Monte Belger vs. Norman Mineta

Who's right? Norman Mineta has repeatedly claimed that he was in contact with Monte Belger (FAA deputy) since the point when Flight 77 was 50 miles out of Washington, and that Belger was tracking the plane on radar:

And a little later on, someone said, "Mr. Vice President, there's a plane 50-miles out." So I was talking to Monte Belger, the Deputy Director of the FAA, and I said, "Monte, what do you have 50-miles out?"

He said, "Well, we have a target, bogey, on the radar, but the transponder's been turned off, so we have no identification of this aircraft. We don't know who it is. We don't know what altitude it's at, speed or anything else. All we're doing is watching with the sweep of the radar, the dot moving from position to position."

So then someone came in, the same person came in and said, "Mr. Vice President, it -- the plane's 30-miles out." So I said, "Monte, can you see it, and where is it in relationship to the ground?"

He said, "Well, that's difficult to really determine. I would guess it's somewhere between Great Falls and National Airport, coming what they call the DRA, the down river approach."

And so then the person came in and said, "Mr. Vice President, the plane's ten-miles out," and so I said, "Monte, where is it?" and he said, "Well, I'm not really sure but I'd be guessing somewhere maybe between the USA Today building and, and National Airport."

And then pretty soon he said, "Oh-oh, we just lost the target." And so a few moments later, someone came in and said, "Mr. Vice President, there's been an explosion at the Pentagon."

So I said, "Monte, is there something -- can you identify it as being at the Pentagon?" He said, "No, we can't really pinpoint it like that."

http://www.msnbc.com/modules/91102/interviews/mineta.asp?0cb=-31a105678&cp1=1
(this link - a MSNBC interview from 9/11/02 - doesn't work at present; the full text can be read here:
http://911woodybox.blogspot.com/2007/10/statements-of-norman-mineta-chronology.html)

Some young man came in and said to the Vice President, "There's a plane 50 miles out coming towards D.C." So I said to Monty Belger, who is the No. 2 at FAA, I said, "Monty, what do you have on radar on this plane coming in?" He said, "Well, the transponder has been turned off, so we don't know who it is, and we don't know the altitude or speed." I said, "Well, where is it?" He said, "It's somewhere beyond Great Falls right now." Then, the young man came in and said it's 20 miles away. I'd say, "Well, Monty, where is this plane in relationship to the ground?" On radar it is hard to associate with a ground point, but they'd be able to tell you roughly the distance from wherever you are, but he couldn't tell you the speed or altitude, and then all of a sudden, as I was talking to him, he said, "Oh, I lost the bogie. Lost the target." I said, "Well, where is it?" He said, "Well, it's somewhere between Rosslyn and National Airport," and about that time someone broke into the conversation and said, "Mr. Secretary, we just had a confirmation from an Arlington County police officer saying that he saw an American Airlines plane go into the Pentagon." So then I said, "Monty, bring all the airplanes down." When you see one of something happen, it's an accident; when you see two of the same thing happening, it's a trend, something. When you see three, it's a plan. So I said, "Bring all the planes down."

http://www.achievement.org/autodoc/page/min0int-8

It is interesting to confront these accounts with two statements of Monte Belger (note that both Mineta and Belger refer to the same time interval 9:20-9:45).

"The most frustrating after-the-fact scenario for me to understand and to explain is the communication link on that morning between the FAA operations center and the NMCC," said Monte Belger, who was the acting FAA deputy administrator when the attacks occurred. "I know how it's supposed to work, but I have to tell you it's still a little frustrating for me to understand how it actually did work on that day."

FAA and Defense officials testified during the final public hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States on Thursday. Belger said the FAA initiated a "hijacking net" at 9:20 a.m. that he thought included the NMCC.

"The hijacking net is an open communication net run by the FAA hijack coordinator, who is a senior person from the FAA security organization, for the purpose of getting the affected federal agencies together to hear information at the same time," he said. "It was my assumption that morning, as it had been for my 30 years of experience with the FAA, that the NMCC was on that net and hearing everything real time," he added. "And I can tell you I've lived through dozens of hijackings in my 30-year FAA career, as a very low entry-level inspector up through to the headquarters, and they were always there."

Belger added that after initiating the hijacking net, he turned his attention to getting airplanes that were still in the air to land safely.

http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0604/062104c1.htm

Between 9:20-9:45 there were many confusing reports about various aircraft being unaccounted for. He ((Belger) heard of a crash on the Indiana/Kentucky border that was thought to be AAL 77. By this point he believes he talked with Bob Baker and Russ Chew at AAL. Jane Garvey talked to Don Carty.

Belger doesn't recall any discussion that morning about the need to contact aircraft in the air about securing their cockpits, even though they were considering an order to land all planes.

With regard to the Primary Net, Belger said he believes that Lee Longmire was in charge. He had the impression that the military was on the line at some point and had assumed that the proper contacts had been made. He had no knowledge about the problem that Lee Longmire shared with the Commission that the NMCC was supposed to be on the Net but was in fact absent for some undetermined length of time. Belger wasn't aware of the NORAD response until after AAL 77 crashed (he subsequently learried that Boston and New York Centers had called NORAD earlier)

Belger was told about UAL 93 after it crashed. He stressed that everyone was very confused about which aircraft hit the Pentagon. UAL and AAL weren't sure what planes hit where. He said that the carriers were searching for information from the FAA not providing it. It took a long time to confirm what aircraft hit the Pentagon.

Belger believes that the "hijack coordinator" would have been the senior security person present who was Lee Longmire. (SEE FAA PROTOCOL ON "Hijack Coordinator).

Belger learned of the crash into the Pentagon shortly after it happened. He and Garvey got on the phone with Norm Mineta who decided to bring everything down (around 9:45) which was implemented. Belger continued to monitor the system as it executed this order. All aircraft were down and the system grounded by 12:15 P.M.

http://media.nara.gov/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00054.pdf

Belger mentions neither the approaching Flight 77 nor being in contact with Mineta prior to the Pentagon crash. In the interview to the Commissioners he indicates that first contact with Mineta was established after the crash. In case he was in contact with him before, this blatant omission would constitute a lie.

So who's right? Mineta or Belger?

Two "Flight 175" taking off from Boston Logan: CONFIRMED

My personal 9/11 researcher "career" started with the detection of a duplicated "Flight 11" at Boston Logan Airport: one departing from Terminal B, Gate 32, at 7:45, the other one from Terminal B, Gate 26, somewhat later because the departure was delayed:



http://911wideopen.com/mirror/twin11-1/twin-11-mod.htm

As opposed to that, the gate departure of United Airlines 175 is indisputable: 7:58 a.m., which is also confirmed by the database of the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS):

http://www.bts.gov/xml/ontimesummarystatistics/src/dstat/OntimeSummaryDepatures.xml

However, the BTS database reveals a strange discrepancy regarding the "wheels-off time" of Flight 175 - i.e. the moment when the plane lifted off from the runway. The BTS notes a wheels-off time of 8:23, which differs distinctly from the "official" wheels-off time, which is 8:14.

