ACARS (Aircraft Conditioning and Reporting System) is the basic radio-based tool for communication between an aircraft and its company. On 9/11, United Airlines flight dispatchers sent several ACARS text messages to the planes they were responsible for, including Flight 93 and Flight 175.
On January 28, 2002, Michael J. Winter of United Airlines was interviewed by the FBI to help them with the interpretation of the ACARS messages. The full FBI report is appended at the end of this article and can also be looked here (scroll down to the very last interview):
http://www.911myths.com/images/1/1c/Team7_Box11_FBI302s_ACARS.pdf
The actual content of the messages is already known and hardly interesting ("beware cockpit intrusion" etc.), but what makes them toxic for the official story is the plane's approximate position that is attached to each message:
Mr. Winter explained the Aircraft Condition and Reporting System ACARS uses radio ground stations (RGS) at various locations throughout the United States for communication. The messages from the aircraft utilize the RGS in a downlink operating system. A central router determines the strongest signal received from the aircraft and routes the signal/message to UAL flight dispatch.
In other words: if the message denotes (for example) PIT, this means that the Pittsburgh RGS has received the strongest signal and that the plane is in the vicinity of Pittsburgh (usually up to 70 miles, depending on the distance to other RGS's).
Now these position informations reveal shocking news: Winter explicitly confirms that United 93 received the last ACARS messages when it was near Fort Wayne (Indiana) and, some minutes later, near Champaign (Illinois):
Messages #16 and #17 were sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using the RGS near Ft. Wayne, IN, FWA as designated in the line "AN N591UA/GL FWA...". The messages were sent to the ACARS printer.
Messages #18 and #19 were sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using the RGS near Champaign, IL CMI as designated in the line "AN N591UA/GL CMI...". Both messages were sent to the printer and Message #19 also activated an audible signal in the aircraft.
The original ACARS messages can be found here:
http://www.911myths.com/images/8/82/Team7_Box13_UAL_ACARS.pdf
Not all of the messages enumerated by Winter are listed in the file, but messages #16-#19 are, together with the time when they were received. So it's possible to establish a rough flight path for United 93:
9:22 PIT (Pittsburgh)
9:32 CAK (Canton/Akron)
9:36 CLE (Cleveland)
9:47 TOL (Toledo)
9:51 FWY (Fort Wayne, IN)
10:10 CMI (Champaign, IL)
After Champaign, no message was received by United 93 anymore.
The authenticity of the ACARS messages is beyond doubt. The proper interpretation has been delivered by Michael J. Winter and confirmed by David Knerr, Manager Flight Dispatch Automation, United Airlines. The flight path is consistent with the speed of a commercial airliner (keeping in mind that the plane is up to 70 miles away from the respective radio station), and the tail number of the plane that received the messages was N591UA: United 93.
Does that mean that the official flight path, with United 93 making a U turn over Cleveland, is faked? No, not at all. The U turn is confirmed multiple times by air traffic control radio messages and personal statements from Cleveland Center controllers. I will take a closer look at these sources and their relation to the RADES radar data in forthcoming blog entries. I can already promise that this checkup will further damage the credibility of the RADES files.
In my past research, I have uncovered the duplication of several planes involved in 9/11, but the case of Flight 93 over Illinois is the strongest one due to the authentic power of the ACARS messages. The Flight 93 that was tracked by United Airlines was a different plane than the Flight 93 that was tracked by the FAA.
In my previous blog entry, I already have presented evidence that Flight 93 was duplicated right from the start. Also note the same dichotomy at Logan Airport: According to ACARS, Flight 175 took off at 8:28. According to the FAA, Flight 175 took off at 8:43.
A pattern emerges.
Appendix - FBI summary of the interview with Michael J. Winter
On January 28, 2002, Michael J. Winter was interviewed at United Airlines UAL, World Headquarters, 1200 E. Algonquin Road, Elk Grove Village, IL. The interviewing Agent indentified himself to Mr. Winter and told him, the interview concerned UAL flight 93 on September 11, 2001 and the communications between UAL flight 93 and the flight dispatchers. Mr. Winter voluntarily provided the following information regarding these communications.
