Tuesday, December 30, 2008

Two "Flight 175" taking off from Boston Logan: CONFIRMED

My personal 9/11 researcher "career" started with the detection of a duplicated "Flight 11" at Boston Logan Airport: one departing from Terminal B, Gate 32, at 7:45, the other one from Terminal B, Gate 26, somewhat later because the departure was delayed:


As opposed to that, the gate departure of United Airlines 175 is indisputable: 7:58 a.m., which is also confirmed by the database of the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS):


However, the BTS database reveals a strange discrepancy regarding the "wheels-off time" of Flight 175 - i.e. the moment when the plane lifted off from the runway. The BTS notes a wheels-off time of 8:23, which differs distinctly from the "official" wheels-off time, which is 8:14.

This 8:14 take-off is confirmed by the ATC/pilot radio transcript and various radar data. So what about the 8:23? How was this datum being generated?

The wheels-off time of is triggered automatically by a mechanical switcher when the plane loses contact to the ground. The data are sent automatically to the airline via ACARS, and the airline forwards them to the BTS on a regular base. So apparently no human failure is possible. The fact that the gate departure 7:58 coincides with the official story suggests that the data are valid.

Being familiar with the duplication of Flight 11 at Logan Airport as well as the duplication of Delta 1989 at Cleveland Hopkins Airport, I arrived at the inevitable conclusion that this was another case of a duplicated plane - i.e. a "Flight 175" taking off at 8:14 and another "Flight 175" taking off at 8:23. However, there was no independent confirmation, so I hinted at the discrepancy on occasion, but always added a question mark -here, for instance:


I am now able to proudly present an eyewitness for the 8:23 wheels-offtime of Flight 175: Steven Miller, US Airways pilot, who was next in line behind Flight 175 to take off from the runway:

On the taxi-out in Boston, they ((the pilots of US Airways 6805)) waited at the runway's hold-short line, where Miller looked up to watch a United Boeing 767 take off, United Flight 175. The final weight and balance calculations from dispatch came over the ACARS at 8:05, and with that in hand, the crew was ready to fly. Wide-body aircraft produce especially powerful wingtip vortices - horizontal, tornado-like winds off the ends of the wings - which require time to dissipate before other aircraft can take off, so he waited the required three minutes after United 175 departed before he received his takeoff clearance.

(Lynn Spencer, "Touching History", p. 58)

A quick check with the BTS database reveals that USA 6805 had a wheels-off time of 8:28. Miller explicitly describes that he waited 3 minutes before getting takeoff clearance; adding a little bit for the timespan between takeoff clearance and actual wheels-off, Flight 175 must have lifted off the runway around 8:23-8:24. It is out of the question that Miller observed a plane that took off at 8:14.

Did Miller maybe see a different United plane? Very unlikely. Searching the BTS database for other United Boeing 767's delivers no results for the relevant time. There is a very slim possibility that a non-domestic United Boeing 767 took of just then, because the BTS database lists only domestic flights. However, Miller himself says it was Flight 175; so either he overheard the flight number when taxiing out, or, as someone who was frequently flying from Logan (as he says) he was familiar with the wide-body planes departing at that time.

The BTS database also reveals that the tail number of the plane that took off at 8:23 was N612UA. This was United Airlines Flight 175. And there is no proof that the plane that took off at 8:14 was indeed N612UA, leading to the conclusion that the pilot only pretended to fly United Airlines Flight 175.

Monday, December 29, 2008

Cleveland Center supervisor memos on Flight 93

Transcript of handwritten statements concerning Flight 93 by Cleveland Center supervisors. Many thanks to http://911workinggroup.org for their efforts and the citizen (unknown to me) who initiated the FOIA to obtain these important documents.