This 8:14 take-off is confirmed by the ATC/pilot radio transcript and various radar data. So what about the 8:23? How was this datum being generated?

The wheels-off time of is triggered automatically by a mechanical switcher when the plane loses contact to the ground. The data are sent automatically to the airline via ACARS, and the airline forwards them to the BTS on a regular base. So apparently no human failure is possible. The fact that the gate departure 7:58 coincides with the official story suggests that the data are valid.

Being familiar with the duplication of Flight 11 at Logan Airport as well as the duplication of Delta 1989 at Cleveland Hopkins Airport, I arrived at the inevitable conclusion that this was another case of a duplicated plane - i.e. a "Flight 175" taking off at 8:14 and another "Flight 175" taking off at 8:23. However, there was no independent confirmation, so I hinted at the discrepancy on occasion, but always added a question mark -here, for instance:

http://pilotsfor911truth.org/forum//index.php?showtopic=29

I am now able to proudly present an eyewitness for the 8:23 wheels-offtime of Flight 175: Steven Miller, US Airways pilot, who was next in line behind Flight 175 to take off from the runway:

On the taxi-out in Boston, they ((the pilots of US Airways 6805)) waited at the runway's hold-short line, where Miller looked up to watch a United Boeing 767 take off, United Flight 175. The final weight and balance calculations from dispatch came over the ACARS at 8:05, and with that in hand, the crew was ready to fly. Wide-body aircraft produce especially powerful wingtip vortices - horizontal, tornado-like winds off the ends of the wings - which require time to dissipate before other aircraft can take off, so he waited the required three minutes after United 175 departed before he received his takeoff clearance.

(Lynn Spencer, "Touching History", p. 58)

A quick check with the BTS database reveals that USA 6805 had a wheels-off time of 8:28. Miller explicitly describes that he waited 3 minutes before getting takeoff clearance; adding a little bit for the timespan between takeoff clearance and actual wheels-off, Flight 175 must have lifted off the runway around 8:23-8:24. It is out of the question that Miller observed a plane that took off at 8:14.

Did Miller maybe see a different United plane? Very unlikely. Searching the BTS database for other United Boeing 767's delivers no results for the relevant time. There is a very slim possibility that a non-domestic United Boeing 767 took of just then, because the BTS database lists only domestic flights. However, Miller himself says it was Flight 175; so either he overheard the flight number when taxiing out, or, as someone who was frequently flying from Logan (as he says) he was familiar with the wide-body planes departing at that time.

The BTS database also reveals that the tail number of the plane that took off at 8:23 was N612UA. This was United Airlines Flight 175. And there is no proof that the plane that took off at 8:14 was indeed N612UA, leading to the conclusion that the pilot only pretended to fly United Airlines Flight 175.

Cleveland Center supervisor memos on Flight 93

Transcript of handwritten statements concerning Flight 93 by Cleveland Center supervisors. Many thanks to http://911workinggroup.org for their efforts and the citizen (unknown to me) who initiated the FOIA to obtain these important documents.



Richard Barnett (YN) Area Supervisor 9:00-11:00

The Franklin Controller advised me that UAL93 was unexpectedly changing altitude near EWC PA. I observed altitude deviation of approx. 500 feet high. Aircraft was on LOR freq. I was observing DAL1989 so this was a surprise however due to flight profile (long distance coast to coast) I became alarmed. I went to Area 4 to ascertain status and observed the turn, decent and transponder problem. I was advised by Area 4 sup(ervisor) that UAL93 was turning around and coming back. I returned to area to advise controllers. I became involved in other area activities (helping land aircraft, evacuating personnel, answering calls and combining sectors) when the Westmoreland and Indianhead controllers adivsed that UL93 was possibly entering our airspace over PIT. I observed the data block with only 350N, so I did not know altitude. As the aircraft approached near the Nesto intersection, the Westmoreland Controllers (D&R) both advised a visual confirmation of UAL93's altitude by another (VFR) aircraft. We verified and determined that UAL93 was at 7000'. I was very surprised at the low altitude. The aircraft that observed UAL93 stated that aircraft was rucking wings. UAL93 appeared as if it were heading to JST. We knew aircraft was hijacked so I ordered the controller (D-side) to call JST tower and evacuate and to give reason. Approximately 3 or 4 minutes later aircraft went into coast track and we started receiving reports from other airborne aircraft of smoke and an apparent crash. I asked the controllers to give me the track back coordinates and lat./long. of site which I passed on to the operations manager.

I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident.



Gary M. Klingler (GK) Command Post 10:00-22:30

Upon hearing of the Worls Trade Center accident, I left a meeting at NASA and returned to Cleveland Center (ZOB). I arrived at the watch desk area at approximately 1400Z. I observed that the Traffic Management Unit had been turned into a command post. The ATM and three operations managers were staffing the command post. I was briefed upon arrival by Rich Reid, operations manager, of the situation. The briefing focused on UAL93, DAL1989, reports of an aircraft circling over ZOB and the subsequent release of non-essential personnel. Numerous individuals were following up with the situation concerning UAL93 and DAL1989. I started to investigate the possibility of an unidentified aircraft circling over ZOB. Actual scanning the skies over the Center, discussion with law enforcement personnel on scene and discussions with Cleveland Approach Control about what they were observing on terminal radar led to the following determination: either the aircraft had left the Center area or personnel on the ground had observed DAL1989 turning back toward Cleveland Hopkins Airport. Upon return to the command post I learned of UAL93's accident. DAL1989 was being worked by CLE Approach. We received another report of a large aircraft over ZOB. My investigation revealed it was a military refueler which had been positioned to support the military fighter aircraft. I remained at the facility through the evening providing support at the command post. 9/19/01


Leo E. Wolbers (LV) Operations manager 2:00-10:00

About 0820 I heard that we were trying to find AAL77 that had lost its transponder in Boston Center airspace. I then went to the 0830 stand-up, after the stand-up I was told that a plane had hit the World Trade Center. We were told by Central Flow that they thought the aircraft was AAL77. We were then told that a second aircraft believed to be UAL175 had hit the other tower. We were told both aircraft were thought to have departed BOS for LAX. We did a quick check and found we were working DAL1989 who had departed BOS for LAX. We advised Delta operations of what information we had at that time. The next thing we were told was that DAL1989 was a confirmed hijack and was diverting to CLE. While we were trying to assist DAL1989 we were informed that UAL93 was being hijacked and was on the LOR sector frequency. I went to Area 4 at that time to assist with UAL93. Since UAL93 was overhead our facility we made the decision to evacuate all non-essential personal and get as many controllers out as possible. We were then told to pur every aircraft we were working on the ground. I went to each area and advised them to land all aircraft ASAP. We were then advised an aircraft had hit the Pentagon. The next event was UAL93 was confirmed to have crashed at Somerset PA. After we got all of our aircraft on the ground we went to one person in each area until the building was searched and found to be secure.

