the down river approach."

And so then the person came in and said, "Mr. Vice President, the plane's ten-miles out," and so I said, "Monte, where is it?" and he said, "Well, I'm not really sure but I'd be guessing somewhere maybe between the USA Today building and, and National Airport."

And then pretty soon he said, "Oh-oh, we just lost the target." And so a few moments later, someone came in and said, "Mr. Vice President, there's been an explosion at the Pentagon."

So I said, "Monte, is there something -- can you identify it as being at the Pentagon?" He said, "No, we can't really pinpoint it like that."

http://www.msnbc.com/modules/91102/interviews/mineta.asp?0cb=-31a105678&cp1=1
(this link - a MSNBC interview from 9/11/02 - doesn't work at present; the full text can be read here:
http://911woodybox.blogspot.com/2007/10/statements-of-norman-mineta-chronology.html)

Some young man came in and said to the Vice President, "There's a plane 50 miles out coming towards D.C." So I said to Monty Belger, who is the No. 2 at FAA, I said, "Monty, what do you have on radar on this plane coming in?" He said, "Well, the transponder has been turned off, so we don't know who it is, and we don't know the altitude or speed." I said, "Well, where is it?" He said, "It's somewhere beyond Great Falls right now." Then, the young man came in and said it's 20 miles away. I'd say, "Well, Monty, where is this plane in relationship to the ground?" On radar it is hard to associate with a ground point, but they'd be able to tell you roughly the distance from wherever you are, but he couldn't tell you the speed or altitude, and then all of a sudden, as I was talking to him, he said, "Oh, I lost the bogie. Lost the target." I said, "Well, where is it?" He said, "Well, it's somewhere between Rosslyn and National Airport," and about that time someone broke into the conversation and said, "Mr. Secretary, we just had a confirmation from an Arlington County police officer saying that he saw an American Airlines plane go into the Pentagon." So then I said, "Monty, bring all the airplanes down." When you see one of something happen, it's an accident; when you see two of the same thing happening, it's a trend, something. When you see three, it's a plan. So I said, "Bring all the planes down."

http://www.achievement.org/autodoc/page/min0int-8

It is interesting to confront these accounts with two statements of Monte Belger (note that both Mineta and Belger refer to the same time interval 9:20-9:45).

"The most frustrating after-the-fact scenario for me to understand and to explain is the communication link on that morning between the FAA operations center and the NMCC," said Monte Belger, who was the acting FAA deputy administrator when the attacks occurred. "I know how it's supposed to work, but I have to tell you it's still a little frustrating for me to understand how it actually did work on that day."

FAA and Defense officials testified during the final public hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States on Thursday. Belger said the FAA initiated a "hijacking net" at 9:20 a.m. that he thought included the NMCC.

"The hijacking net is an open communication net run by the FAA hijack coordinator, who is a senior person from the FAA security organization, for the purpose of getting the affected federal agencies together to hear information at the same time," he said. "It was my assumption that morning, as it had been for my 30 years of experience with the FAA, that the NMCC was on that net and hearing everything real time," he added. "And I can tell you I've lived through dozens of hijackings in my 30-year FAA career, as a very low entry-level inspector up through to the headquarters, and they were always there."

Belger added that after initiating the hijacking net, he turned his attention to getting airplanes that were still in the air to land safely.

http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0604/062104c1.htm

Between 9:20-9:45 there were many confusing reports about various aircraft being unaccounted for. He ((Belger) heard of a crash on the Indiana/Kentucky border that was thought to be AAL 77. By this point he believes he talked with Bob Baker and Russ Chew at AAL. Jane Garvey talked to Don Carty.

Belger doesn't recall any discussion that morning about the need to contact aircraft in the air about securing their cockpits, even though they were considering an order to land all planes.

With regard to the Primary Net, Belger said he believes that Lee Longmire was in charge. He had the impression that the military was on the line at some point and had assumed that the proper contacts had been made. He had no knowledge about the problem that Lee Longmire shared with the Commission that the NMCC was supposed to be on the Net but was in fact absent for some undetermined length of time. Belger wasn't aware of the NORAD response until after AAL 77 crashed (he subsequently learried that Boston and New York Centers had called NORAD earlier)

Belger was told about UAL 93 after it crashed. He stressed that everyone was very confused about which aircraft hit the Pentagon. UAL and AAL weren't sure what planes hit where. He said that the carriers were searching for information from the FAA not providing it. It took a long time to confirm what aircraft hit the Pentagon.

Belger believes that the "hijack coordinator" would have been the senior security person present who was Lee Longmire. (SEE FAA PROTOCOL ON "Hijack Coordinator).

Belger learned of the crash into the Pentagon shortly after it happened. He and Garvey got on the phone with Norm Mineta who decided to bring everything down (around 9:45) which was implemented. Belger continued to monitor the system as it executed this order. All aircraft were down and the system grounded by 12:15 P.M.

http://media.nara.gov/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00054.pdf

Belger mentions neither the approaching Flight 77 nor being in contact with Mineta prior to the Pentagon crash. In the interview to the Commissioners he indicates that first contact with Mineta was established after the crash. In case he was in contact with him before, this blatant omission would constitute a lie.

So who's right? Mineta or Belger?