Richard Barnett
(YN) Area Supervisor 9:00-11:00

The Franklin Controller advised me that UAL93 was unexpectedly changing altitude near EWC PA. I observed altitude deviation of approx. 500 feet high. Aircraft was on LOR freq. I was observing DAL1989 so this was a surprise however due to flight profile (long distance coast to coast) I became alarmed. I went to Area 4 to ascertain status and observed the turn, decent and transponder problem. I was advised by Area 4 sup(ervisor) that UAL93 was turning around and coming back. I returned to area to advise controllers. I became involved in other area activities (helping land aircraft, evacuating personnel, answering calls and combining sectors) when the Westmoreland and Indianhead controllers adivsed that UL93 was possibly entering our airspace over PIT. I observed the data block with only 350N, so I did not know altitude. As the aircraft approached near the Nesto intersection, the Westmoreland Controllers (D&R) both advised a visual confirmation of UAL93's altitude by another (VFR) aircraft. We verified and determined that UAL93 was at 7000'. I was very surprised at the low altitude. The aircraft that observed UAL93 stated that aircraft was rucking wings. UAL93 appeared as if it were heading to JST. We knew aircraft was hijacked so I ordered the controller (D-side) to call JST tower and evacuate and to give reason. Approximately 3 or 4 minutes later aircraft went into coast track and we started receiving reports from other airborne aircraft of smoke and an apparent crash. I asked the controllers to give me the track back coordinates and lat./long. of site which I passed on to the operations manager.

I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident.

Gary M. Klingler (GK) Command Post 10:00-22:30

Upon hearing of the Worls Trade Center accident, I left a meeting at NASA and returned to Cleveland Center (ZOB). I arrived at the watch desk area at approximately 1400Z. I observed that the Traffic Management Unit had been turned into a command post. The ATM and three operations managers were staffing the command post. I was briefed upon arrival by Rich Reid, operations manager, of the situation. The briefing focused on UAL93, DAL1989, reports of an aircraft circling over ZOB and the subsequent release of non-essential personnel. Numerous individuals were following up with the situation concerning UAL93 and DAL1989. I started to investigate the possibility of an unidentified aircraft circling over ZOB. Actual scanning the skies over the Center, discussion with law enforcement personnel on scene and discussions with Cleveland Approach Control about what they were observing on terminal radar led to the following determination: either the aircraft had left the Center area or personnel on the ground had observed DAL1989 turning back toward Cleveland Hopkins Airport. Upon return to the command post I learned of UAL93's accident. DAL1989 was being worked by CLE Approach. We received another report of a large aircraft over ZOB. My investigation revealed it was a military refueler which had been positioned to support the military fighter aircraft. I remained at the facility through the evening providing support at the command post. 9/19/01

Leo E. Wolbers (LV) Operations manager 2:00-10:00

About 0820 I heard that we were trying to find AAL77 that had lost its transponder in Boston Center airspace. I then went to the 0830 stand-up, after the stand-up I was told that a plane had hit the World Trade Center. We were told by Central Flow that they thought the aircraft was AAL77. We were then told that a second aircraft believed to be UAL175 had hit the other tower. We were told both aircraft were thought to have departed BOS for LAX. We did a quick check and found we were working DAL1989 who had departed BOS for LAX. We advised Delta operations of what information we had at that time. The next thing we were told was that DAL1989 was a confirmed hijack and was diverting to CLE. While we were trying to assist DAL1989 we were informed that UAL93 was being hijacked and was on the LOR sector frequency. I went to Area 4 at that time to assist with UAL93. Since UAL93 was overhead our facility we made the decision to evacuate all non-essential personal and get as many controllers out as possible. We were then told to pur every aircraft we were working on the ground. I went to each area and advised them to land all aircraft ASAP. We were then advised an aircraft had hit the Pentagon. The next event was UAL93 was confirmed to have crashed at Somerset PA. After we got all of our aircraft on the ground we went to one person in each area until the building was searched and found to be secure.

To the best of my knowledge this is the order that events occured. The only time that I am sure of is the 0830 stand-up. 9/19/01

Craig Pass (CP) STMC 5:50-17:50

Operations Manager came into the unit from the Area 4 specializtaion advising of a possible problem with UAL93 in the Lorain (R49) sector. We brought up the frequency (133.37) for monitoring at Pos 96 in the Traffic Management Unit. Transmissions were made without call sign identification. Other aircraft on frequency overheard the unidentified transmissions and inquired if the controller was aware of situation. As UAL93 neared DJB, the data block reflected the aircraft climbing (without clearance). Then the target diappeared. Controller selected the primary button at his position and tracked UAL93's primary target. The primary target was observed making a left turn, heading southeast bound. Coordination with the ATCSCC was being accomplished by Traffic Management personnel. Another transmission was made which was unidentified. Information was relayed to the unit from aircraft in the vicinity of UAL93 that the aircraft was at a low altitude. Primary target assosciated with UAL93 was lost. Black smoke was reported in the are of the loss of primary target. Visual report by aircraft in vicinity confirmed a crash.