To the best of my knowledge this is the order that events occured. The only time that I am sure of is the 0830 stand-up. 9/19/01


Craig Pass (CP) STMC 5:50-17:50

Operations Manager came into the unit from the Area 4 specializtaion advising of a possible problem with UAL93 in the Lorain (R49) sector. We brought up the frequency (133.37) for monitoring at Pos 96 in the Traffic Management Unit. Transmissions were made without call sign identification. Other aircraft on frequency overheard the unidentified transmissions and inquired if the controller was aware of situation. As UAL93 neared DJB, the data block reflected the aircraft climbing (without clearance). Then the target diappeared. Controller selected the primary button at his position and tracked UAL93's primary target. The primary target was observed making a left turn, heading southeast bound. Coordination with the ATCSCC was being accomplished by Traffic Management personnel. Another transmission was made which was unidentified. Information was relayed to the unit from aircraft in the vicinity of UAL93 that the aircraft was at a low altitude. Primary target assosciated with UAL93 was lost. Black smoke was reported in the are of the loss of primary target. Visual report by aircraft in vicinity confirmed a crash.

I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. 9/19/01


Kimberly W. Warnica (KW) Watch Desk 8:40-11:20

I came to the watch desk to relieve Ed Wolbers the operations manager in charge. He was at the 8:30 stand-up. We received news that an aircraft had hit the World Trade Center. Central flow then informed us it was AAL11 a 767. ZNY went ATC Zero and I coordinated this with the areas. We were then told a second aircraft it the World Trade Center. Central flow called and told us to monitor DAL1989 who fit the profile (BOS to LAX) as the other 2 aircraft. I found out that the Franklin sector was working the Delta. So while the other s were coordinating with Delta, I went to Area 6 to talk to the controllers and supervisors. I told them that Delta fit the profile of the other two aircraft and to report anything out of the ordinary to me immediately. I asked who Franklin would be handing the aircraft off to and they told me the Lorain Sector. I then went to Area 4 to talk to the controllers and supervisor. While I was briefing them on DAL1989 the Lorain controller said he heeded someone to listen to his frequency because there was screaming on it. I told Mark Barnick, the supervisor, to plug in and I went up to the watch desk. I asked STMC Craig Pass to bring up the Lorain frequency so we could hear it because there was a problem. When we listened we heard the controller trying to track UAL93 several times, then I heard him talk to 2 other aircraft about the transmissions he had just heard. Both aircraft heard the screaming. Then a voice came on shouting and used the words "bomb onboard". The controller asked the caller to say again. I went to the area and confirmed that they also heard "bomb onboard". The sup(ervisor) confirmed this. I went back to the watch desk and was told and aircraft had hit the Pentagon. I was then told to have the controllers land everyone. Leo Wolbers and I went to the areas and told them to put everyone on the ground. When I returned to the watch desk, I was asked to take a phone call at the military position. It was Huntress and she told me that DAL1989 was a confirmed hijacking. I went to the Sandusky sector in Area 4 who was working DAL1989 inbound to Cleveland and told them he was a confirmed hijacking. The controller then used the word "trip" in his transmission to the Delta. He said "the pilot doesn't think he's a hijack. When I used the word trip, he said: not in less you know something we don't." I told them to treat him as a hijack anyway. I went back to the watch desk and the sup(ervisor) from Area 6 asked me to come to the area. I went to Area 6 and was informed by the Imperial controller that Gopher-06 saw a black cloud of smoke at his 9 o'clock and 30 miles which I recognized as the United jet's last known position. I gave my report to the watch and they told me to confirm it. I went back to Area 4 and asekd the controller to descend the Gopher to confirm it was the United. The controller coordinated for lower with Area 5. Area 5 then yelled to me that they had a report. I walked over to the Indianhead sector and the controller told me she had an aircraft that positively confirmed the aircraft was a United jet. I went back to the watch desk and told them about the positive confirmation. I went back to Area 4 who had put the Delta on Cleveland Approach's frequency. When I returned to the watch desk they told me to evacuate. I went outside the facility at this time.

I certify, to the best of my knowledge and recollection, the above statement is correct. 9/19/01


Rick Kettell Air Traffic Manager

At approximately 1310Z, I was advised that an air carrier at FL290 in ZBW airspace, destined through ZOB airspace had lost its transponder and communications with ATC. I then learned of events regarding the World Trade Center and at 1315Z established a temporary command post in the TMU. I began tracking aircraft in ZOB airspace identified by the STMC's as BOS-LAX flights. I observed DAL1989 as the aircraft entered the Lorain sector. At approximately 1330Z, I was told by OM Kim Warnica that NORAD confirmed that DAL1989 was possible hijack aircraft. I instructed OM Ed Wolbers to contact Delta operations. OM Warnica then advised me that UAL93 in the Lorain Sector may have reported a bomb on board. I then began monitoring the Lorain sector frequency and heard two aircraft (Am 1060 and EJA) confirm to the Lorain sector controller that they heard a report of a bomb aboard an aircraft. I then heard a transmission in English, but an Arabic accent stating "that a bomb was onboard the aircraft, the aircraft was returning to the airport until demands were met, stay in your seats and be quiet." I informed OM Rich Reid to contact the ROC, and reported the information on a national telecon to David Caroles in headquarters at 1340Z. I then continued to monitor the track of UAL93 until the transponder disappeared and then proceeded to follow the primary target as the aircraft turned southeastbound. I remained on the national telecon updating the position of the target until the target disappeared from ZOB radar at 1403Z. I received confirmation from OM Kim Warnica that two aircraft had confirmed smoke and fire in the vicinity that radar contact with UAL93 was last observed. I relayed that information to Mr. Caroles and remained on the telecon and continued to operate the temporary command post.


Mark E. Evans (YP) STMC 9:25-19:15

I entered the Traffic Management Unit at approximately 1323Z. At 1331Z we received a call from the ATCSCC asking us to inventory all flights and report any missing flights or unusual situations directly to the ATCSCC. At 1340Z I initiated a call from the TMCSC position in the TMU (Tape ID 45) to report erratic altitude changes by UAL93. At 1341Z I reported via the same line that we had lost the transponder on UAL93 and he was headed eastbound. This was a reversal of his flight plan. We were not in communication with the flight. A decision was made to leave the ATCSCC line open to facilitate updates on UAL93. I continued to coordinate all information provided to me by the area managers and traffic management personnel. This included updates on the primary target we believed to be UAL93, requests for military verification, and other data. We received verification from a VFR aircraft of a UAL jet in the location of our primary target at 8000! This was also forwarded along with location and direction for the flight (southeast). Shortly after this we had a report of black smoke in the vicinity of the last radar returns. This was reported along with location to the ATCSCC at 1404Z.



Mark Barnick (AB) Area 4 Ops Supervisor 8:51-11:54

On Tuesdax, september 11, 2001, I was working the Area 4 Operational Supervisor's position from 1251Z to 1554Z.