In reviewing the Sanitized Time and Text of ACARS messages as provided by the FBI, Mr. Winter said Meassage #1 was from the aircraft to UAL Dispatch. Message #2 was to the aircraft from UAL Dispatch at John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York, NY and Message #3 was to the aircraft from UAL flight dispatcher ED BALLINGER. Message #4 was from the aircraft to UAL flight dispatcher ED BALLINGER. Message #5, listed as unreadable, was engine data advisory information. Message #6 was from UAL flight dispatcher A.D. "Sandy " ROGERS to the aircraft and Message #7 was from UAL flight dispatcher ROBERT BRITTAIN to the aircraft.Message #8 was to the aircraft from BALLINGER and Message #9, listed as unreadable, was the engine data advisory information. Message #10 was from UAL flight Dispatcher CHAD McCURDY to the aircraft. Except for Message #13, which was to the aircraft from UAL SAn Francisco Maintenance, DAVID PRICE, all of the other messages listed were from UAL flight dispatcher BALLINGER.
Mr. Winter explained the Aircraft Condition and Reporting System ACARS uses radio ground stations RGS at various locations throughout the United States for communication. The messages from the aircraft utilize the RGS ina downlink operating system. A central router determines the strongest signal received from the aircraft and routes the signal/message to UAL flight dispatch.
Message #1 was routed from the aircraft through the RGS near Pittsburgh, PA PIT as designated in the line "DT DDL PIT...". Message #2, to the aircraft, was also routed through the RGS near Pittsburgh, A and was directed to the ACARS printer on the aircraft. The routing to the printer is designated by the letters "AGM" following "Smi=AGM" and "STX=AGM.."
Message #3 was a message to the aircraft from Chicago Dispatch CHIDD listed as a Command Respoinse MD type message. The CMD message, designated in the line "Smi=CMD Agy/Num=65535", was sent to the ACARS screen and utilized the RGS near Pittsburgh, PA. In this type of message, the flight dispatcher can also activate an audible signal to alert the flight crew of the sent message but this was not done.
Message #4 was sent from the aircraft to UAL flight dispatch using the RGS near Pittsburgh, PA. The designation "C4" appears just before the sentence "EWRSFO..." indicating the message was sent from the aircraft.
Message #5 was an engine data message which was sent automatically to UAL Chicago dispatch and a UAL maintenance computer. The information in the message as N41.20 W080.5" was the latitude and longitude of the aircraft when the date was sent.
Message #6 was a message to the aircraft from CHIDD using a RGS near Akron/Canton, OH CAK and was sent to the ACARS screen. The designation for Akron/Canton, OH CAK appears in the line beginning "AN N591UA/GL CAK..."
Message #7 was sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using a RGS near Akron/Canton, OH. The message was sent to the ACARS screen and was a CMD type message.
Message #8 was sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using the RGS near Akron/Canton, OH. The message ws a CMD message and also activated the audible signal. The audible signal designated as "BEL" in the line "QUCHIAKUA-1-BL>UA 93".
Message #9 was an engine data message. The latitude and longitude was also listed in the message as "N41.31 W081.06".
Message #10 was sent to the aircraft from CHIDD and was sent to the ACARS screen omly. The RGS in this instance was near Cleveand, OH CLE from the line "AN N591UA/GL CLE...".
Messages #11 and #12 were sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using the RGS near Cleveland, OH. These messages also activated the audible signal in the aircraft.
Message #13 was sent to the aircraft from UAL San Francisco, CA line maintenance to the ACARS screen and also activated the audible signal. The RGS for this message was near Toledo, OH as designated "TOL" in the oine "AN N591UA/GL TOL...".
Messages #14 and #15 were sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using the RGS near Toledo, OH. The messages were sent to the ACARS printer.
Messages #16 and #17 were sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using the RGS near Ft. Wayne, IN, FWA as designated in the line "AN N591UA/GL FWA...". The messages were sent to the ACARS printer.
Messages #18 and #19 were sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using the RGS near Champaign, IL CMI as designated in the line "AN N591UA/GL CMI...". Both messages were sent to the printer and Message #19 also activated an audible signal in the aircraft.
Messages #20 to #24 were sent to the aircraft from CHIDD. However, all of the messages were rejected indicating the aircraft did not receive them.
Also present during part of this interview was David Knerr, Manager Flight Dispatch Automation, UAL WHQ.