I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. 9/19/01

Kimberly W. Warnica (KW) Watch Desk 8:40-11:20

I came to the watch desk to relieve Ed Wolbers the operations manager in charge. He was at the 8:30 stand-up. We received news that an aircraft had hit the World Trade Center. Central flow then informed us it was AAL11 a 767. ZNY went ATC Zero and I coordinated this with the areas. We were then told a second aircraft it the World Trade Center. Central flow called and told us to monitor DAL1989 who fit the profile (BOS to LAX) as the other 2 aircraft. I found out that the Franklin sector was working the Delta. So while the other s were coordinating with Delta, I went to Area 6 to talk to the controllers and supervisors. I told them that Delta fit the profile of the other two aircraft and to report anything out of the ordinary to me immediately. I asked who Franklin would be handing the aircraft off to and they told me the Lorain Sector. I then went to Area 4 to talk to the controllers and supervisor. While I was briefing them on DAL1989 the Lorain controller said he heeded someone to listen to his frequency because there was screaming on it. I told Mark Barnick, the supervisor, to plug in and I went up to the watch desk. I asked STMC Craig Pass to bring up the Lorain frequency so we could hear it because there was a problem. When we listened we heard the controller trying to track UAL93 several times, then I heard him talk to 2 other aircraft about the transmissions he had just heard. Both aircraft heard the screaming. Then a voice came on shouting and used the words "bomb onboard". The controller asked the caller to say again. I went to the area and confirmed that they also heard "bomb onboard". The sup(ervisor) confirmed this. I went back to the watch desk and was told and aircraft had hit the Pentagon. I was then told to have the controllers land everyone. Leo Wolbers and I went to the areas and told them to put everyone on the ground. When I returned to the watch desk, I was asked to take a phone call at the military position. It was Huntress and she told me that DAL1989 was a confirmed hijacking. I went to the Sandusky sector in Area 4 who was working DAL1989 inbound to Cleveland and told them he was a confirmed hijacking. The controller then used the word "trip" in his transmission to the Delta. He said "the pilot doesn't think he's a hijack. When I used the word trip, he said: not in less you know something we don't." I told them to treat him as a hijack anyway. I went back to the watch desk and the sup(ervisor) from Area 6 asked me to come to the area. I went to Area 6 and was informed by the Imperial controller that Gopher-06 saw a black cloud of smoke at his 9 o'clock and 30 miles which I recognized as the United jet's last known position. I gave my report to the watch and they told me to confirm it. I went back to Area 4 and asekd the controller to descend the Gopher to confirm it was the United. The controller coordinated for lower with Area 5. Area 5 then yelled to me that they had a report. I walked over to the Indianhead sector and the controller told me she had an aircraft that positively confirmed the aircraft was a United jet. I went back to the watch desk and told them about the positive confirmation. I went back to Area 4 who had put the Delta on Cleveland Approach's frequency. When I returned to the watch desk they told me to evacuate. I went outside the facility at this time.

I certify, to the best of my knowledge and recollection, the above statement is correct. 9/19/01