At approximately 1328Z, the Lorain radar controller (John Werth), advised med that he had lost radio contact (NORDO) with United Airlines Flight Number 93 (UAL93) and that he needed to talk to the aircraft. I telephoned United flight operations and advised them that we had lost radio contact with UAL93 and that we needed them to send the aircraft a message to contact the Lorain radar controller on frequency 133.37. The United flight operator was upset to hear about another NORDO aircraft but stated that he would send the message to the aircraft. A few minutes later, John Werth advised me that he had a problem with shouting on the frequency. Using a hand set, we plugged into the Lorain radar position and monitored the frequency. Shortly thereafter, I heard some type of yelling and screaming on the frequency as well as someone stating that "they have a bomb". Numerous other aircraft on the frequency confirmed that they also heard the "have a bomb" statement. At this time, John Werth was the Lorain radar controller and Daver Leister was the D-side associate. During this time, UAL93 was descending from FL350 without a clearance and would not answer any transmissions made to the aircraft.

I paged Mike Zientarski and Mark Saunders back to the area from their breaks. I assigned Mike Zientarski to track and assist John Werth on the radar position. I assigned Mark Saunders to assist Dave Leister with the D-side outies and to ensure that all coordination was completed with surrounding radar sectors.

I notified the watch operations manager (Leo Wolbers) and two other operation managers (Kim Warnica and Rich Reid) of the reported bomb and of the problem with UAL93. During this time, UAL93 continued on course (westbound) but began to climb from FL343 without a clearance or any communications.

I paged all Area 4 controllers back to the area in order to assist the other area radar positions. All controllers were advised of a possible bomb threat/hijacking on UAL93. Controllers were instructed to keep other aircraft be they above, below or at the same altitude, well clear of UAL93. I continued to monitor UAl93 on the radar scope and continued to monitor the Lorain radar frequency. More yelling and screaming could be heard at times but UAL93 would not answer any calls. The aircraft continued to climb without any radio contact.

When UAL93's transponder indicated an altitude of FL407, the aircraft began to turn to the south. Other aircraft in the area were vectored well clear of UAL93's new course. UAL93 then began to descend and when the transponder indicated FL397, the aircraft turned towards the southeast. I suggested to Rich Reid, who was in the area at that time, that the military should be contacted regarding this situation.

UAL93's transponder was then lost or shut off and the radar tag went into coast. Other aircraft in the area verified that they had visual ontact with UAL93 and that it was still flying southeastbound. In order to follow the aircraft, John Werth started a new flight following tag on UAL93's primary radar target. No altitude information was available and all other controllers were advised to keep all aircraft well away from the target of UAL93.

As UAL93 continued southeastbound, it was going to enter the airspace of Allegheny radar position in Area (?). UAL 93 continued not to respond to any broadcasts made to it. The Allegheny radar controller was advised of the situation with UAL93 and confirmed the position of the radar track in order to continue flight following. Altitude was still unknown.

Area 4 had no further contact with UAL93 after the aircraft left the Lorain radar airspace.
9/19/01


URL of the original document:

http://www.911workinggroup.org/foia/911%20COMMISSION%20REPORT%20DATA%20(redact)/5%20AWA%20324%20Package%20ZOB%20Copies%20of%20Addtnl%20Personnel%20Statements.pdf

Cleveland Center controller memos on Flight 93

Transcript of handwritten statements concerning Flight 93 by Cleveland Center controllers. Many thanks to http://911workinggroup.org for their efforts and the citizen (unknown to me) who initiated the FOIA to obtain these important documents.

David M Norton (HD) Franklin Sector 8:42-9:50

UAL 93's flight through Franklin airspace was normal from initial handoff from NY Center until handoff to Lorain Sector. After switching UAL 93's frequency I noticed a change in the altitude of UAL 93 and called Lorain to see what was going on and to verify they were talking with the aircraft.

I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. 11/29/01

Brad Kennedy (KB) Franklin-D 9:02-9:50

UAL 93 was westbound toward DJB at FL350. We were busy diverting aircrraft from ZNY airspace, handed UAL 93 off to sector (Lorain?) about 20-30 miles from boundry. About 10 miles from boundry noticed UAL93 altitude descended slowly 4 to 5 hundred feet. We advised supervisor Barnett to watch aircraft something might be wrong and then we continued working.

I did not view satori or listen to tapes to confirm my statement, but would like to do that in the near future. I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. 9/13/01

John Werth (WH) Lorain Radar 8:55-10:18

I was working the Lorain radar position when the incident with UAL93 occurred. I issued traffic to UAL93 and received a normal response from the crew. I heard two transmissions which sounded like a struggle took place. Shortly afterwards the aircraft descended several hundred feet. The aircraft made an abrupt turn at DJB VOR to the south. Two more transmissions followed, stating that a bomb was on board, the aircraft had started to climb and was heading s/e in the general direction of two other aircraft which I had already started to vector away from UAL93. When UAL93 reached approx. FL410 he stopped his beacon squawk. I then started a primary track to follow the target. I received no more transmissions from UAL93, and continued vectoring several other aircraft clear of his position. I then transferred control of the data block to the area s/e of mine to monitor the aircraft's track.

I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. 9/13/01

David Leister (LE) LOR (Lorain)-D 8:39-10:18

I have listened to the voice tape of UAL93 and I would like to say I am deeply shocked and horrified about this event. The data tapes have recorded my computer input as well as my voice transmissions. As the events unfolded, I quickly realized there was nothing we could do for UAL93. Our training and common sense dictated that we protect surrounding aircraft, and that became my primary goal. I called for a supervisor at the first indication of trouble, which brought two additional controllers to our aid, making sure that we fulfilled our mission of protecting other aircraft. God bless the souls of UAL93.

I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident.

Mike Zientarski (MW) LOR (Lorain) Handoff position 9:30-9:43

I was put in to track at LOR-radar because traffic was starting to build. About that time UAL93 descended about 500 feet. A transmission was made that was unintelligible to me but another aircraft claimed to have heard that a bomb was on board. At that time I told another controller to assist on the associate position. I then began to direct him to pointouts and reroute aircraft away from our sector. Southeast of DJB contact was lost and then I helped to reestablish his positioning. We continued tracking what we believed to be UAL93 and I continued to have aircraft moved away. This continued until the target we believed to be UAL93 was out of the airspace.

I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. 9/13/01

Mark Saunders (MS) Assoc. Radar D-side 9:33-10:00

I was told to plug in and help the D-side position, because of the unusual situation. I saw UAL93 make radical turns and head to the southeast. The transponder went off and we tracked the primary target. I told sectors around us about this and to move all aircraft around us because we didn't know what altitude he was at.