Rick Kettell Air Traffic Manager

At approximately 1310Z, I was advised that an air carrier at FL290 in ZBW airspace, destined through ZOB airspace had lost its transponder and communications with ATC. I then learned of events regarding the World Trade Center and at 1315Z established a temporary command post in the TMU. I began tracking aircraft in ZOB airspace identified by the STMC's as BOS-LAX flights. I observed DAL1989 as the aircraft entered the Lorain sector. At approximately 1330Z, I was told by OM Kim Warnica that NORAD confirmed that DAL1989 was possible hijack aircraft. I instructed OM Ed Wolbers to contact Delta operations. OM Warnica then advised me that UAL93 in the Lorain Sector may have reported a bomb on board. I then began monitoring the Lorain sector frequency and heard two aircraft (Am 1060 and EJA) confirm to the Lorain sector controller that they heard a report of a bomb aboard an aircraft. I then heard a transmission in English, but an Arabic accent stating "that a bomb was onboard the aircraft, the aircraft was returning to the airport until demands were met, stay in your seats and be quiet." I informed OM Rich Reid to contact the ROC, and reported the information on a national telecon to David Caroles in headquarters at 1340Z. I then continued to monitor the track of UAL93 until the transponder disappeared and then proceeded to follow the primary target as the aircraft turned southeastbound. I remained on the national telecon updating the position of the target until the target disappeared from ZOB radar at 1403Z. I received confirmation from OM Kim Warnica that two aircraft had confirmed smoke and fire in the vicinity that radar contact with UAL93 was last observed. I relayed that information to Mr. Caroles and remained on the telecon and continued to operate the temporary command post.

Mark E. Evans (YP) STMC 9:25-19:15

I entered the Traffic Management Unit at approximately 1323Z. At 1331Z we received a call from the ATCSCC asking us to inventory all flights and report any missing flights or unusual situations directly to the ATCSCC. At 1340Z I initiated a call from the TMCSC position in the TMU (Tape ID 45) to report erratic altitude changes by UAL93. At 1341Z I reported via the same line that we had lost the transponder on UAL93 and he was headed eastbound. This was a reversal of his flight plan. We were not in communication with the flight. A decision was made to leave the ATCSCC line open to facilitate updates on UAL93. I continued to coordinate all information provided to me by the area managers and traffic management personnel. This included updates on the primary target we believed to be UAL93, requests for military verification, and other data. We received verification from a VFR aircraft of a UAL jet in the location of our primary target at 8000! This was also forwarded along with location and direction for the flight (southeast). Shortly after this we had a report of black smoke in the vicinity of the last radar returns. This was reported along with location to the ATCSCC at 1404Z.

Mark Barnick (AB) Area 4 Ops Supervisor 8:51-11:54

On Tuesdax, september 11, 2001, I was working the Area 4 Operational Supervisor's position from 1251Z to 1554Z.

At approximately 1328Z, the Lorain radar controller (John Werth), advised med that he had lost radio contact (NORDO) with United Airlines Flight Number 93 (UAL93) and that he needed to talk to the aircraft. I telephoned United flight operations and advised them that we had lost radio contact with UAL93 and that we needed them to send the aircraft a message to contact the Lorain radar controller on frequency 133.37. The United flight operator was upset to hear about another NORDO aircraft but stated that he would send the message to the aircraft. A few minutes later, John Werth advised me that he had a problem with shouting on the frequency. Using a hand set, we plugged into the Lorain radar position and monitored the frequency. Shortly thereafter, I heard some type of yelling and screaming on the frequency as well as someone stating that "they have a bomb". Numerous other aircraft on the frequency confirmed that they also heard the "have a bomb" statement. At this time, John Werth was the Lorain radar controller and Daver Leister was the D-side associate. During this time, UAL93 was descending from FL350 without a clearance and would not answer any transmissions made to the aircraft.

I paged Mike Zientarski and Mark Saunders back to the area from their breaks. I assigned Mike Zientarski to track and assist John Werth on the radar position. I assigned Mark Saunders to assist Dave Leister with the D-side outies and to ensure that all coordination was completed with surrounding radar sectors.

I notified the watch operations manager (Leo Wolbers) and two other operation managers (Kim Warnica and Rich Reid) of the reported bomb and of the problem with UAL93. During this time, UAL93 continued on course (westbound) but began to climb from FL343 without a clearance or any communications.

I paged all Area 4 controllers back to the area in order to assist the other area radar positions. All controllers were advised of a possible bomb threat/hijacking on UAL93. Controllers were instructed to keep other aircraft be they above, below or at the same altitude, well clear of UAL93. I continued to monitor UAl93 on the radar scope and continued to monitor the Lorain radar frequency. More yelling and screaming could be heard at times but UAL93 would not answer any calls. The aircraft continued to climb without any radio contact.

When UAL93's transponder indicated an altitude of FL407, the aircraft began to turn to the south. Other aircraft in the area were vectored well clear of UAL93's new course. UAL93 then began to descend and when the transponder indicated FL397, the aircraft turned towards the southeast. I suggested to Rich Reid, who was in the area at that time, that the military should be contacted regarding this situation.

UAL93's transponder was then lost or shut off and the radar tag went into coast. Other aircraft in the area verified that they had visual ontact with UAL93 and that it was still flying southeastbound. In order to follow the aircraft, John Werth started a new flight following tag on UAL93's primary radar target. No altitude information was available and all other controllers were advised to keep all aircraft well away from the target of UAL93.

As UAL93 continued southeastbound, it was going to enter the airspace of Allegheny radar position in Area (?). UAL 93 continued not to respond to any broadcasts made to it. The Allegheny radar controller was advised of the situation with UAL93 and confirmed the position of the radar track in order to continue flight following. Altitude was still unknown.

Area 4 had no further contact with UAL93 after the aircraft left the Lorain radar airspace.

URL of the original document:


Saturday, December 20, 2008

Cleveland Center controller memos on Flight 93

Transcript of handwritten statements concerning Flight 93 by Cleveland Center controllers. Many thanks to
http://911workinggroup.org for their efforts and the citizen (unknown to me) who initiated the FOIA to obtain these important documents.

David M Norton (HD) Franklin Sector 8:42-9:50

UAL 93's flight through Franklin airspace was normal from initial handoff from NY Center until handoff to Lorain Sector. After switching UAL 93's frequency I noticed a change in the altitude of UAL 93 and called Lorain to see what was going on and to verify they were talking with the aircraft.

I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. 11/29/01

Brad Kennedy (KB) Franklin-D 9:02-9:50

UAL 93 was westbound toward DJB at FL350. We were busy diverting aircrraft from ZNY airspace, handed UAL 93 off to sector (Lorain?) about 20-30 miles from boundry. About 10 miles from boundry noticed UAL93 altitude descended slowly 4 to 5 hundred feet. We advised supervisor Barnett to watch aircraft something might be wrong and then we continued working.

I did not view satori or listen to tapes to confirm my statement, but would like to do that in the near future. I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. 9/13/01

John Werth (WH) Lorain Radar 8:55-10:18

I was working the Lorain radar position when the incident with UAL93 occurred. I issued traffic to UAL93 and received a normal response from the crew. I heard two transmissions which sounded like a struggle took place. Shortly afterwards the aircraft descended several hundred feet. The aircraft made an abrupt turn at DJB VOR to the south. Two more transmissions followed, stating that a bomb was on board, the aircraft had started to climb and was heading s/e in the general direction of two other aircraft which I had already started to vector away from UAL93. When UAL93 reached approx. FL410 he stopped his beacon squawk. I then started a primary track to follow the target. I received no more transmissions from UAL93, and continued vectoring several other aircraft clear of his position. I then transferred control of the data block to the area s/e of mine to monitor the aircraft's track.

I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. 9/13/01

David Leister (LE) LOR (Lorain)-D 8:39-10:18

I have listened to the voice tape of UAL93 and I would like to say I am deeply shocked and horrified about this event. The data tapes have recorded my computer input as well as my voice transmissions. As the events unfolded, I quickly realized there was nothing we could do for UAL93. Our training and common sense dictated that we protect surrounding aircraft, and that became my primary goal. I called for a supervisor at the first indication of trouble, which brought two additional controllers to our aid, making sure that we fulfilled our mission of protecting other aircraft. God bless the souls of UAL93.

I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident.

Mike Zientarski (MW) LOR (Lorain) Handoff position 9:30-9:43

I was put in to track at LOR-radar because traffic was starting to build. About that time UAL93 descended about 500 feet. A transmission was made that was unintelligible to me but another aircraft claimed to have heard that a bomb was on board. At that time I told another controller to assist on the associate position. I then began to direct him to pointouts and reroute aircraft away from our sector. Southeast of DJB contact was lost and then I helped to reestablish his positioning. We continued tracking what we believed to be UAL93 and I continued to have aircraft moved away. This continued until the target we believed to be UAL93 was out of the airspace.