I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. 12/10/01

George W. Keaton (VP) IRL (Imperial) 8:52-10:20

During the time in question I was the radar controller at the IRL sector, obviously aware at this time of what had occurred at the Pentagon and World Trade Center. During my time on position a PVD appeared on my scope with no altitude readout (UAL93). A controller from Area IV appeared in the area and explained the aircraft was deviating from its flight path and noone was receiving altitude information. I was told to keep all aircraft away from UAL93, which was proceeding towards the Washington area approximately on J518. I had to vector 2 - 4 aircraft away from the flight path of UAL93, including one NWA flight and a C130 proceeding northwest on J518. I remember turning the C130 to about a 030 heading, because of its speed. Observing UAL93, I saw it proceed almost directly over the PIT area, and the southeast of PIT it made an abrupt turn up to the northeast for about 10-15 miles. Once it turned back to the Washington area it disappeared from my scope one to two minutes later. Sometime during this period I was ordered to land all aircraft. I asked the pilot of the C-130 if he had observed anything off his left side. He said he observed a dark cloud of smoke off his left in the clouds. I asked for approximate distance and, if I remember correctly, he said about 15 miles. As I turned and told my supervisor (Tim Guess), I heard someone in Area V say they had a visual sighting of the plane at low altitude. The location gioven by the C130 pilot was the approximate position UAL93 went down. Few minutes later I questioned the C130 pilot for his reason for being in the air. He informed me his mission was noncritical and he would call for orders. A few minutes later he requested clearance to YNG, which I gave. At that point my airpace was sterile.

I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. I certify, to the best of my knowledge and recollection the above statement is correct. 9/12/01

Linda Justice (LJ) IRL (Imperial)-D 8:15-10:20

We were given a data block with which to track UAL93. The aircraft appeared to be heading toward Washington Center airspace. In an attempt to expedite the situation I put a charge of routing in to reflect HGR->DCA. This was only to forward to (the) information to the sectors the aircraft appeared to be tracking toward. I then called POT sector to verbally point him out and flashed the handoff to HGR sector. We took the handoff back when UAL93 changed direction to the east and did not resume the handoff to ZDC. Contact (visually) was lost with the target shortly thereafter.

I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. 9/12/01

Donald Edouard Lamoureux (DF) WMD (Westmoreland)-R 8:34-10:13

While working the R-position of the WMD sector I had been notified that UAL93 was a hijacked plane had a bomb on board and was headed toward Pittsburgh Airport and WMD sector. UAL93 was tracking as a primary target with no altitude readout. UAL93 was tracking passed PIT and near a VFR aircraft (N56865) with whom I was in contact with, I asked the VFR pilot to look to his left and up to see if he could see him visually. The VFR aircraft reported the B757 about 1000 feet above him which would put him at about 8000 ft. The VFR pilot reported the UAL93 landing gear was down and his wings were rocking back and forth. UAL93 began to track NE toward JST Tower. Tower has been advised of the situation. Shortly after UAL93 turned SE and then the primary target disappeared in the Somerset area. 9/13/01

I did not review SATORI and voice tape information and I would like to do so before I make a final statement. I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. 9/16/01

Brian C. Hanlon (AZ) WMD (Westmoreland)-D 9:42-10:13

UAL93 was reported visually by a VFR aircraft at 070 near LBE airport. VFR reported he had a UAL flight visually and appeared 1000 ft above; reported the landing gear down and wings flapping, and said the aircraft appeared to be in distress. Several minutes later, UAL93 appeared to track NE bound towards JST airport. Tower was advised aircraft had been hijacked, may have a bomb, and to evacuate. Shortly after, UAL turned SE and dropped track on sector boundry.

I did not review satori or voice information, and would like to so do before making a final statement. I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. 9/14/01

Stacey Taylor (ST) IHD (Indianhead) 9:14-10:17(?)

I was working the Indianhead sector and observed the primary target and associated data block of UAL93 enter my airspace altitude and flight path unknown. I had been told the aircraft was a hijacking and that there was a bomb aboard the aircraft. At some point I was given the hand-off on UAL93, but at no time did I have communications with the aircraft. I observed the aircraft heading towards Johnstown and attempted to get another aircraft out of his flight path. We had been told that the aircraft was reported to be flying at 7.500 (?) feet by a supervisor. UAL 93 flight then appeared to take turn down toward the southeast and I had two radar hits on him showing an altitude of 8.200 feet. I turned my aircraft back to the north to avoid UAL93 and around the Somerset airport, shortly after the turn. I lost the primary target on UAL93 and we suspected it had gone down. I then vectored N20VF toward the supected incident side and asked if he would look for smoke. I explained that we were looking for a downed aircraft that may have a bomb on board, and we didn't know if the bomb had gone off. He said he would overfly the site and he spotted smoke and flames and gave us the position of the crash site and a description of the area.

I do not remember what the various settings of the operational equipment were at the time of the accident. 9/16/01

URL of the original document:

http://911workinggroup.org/foia/911%20COMMISSION%20REPORT%20DATA%20(redact)/5%20AWA%20323%20Package%20ZOB%20Copies%20of%20Personnel%20Statements%20from%20Package.pdf

John Farmer's failed analysis of the NORAD tapes

- this critique has been published half a year ago on the website www.pilotsfor911truth.org. For actual reasons - John Farmer has publicly ceased 9/11 research and shut down his website www.911files.info - it is reposted here.


John Farmer is a Pentagon researcher and firmly believes that Flight 77 hit the Pentagon. He has recently analyzed the NORAD tapes

and arrives at the conclusion that air traffic controllers from Washington tracked Flight 77 on its way back to Washington, but failed to inform NEADS about it. However, the NORAD tapes are the best proof so far that Flight 77 did not fly back to Washington - a FAA manager stresses that several Air Traffic Control Centers were looking for it, but couldn't find any radar blip.

Unlike the 9/11 Commission and Michael Bronner/Vanity Fair, Farmer doesn't omit messages from the NORAD tapes. His transcript is fairly accurate. But he distorts the messages and misinterpretates them, and his "conclusions" are rash and unfounded (Farmer's comments in italic, mine in plain writing):

Conclusions

Boston Military (Scoggins) is the only source of information that NEADS has for the approach of AAL77.

Wrong in multiple ways. At the same time Scoggins provides NEADS with information about a suspicious plane, a NEADS technician reports another "aircraft six miles east of the White House". The message is echoed through several channels, including MCC Kevin Nasypany's one. It is clear that the NEADS crew track this plane directly on their radar screens, completely independent from Scoggins. They assign a tag number to it - 0032 - and watch as it turns into "MCA" (military controlled airspace=restricted area) and finally fades at 9:38.

These two planes - let's call it the "Scoggins plane" and the "Nasypany plane" are clearly not identical. They are reported on different channels with different positions for a fixed time: 6 miles southwest of the White House (Scoggins) vs. 8 miles east of the White House (Nasypany). The Nasypany plane has its transponder off, turns into restricted area and fades at 9:38, fulfilling essential conditions for being "Flight 77"/the decoy jet.