I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. 9/13/01

Mark Saunders (MS) Assoc. Radar D-side 9:33-10:00

I was told to plug in and help the D-side position, because of the unusual situation. I saw UAL93 make radical turns and head to the southeast. The transponder went off and we tracked the primary target. I told sectors around us about this and to move all aircraft around us because we didn't know what altitude he was at.

I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. 12/10/01

George W. Keaton (VP) IRL (Imperial) 8:52-10:20

During the time in question I was the radar controller at the IRL sector, obviously aware at this time of what had occurred at the Pentagon and World Trade Center. During my time on position a PVD appeared on my scope with no altitude readout (UAL93). A controller from Area IV appeared in the area and explained the aircraft was deviating from its flight path and noone was receiving altitude information. I was told to keep all aircraft away from UAL93, which was proceeding towards the Washington area approximately on J518. I had to vector 2 - 4 aircraft away from the flight path of UAL93, including one NWA flight and a C130 proceeding northwest on J518. I remember turning the C130 to about a 030 heading, because of its speed. Observing UAL93, I saw it proceed almost directly over the PIT area, and the southeast of PIT it made an abrupt turn up to the northeast for about 10-15 miles. Once it turned back to the Washington area it disappeared from my scope one to two minutes later. Sometime during this period I was ordered to land all aircraft. I asked the pilot of the C-130 if he had observed anything off his left side. He said he observed a dark cloud of smoke off his left in the clouds. I asked for approximate distance and, if I remember correctly, he said about 15 miles. As I turned and told my supervisor (Tim Guess), I heard someone in Area V say they had a visual sighting of the plane at low altitude. The location gioven by the C130 pilot was the approximate position UAL93 went down. Few minutes later I questioned the C130 pilot for his reason for being in the air. He informed me his mission was noncritical and he would call for orders. A few minutes later he requested clearance to YNG, which I gave. At that point my airpace was sterile.

I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. I certify, to the best of my knowledge and recollection the above statement is correct. 9/12/01

Linda Justice (LJ) IRL (Imperial)-D 8:15-10:20

We were given a data block with which to track UAL93. The aircraft appeared to be heading toward Washington Center airspace. In an attempt to expedite the situation I put a charge of routing in to reflect HGR->DCA. This was only to forward to (the) information to the sectors the aircraft appeared to be tracking toward. I then called POT sector to verbally point him out and flashed the handoff to HGR sector. We took the handoff back when UAL93 changed direction to the east and did not resume the handoff to ZDC. Contact (visually) was lost with the target shortly thereafter.
I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. 9/12/01

Donald Edouard Lamoureux (DF) WMD (Westmoreland)-R 8:34-10:13

While working the R-position of the WMD sector I had been notified that UAL93 was a hijacked plane had a bomb on board and was headed toward Pittsburgh Airport and WMD sector. UAL93 was tracking as a primary target with no altitude readout. UAL93 was tracking passed PIT and near a VFR aircraft (N56865) with whom I was in contact with, I asked the VFR pilot to look to his left and up to see if he could see him visually. The VFR aircraft reported the B757 about 1000 feet above him which would put him at about 8000 ft. The VFR pilot reported the UAL93 landing gear was down and his wings were rocking back and forth. UAL93 began to track NE toward JST Tower. Tower has been advised of the situation. Shortly after UAL93 turned SE and then the primary target disappeared in the Somerset area. 9/13/01

I did not review SATORI and voice tape information and I would like to do so before I make a final statement. I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. 9/16/01

Brian C. Hanlon (AZ) WMD (Westmoreland)-D 9:42-10:13

UAL93 was reported visually by a VFR aircraft at 070 near LBE airport. VFR reported he had a UAL flight visually and appeared 1000 ft above; reported the landing gear down and wings flapping, and said the aircraft appeared to be in distress. Several minutes later, UAL93 appeared to track NE bound towards JST airport. Tower was advised aircraft had been hijacked, may have a bomb, and to evacuate. Shortly after, UAL turned SE and dropped track on sector boundry.

I did not review satori or voice information, and would like to so do before making a final statement. I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. 9/14/01

Stacey Taylor (ST) IHD (Indianhead) 9:14-10:17(?)