As opposed to that, the Scoggins plane is reported 6 miles southwest of the White House at 9:36:15 and still deviating away (i.e. flying west), making it virtually impossible to be over the Pentagon at 9:38.

He is making it a point to pass on information that he is overhearing in the Boston ARTCC. His initial report (13:20:56) of an aircraft headed towards Washington is second-hand information and mistakes the identification as AAL11. This may have caused momentary confusion but none-the-less established that a 3rd hijacked aircraft was headed towards the DC area. The only significant problem this caused for the MCC is that he scrambled the Langley fighters to Baltimore-Washington International (north of DC) in anticipation of an approach from the north.

Scoggins gives a position for this phantom flight 11: "somewhere over New Jersey or further south." That's exactly the reason why Nasypany sent his fighters to the Baltimore area. Farmer seems to insinuate that Scoggins reports the eastbound Flight 77, but at this time Flight 77 was (according to the official story, which Farmer sticks to!) somewhere over the Appalaches in West Virginia, far away from New Jersey or Baltimore.

At 13:24:02 Boston Military calls back and gives the position of the approaching aircraft as "southwest" of Washington, but has no specific coordinates for it. This is exactly what the 84 RADES radar shows at that time. This confirms that Washington ARTCC was tracking AAL77’s primary return although Scoggins was still under the impression that it was being identified as AAL11.

Wrong. Scoggins reports phantom Flight 11 "southwest", but not "southwest of Washington". He gives no reference point, making the remark practically worthless. Did he mean "southwest of New York" or "he's heading southwest"? Our fears that Farmer wants to use the messages on phantom flight 11 improperly as evidence that Flight 77 was tracked by controllers on its way back to Washington are validated. Even the official story has Flight 77's position at 13:24 not southwest, but straight west of Washington.

Here's Scoggins' message: "We did hear from Washington, there is an aircraft, they believe it is American 11 and he is southwest, only just don’t have a point…"

For reasons unknown, the Washington ARTCC was NOT sharing this information with NEADS after multiple phone calls by them to get more information. This includes a call (13:33:58) with the Washington ARTCC Operations Manager who does identify the 3rd missing plane as AAL77, but makes no mention of the primary track headed straight for the Washington, DC area. After AAL77 impacts the Pentagon, the Washington ARTCC is still (13:38:32) denying that they are tracking anything headed towards the Washington area and calls it a "rumor."

Hard to believe, but Scoggins' mistakable "southwest" remark is enough proof for Farmer that Washington ARTCC tracked Flight 77, but failed to share this information with NEADS for "unknown reasons". However, the manager of Washington ARTCC states very clearly that Washington and the surrounding ARTCC's desperately tried to pick up primary targets who possibly could have been the missing Flight 77. The manager not only "makes no mention of the primary radar track headed straight for Washington DC" (Farmer) - he explicitly says that there was no such primary radar track!

Here's what the manager of Washington ARTCC said:

"so what we have done at the surrounding centers here is tell everyone to look out for limited codes, primary targets, or whatever the case may be. And that was the last time, that was about fifteen minutes ago since I talked to the Indianapolis Center Operations Manager."

It is well documented in media accounts that the Dulles TRACON was watching the final approach of AAL77. Further, GOPHER 6 (the infamous C-130) was diverted by the Andrews TRACON to intercept and identify the approaching plane. It has been argued that these were the first indications that the Washington ARTCC had of the plane.

However, Boston Military indicates they were watching it very early on when it was southwest of the area and recognized it as a threat. This minor detail, if Washington ARTCC had been forthcoming with NEADS would have resulted in the MCC scrambling Langley to intercept a plane coming from the west, not the north.

The next significant issue is why the Langley fighters were handed off by the Langley TRACON to Giant Killer instead of the Washington ARTCC. Giant Killer followed the SOP for airspace under its control and sent the fighters out over the Atlantic. NEADS was very specific in where to send the fighters which would have required a hand off to the Washington ARTCC, and it is not clear at this point why that did not happen. Once the error has been noted and corrected by NEADS, it is at least three minutes before the planes are turned to the north and then only after NEADS takes direct control from Giant Killer. At 13:49:26 Washington ARTCC calls NEADS wanting to know what the planes are entering their airspace (squawking 7777). So undoubtedly, something has gone very wrong with the handoff by Giant Killer to Washington ARTCC. What many have not understood (including myself until recently) is that the Andrews and Langley TRACON’s are all under the Washington ARTCC control.

In the quest to learn what went wrong, what went right is often overlooked. From the NORAD tapes and 84 RADES radar data, it is clear that what went right was NEADS. They responded professionally and rapidly to a very unique and dangerous situation with minimal resources and information. For some reason, Washington ARTCC did not keep NEADS in the loop on what it knew about the approach of AAL77 and the Langley TRACON mishandled the scramble of the Langley fighters, both of which are civilian components of the FAA. Why this happened is an avenue ripe for further research.

Again: There is no reason at all to believe that Washington ARTCC did withhold any information to NEADS about a primary radar track heading for Washington. It's amazing how Farmer uses one single meaningless word - "southwest" - to accuse FAA controllers and officials of failing to do their job in an extreme emergency situation - "for some reason".

Here's a better and simpler explanation: Flight 77's radar track was not reported to NEADS because Washington controllers didn't spot any primary target. And they didn't spot it because Flight 77 was not there. So simple.

The statements of Norman Mineta - a chronology

Here's a survey of Mineta's statements on the events in the morning of 9/11 without comments - for documentation purposes. I learned only recently of the The Daily Californian and MSNBC interviews.

Congressional testimony, September 20, 2001

On the morning of September 11th, on first word of the attack, I moved directly
to the Presidential Emergency Operations Center in the White House. As soon as I was aware of the nature and scale of the attack, I called from the White House
to order the air traffic system to land all aircraft, immediately and without
exception. That was an unprecedented step. But with the risk of additional
flights that might be used as terrorist weapons, I believe that it was the right
and necessary step to take.

http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/sept_11/dot_008.htm

Washington Post, January 27, 2002

Transportation Secretary Norman Y. Mineta, summoned by the White House to the bunker, was on an open line to the Federal Aviation Administration operations center, monitoring Flight 77 as it hurtled toward Washington, with radar tracks coming every seven seconds. Reports came that the plane was 50 miles out, 30 miles out, 10 miles out-until word reached the bunker that there had been an explosion at the Pentagon.

Mineta shouted into the phone to Monte Belger at the FAA: "Monte, bring all the planes down." It was an unprecedented order-there were 4,546 airplanes in the air at the time. Belger, the FAA's acting deputy administrator, amended Mineta's directive to take into account the authority vested in airline pilots. "We're bringing them down per pilot discretion," Belger told the secretary.

"[Expletive] pilot discretion," Mineta yelled back. "Get those goddamn planes down."

Sitting at the other end of the table, Cheney snapped his head up, looked squarely at Mineta and nodded in agreement.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A42754-2002Jan26

Daily Californian, March 18, 2002

That morning, I was having breakfast with the Deputy Prime minister of Belgium Isabelle Durant. Mrs. Durant is also the minister of transport for Belgium. So Jane Garvey, the administrator of the FAA and I were having breakfast with her in my conference room.

My chief of staff then came in and said, 'Mr. Secretary, can I see you?' The television was on and obviously it was the World Trade Center with all this black smoke coming out of it. So I asked John, 'What the heck is that?.' And he said, 'Well we don't know. We have heard explosion, we have heard the possibility of an airplane that went into the building.' And so I said, 'Keep me posted,' and I went back into my breakfast meeting. I explained to Mrs. Durant what was going on.

Then in about five or six minutes, the chief of staff came back in and said, 'Mr. Secretary, may I see you again?' He said at that point that it has been confirmed it was a commercial airliner that went into the World Trade Center. And as I was standing there watching the television set, all of a sudden from the right side of the screen came a gray object and then it sort of disappeared and the next thing, from the left of the screen was this white yellow orangey billow of cloud coming out of the left side of the screen, so I ran into the conference room and told Mrs. Durant I was going to have to leave and take care of whatever this was about.

I told Jane to come back in with me, and soon after that, I got a call from the White House saying for me to get over there right away. So I grabbed some papers, grabbed some stuff and went to the garage. I got in my car and went over to the White House. Its only seven minutes away. I drove into the White House grounds, and everyone was running out of the White House, running out of the Executive Office Building.

And I said to the people with me, 'Is there something wrong with this picture? We are driving into the White House and everyone else is running out of it. So I went into the White House and was briefed by Dick Clark of the National Security Council and he said, 'You have to get over to the Presidential Emergency Operation Center to be with the vice president.' ...

We started to monitor what was going on. We knew that there were now two airplanes that had gone into World Trade Center 1 and World Trade Center 2, and I had a direct line set up with the FAA.

Someone came in and said, 'Mr. Vice President, there is a plane 50 miles out.' I asked our FAA people, 'Can you see an aircraft coming in 50 miles out?' and they said, 'Yeah, we're tracking it, but the transponder is off, so we don't know what the identification of that airplane is.' Pretty soon the same person came in and informed the vice president, sitting right across from me at the conference table, that the airplane is 30 miles out. I asked the FAA about it and they said, 'Yeah, we know where the plane is, but we don't know who it is.'

Then they came in and said it was 10 miles out. Soon after that, I was talking to the deputy director of the FAA, and he told me they had lost the target off the screen. Soon after that, then, the vice president was informed that there was an explosion at the Pentagon. So I was trying to relate with the air traffic controllers where that plane went to see whether it was close to the Pentagon. The radar is very difficult to pinpoint it to a ground location.

But while I was talking to the FAA, someone broke into the conversation and said, 'Mr. Secretary, we have just had confirmation from the Arlington County Police Department that they saw a commercial airliner-an American airline-go into the Pentagon.

Well, its like anything else, if you see one of something occur you consider that an accident. But when you see two of the same thing occur then you know that there is a pattern or a trend. In this instant we had three of the same thing occur, and that is a program or a plan. So I then informed the FAA to bring all the airplanes down.

I said, 'Any airplanes coming into the Eastern seaboard, turn them around and get them out of the Eastern seaboard heading west. Any planes heading west, have them go on to their destination if they are close by. But in any event bring all the airplanes down."

http://www.dailycal.org/sharticle.php?id=8072

MSNBC, September 11, 2002

MINETA: I had a breakfast meeting with the Deputy Prime Minister of Belgium who also is the minister of Transport. She, Mrs. Durante, Jane Garvey, the head of FAA, and I were going to have breakfast.

And so we were in the midst of having breakfast and my chief of staff came into the breakfast and said, "Mr. Secretary, may I see you?"

So I excused myself, went into my office, and at the other end of the office is a TV set and as I walked in, obviously it's the World Trade Center, black smoke billowing out of there, and I said, "What the heck is that?"

He said, "Well, we don't know, we've heard explosion, we've heard GA -- general aviation -- aircraft go into it. So we don't know."

I said, "Well, keep me posted," and I went back into the conference room, and then told Mrs. Durante about what I saw and knew so far about what was happening in New York.

Then about five minutes later, John Flaherty, my chief of staff, came back in and said, "Mr. Secretary, may I see you?"

So I came back into the office and he said it's been confirmed, it was a commercial airliner that went into the World Trade Center, and so as I then started getting closer to my TV set and I was watching it, and all of a sudden from the right side of the set I see something gray, and then it sort a disappears, and then from the right side of the screen I see this white billowing, yellow-orange cloud, and I go, "Holy cow!"

I turned around, ran into the conference room, and I said, "Mrs. Durante, I'm going to have to excuse myself cause I don't know what's going on in New York City. Jane, you've got to get back to FAA."

And so by the time I came back into my office, I had a call from the White House saying, "Get, get over here right away." So I grabbed a, a few papers and a manual, and ran down to the car, red light and sirens, went over to the White House.

HAGER: So you already knew commercial airliner fairly early on then. Initially, initially you were wondering, "Is it general aviation?"

MINETA: That's right.

HAGER: Which would be the first reaction.

MINETA: That's right. And I was thinking about the, the B-25 that went into the Empire State Building during World War II.

And so anyway, we drove into the White House on West Executive Drive. People were coming out of the White House, pouring out of the Executive Office Building, running over towards Lafayette Park, and I said to my driver and security person, I said, "Hey, is there something wrong with this picture, cause here we are driving in and everybody else is running out."

So I ran into the White House and someone said you have to be briefed by Dick Clarke of the National Security Council.

So I went into the Situation Room and he briefly told me what was going on, and then he said you've got to be down in the PEOC with the Vice President. I said I don't know where the PEOC is, the Presidential Emergency Operations Center, and there was a Secret Service agent standing there, and he says, "I'll take you over there right away."

So we went running down and went into the PEOC which is the bunker, as you know, under the White House.

I started to establish a direct line to the FAA to find out what was going on, and the Vice President and I were across from each other on the conference room table in the PEOC, and about this time someone came in and said this was -- when I finally got in there, it was probably about 9:27, is what I recall.

And a little later on, someone said, "Mr. Vice President, there's a plane 50-miles out." So I was talking to Monte Belger, the Deputy Director of the FAA, and I said, "Monte, what do you have 50-miles out?"

He said, "Well, we have a target, bogey, on the radar, but the transponder's been turned off, so we have no identification of this aircraft. We don't know who it is. We don't know what altitude it's at, speed or anything else. All we're doing is watching with the sweep of the radar, the dot moving from position to position."

So then someone came in, the same person came in and said, "Mr. Vice President, it -- the plane's 30-miles out." So I said, "Monte, can you see it, and where is it in relationship to the ground?"

He said, "Well, that's difficult to really determine. I would guess it's somewhere between Great Falls and National Airport, coming what they call the DRA, the down river approach."