I was working the Indianhead sector and observed the primary target and associated data block of UAL93 enter my airspace altitude and flight path unknown. I had been told the aircraft was a hijacking and that there was a bomb aboard the aircraft. At some point I was given the hand-off on UAL93, but at no time did I have communications with the aircraft. I observed the aircraft heading towards Johnstown and attempted to get another aircraft out of his flight path. We had been told that the aircraft was reported to be flying at 7.500 (?) feet by a supervisor. UAL 93 flight then appeared to take turn down toward the southeast and I had two radar hits on him showing an altitude of 8.200 feet. I turned my aircraft back to the north to avoid UAL93 and around the Somerset airport, shortly after the turn. I lost the primary target on UAL93 and we suspected it had gone down. I then vectored N20VF toward the supected incident side and asked if he would look for smoke. I explained that we were looking for a downed aircraft that may have a bomb on board, and we didn't know if the bomb had gone off. He said he would overfly the site and he spotted smoke and flames and gave us the position of the crash site and a description of the area.

I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. 9/16/01

URL of the original document:

Sunday, December 14, 2008

John Farmer's failed analysis of the NORAD tapes

- this critique has been published half a year ago on the website www.pilotsfor911truth.org. For actual reasons - John Farmer has publicly ceased 9/11 research and shut down his website www.911files.info - it is reposted here.

John Farmer is a Pentagon researcher and firmly believes that Flight 77 hit the Pentagon. He has recently analyzed the NORAD tapes

and arrives at the conclusion that air traffic controllers from Washington tracked Flight 77 on its way back to Washington, but failed to inform NEADS about it. However, the NORAD tapes are the best proof so far that Flight 77 did not fly back to Washington - a FAA manager stresses that several Air Traffic Control Centers were looking for it, but couldn't find any radar blip.

Unlike the 9/11 Commission and Michael Bronner/Vanity Fair, Farmer doesn't omit messages from the NORAD tapes. His transcript is fairly accurate. But he distorts the messages and misinterpretates them, and his "conclusions" are rash and unfounded (Farmer's comments in italic, mine in plain writing):


Boston Military (Scoggins) is the only source of information that NEADS has for the approach of AAL77.

Wrong in multiple ways. At the same time Scoggins provides NEADS with information about a suspicious plane, a NEADS technician reports another "aircraft six miles east of the White House". The message is echoed through several channels, including MCC Kevin Nasypany's one. It is clear that the NEADS crew track this plane directly on their radar screens, completely independent from Scoggins. They assign a tag number to it - 0032 - and watch as it turns into "MCA" (military controlled airspace=restricted area) and finally fades at 9:38.

These two planes - let's call it the "Scoggins plane" and the "Nasypany plane" are clearly not identical. They are reported on different channels with different positions for a fixed time: 6 miles southwest of the White House (Scoggins) vs. 8 miles east of the White House (Nasypany). The Nasypany plane has its transponder off, turns into restricted area and fades at 9:38, fulfilling essential conditions for being "Flight 77"/the decoy jet.

As opposed to that, the Scoggins plane is reported 6 miles southwest of the White House at 9:36:15 and still deviating away (i.e. flying west), making it virtually impossible to be over the Pentagon at 9:38.

He is making it a point to pass on information that he is overhearing in the Boston ARTCC. His initial report (13:20:56) of an aircraft headed towards Washington is second-hand information and mistakes the identification as AAL11. This may have caused momentary confusion but none-the-less established that a 3rd hijacked aircraft was headed towards the DC area. The only significant problem this caused for the MCC is that he scrambled the Langley fighters to Baltimore-Washington International (north of DC) in anticipation of an approach from the north.

Scoggins gives a position for this phantom flight 11: "somewhere over New Jersey or further south." That's exactly the reason why Nasypany sent his fighters to the Baltimore area. Farmer seems to insinuate that Scoggins reports the eastbound Flight 77, but at this time Flight 77 was (according to the official story, which Farmer sticks to!) somewhere over the Appalaches in West Virginia, far away from New Jersey or Baltimore.

At 13:24:02 Boston Military calls back and gives the position of the approaching aircraft as "southwest" of Washington, but has no specific coordinates for it. This is exactly what the 84 RADES radar shows at that time. This confirms that Washington ARTCC was tracking AAL77’s primary return although Scoggins was still under the impression that it was being identified as AAL11.

Wrong. Scoggins reports phantom Flight 11 "southwest", but not "southwest of Washington". He gives no reference point, making the remark practically worthless. Did he mean "southwest of New York" or "he's heading southwest"? Our fears that Farmer wants to use the messages on phantom flight 11 improperly as evidence that Flight 77 was tracked by controllers on its way back to Washington are validated. Even the official story has Flight 77's position at 13:24 not southwest, but straight west of Washington.

Here's Scoggins' message:
"We did hear from Washington, there is an aircraft, they believe it is American 11 and he is southwest, only just don’t have a point…"

For reasons unknown, the Washington ARTCC was NOT sharing this information with NEADS after multiple phone calls by them to get more information. This includes a call (13:33:58) with the Washington ARTCC Operations Manager who does identify the 3rd missing plane as AAL77, but makes no mention of the primary track headed straight for the Washington, DC area. After AAL77 impacts the Pentagon, the Washington ARTCC is still (13:38:32) denying that they are tracking anything headed towards the Washington area and calls it a "rumor."

Hard to believe, but Scoggins' mistakable "southwest" remark is enough proof for Farmer that Washington ARTCC tracked Flight 77, but failed to share this information with NEADS for "unknown reasons". However, the manager of Washington ARTCC states very clearly that Washington and the surrounding ARTCC's desperately tried to pick up primary targets who possibly could have been the missing Flight 77. The manager not only "makes no mention of the primary radar track headed straight for Washington DC" (Farmer) - he explicitly says that there was no such primary radar track!

Here's what the manager of Washington ARTCC said:

"so what we have done at the surrounding centers here is tell everyone to look out for limited codes, primary targets, or whatever the case may be. And that was the last time, that was about fifteen minutes ago since I talked to the Indianapolis Center Operations Manager."

It is well documented in media accounts that the Dulles TRACON was watching the final approach of AAL77. Further, GOPHER 6 (the infamous C-130) was diverted by the Andrews TRACON to intercept and identify the approaching plane. It has been argued that these were the first indications that the Washington ARTCC had of the plane.

However, Boston Military indicates they were watching it very early on when it was southwest of the area and recognized it as a threat. This minor detail, if Washington ARTCC had been forthcoming with NEADS would have resulted in the MCC scrambling Langley to intercept a plane coming from the west, not the north.

The next significant issue is why the Langley fighters were handed off by the Langley TRACON to Giant Killer instead of the Washington ARTCC. Giant Killer followed the SOP for airspace under its control and sent the fighters out over the Atlantic. NEADS was very specific in where to send the fighters which would have required a hand off to the Washington ARTCC, and it is not clear at this point why that did not happen. Once the error has been noted and corrected by NEADS, it is at least three minutes before the planes are turned to the north and then only after NEADS takes direct control from Giant Killer. At 13:49:26 Washington ARTCC calls NEADS wanting to know what the planes are entering their airspace (squawking 7777). So undoubtedly, something has gone very wrong with the handoff by Giant Killer to Washington ARTCC. What many have not understood (including myself until recently) is that the Andrews and Langley TRACON’s are all under the Washington ARTCC control.

In the quest to learn what went wrong, what went right is often overlooked. From the NORAD tapes and 84 RADES radar data, it is clear that what went right was NEADS. They responded professionally and rapidly to a very unique and dangerous situation with minimal resources and information.
For some reason, Washington ARTCC did not keep NEADS in the loop on what it knew about the approach of AAL77 and the Langley TRACON mishandled the scramble of the Langley fighters, both of which are civilian components of the FAA. Why this happened is an avenue ripe for further research.

Again: There is no reason at all to believe that Washington ARTCC did withhold any information to NEADS about a primary radar track heading for Washington. It's amazing how Farmer uses one single meaningless word - "southwest" - to accuse FAA controllers and officials of failing to do their job in an extreme emergency situation - "for some reason".

Here's a better and simpler explanation: Flight 77's radar track was not reported to NEADS because Washington controllers didn't spot any primary target. And they didn't spot it because Flight 77 was not there. So simple.