And so then the person came in and said, "Mr. Vice President, the plane's ten-miles out," and so I said, "Monte, where is it?" and he said, "Well, I'm not really sure but I'd be guessing somewhere maybe between the USA Today building and, and National Airport."

And then pretty soon he said, "Oh-oh, we just lost the target." And so a few moments later, someone came in and said, "Mr. Vice President, there's been an explosion at the Pentagon."

So I said, "Monte, is there something -- can you identify it as being at the Pentagon?" He said, "No, we can't really pinpoint it like that."

Then about that time someone broke into our phone conversation and said, "Mr. Secretary, we've had a call from an Arlington County police officer saying that he saw an American Airlines airplane go into the Pentagon."

At that point I said, "Monte, bring all the airplanes down," and we had a slight conversation about that, and then the professionalism of the air traffic controllers and the skill of the pilots and the flight deck, and the flight attendants in the flight cabins, we're able to bring down over 4600 airplanes in about two hours, safely and without incident.

And it was one of these, where every so often Monte would call me and say, "3212 airplanes still in the air." "2112." "1174." And he just kept on reporting back to me as to the number of airplanes left. And as I recall, about 12:20, somewhere around in there, I finally said to him, -- to the Vice President -- I said, "Mr. Vice President, all the airplanes are down" and to me it was just miraculous that the great working team of the airplanes and the air traffic controllers were able to bring everything down safely.

HAGER: Let me take you back over some of that. Now, when you're in your office and you're first seeing it on the TV, I think you said your initial reaction is maybe it's a private plane of some kind. But I think in the second case, you knew right away that was a commercial airliner.

MINETA: I saw a gray airplane, and first I thought maybe -- and I didn't think of it in terms of a commercial airliner and I thought maybe it might be the size of a King Air or a G5, or something of that nature. And then I really should have, if I thought about it, gray -- United Airlines, and -- but it just happened so quickly, that it just, other than seeing a gray object come in, I really couldn't assess what kind of an airplane it might have been.

HAGER: I'm wondering when the first explosion occurred, you could think, you know, somebody had a heart attack -- a pilot, or somebody lost, something like that, equipment failure. But when the second tower is hit, I'm wondering what was flashing through your mind, because then we begin to get sinister implications.

MINETA: Well, the whole issue was what was the nature of what's going on, not only was it a commercial airline, but what's going on with two airplanes going into the World Trade Center, into the twin towers?

Well, when that third one went into the Pentagon, it's like anything else. If you see one of something it's an accident. When you see two of the same thing, it's a pattern or a trend. But when you three -- see three of the same thing occurring, then you know it's a program or a plan.

And so that's when it was decided that all the airplanes had to be brought down.

HAGER: Had the implication of the idea of terrorist attack -- was that one of the things you might have thought of after the second tower?

MINETA: Not at all. I mean, to have the thought of a commercial airliner being used as a missile or the weapon itself, at that point was the farthest thing in my mind.

HAGER: Even after the second tower was --

MINETA: Ever after the second one.

HAGER: Now coming over to the White House and you're down there in the bunker, and that third unidentified blip is coming down the Potomac.

For one thing, had you thought about the possibility that it might be -- I mean you're at the White House. That's the center where everything is going on. Is that something that would have gone through your mind?

MINETA: Well, the question was where is it coming. And so as I was asking Monte, it was following pretty much the DRA, the down river approach, and it had not crossed over towards the White House or towards the Capitol. It was staying on its line towards what would normally be the traffic pattern into National Airport.

And in fact, later on, in looking at the radar track, the plane had actually over-passed the Pentagon, then turned around and then came back into it, and it never took a wide sweep to cross over to the east side of the White House.

On the other hand, we had seven or eight uniden -- or unaccounted-for airplanes, and then I heard about an airplane going down on the Ohio-Kentucky border.

So I said to Monte, I said, "Have we heard anything further about what you just mentioned a little while ago, about that plane down in, along the border of Ohio and Kentucky?" And he said no, we haven't heard anything.

I said, "Well, have you called the Ohio State Patrol or the Kentucky State Patrol to find out if they've heard anything?"

Cause if someone sees an airplane crash, they're immediately going to call the law enforcement agency. I said find out from them if they've heard anything.

But that turned out to be negative. And then about what, 10:15 or so, then we heard about the crash up in Shanksville, and so then the question of course -- and the other thing that happened when the person came in and said that the plane was ten miles out, he said do the orders still stand, and the Vice President said of course the orders still stand.

Have you heard anything to the contrary? I was thinking what are they talking about?

Then I thought, "Oh, my gosh, I wonder if they've scrambled aircraft and have aircraft up there now."

HAGER: And the order would be to shoot --

MINETA: Shoot it down. So then when I heard about the Shanksville plane, then I thought what happened to that airplane? Did it go down on its own?

HAGER: When you first heard that plane went down in Shanksville, what were you thinking?

MINETA: Well, the question, when I first heard about that plane was what happened to it. Did it go down on its own or might it have been shot down by one of the aircraft that had been scrambled, and -- now I knew that afterwards, that planes had been scrambled to intercept the airplane coming in on the river approach, but because it was coming up from Norfolk, it was still 10, 11 minutes away when that plane went into the Pentagon.

But by that time I knew that there was an airplane now in the area and so then when I heard about the Shanksville airplane, then the question came up, "Wow, what happened to that?"

Did it go down on its own or was it shot down? And even the Pentagon was not able to answer that until some two hours after that plane had gone down.

HAGER: Was it a fleeting idea at all in, in your head, that, "Gee, they might be coming for us?"

MINETA: Oh, absolutely, it's something like that, but at least at the time the track of the radar was following what would be considered the down-river approach and it never came over to cross the east side of the Potomac River and it just followed the river all the way in.

But the -- of course the thought about, you know, is the White House the target, because I think as we found out later on, about the way al Qaida operates, they were looking for significant, something of a significant nature and that they wanted to go after political, economic and a military icon.

So here in terms of icon, they had hit the twin towers in New York, in terms of economic icon and then now they've struck the Pentagon, the military icon, and you think about political icon either being in the White House or the Capitol.

HAGER: Not to dwell on the personal, but besides being Secretary of Transportation, you're a human being. Did this thing ever get your heart pumping or make your adrenaline go?

MINETA: Oh, absolutely. I mean you're on the edge of your seat and you're saying, "Monte, tell me what's going on. What is it?" Because we're in the bunker and we're getting bits and pieces of news.

We frankly have had CNN, Fox and NBC on in the screens inside the bunker, and that was really as probably up to date news as we were getting in the bunker and then the input that the Vice President was getting from his staff.

HAGER: Now moving to the decision to bring the planes down, you said you had a discussion, but I heard it described as a somewhat more animated discussion than that.

MINETA: It was. What had happened was that earlier that day, as this was all unfolding, I had already talked to Don Carty, the CEO at American Airlines, and Jim Goodwin, the CEO of United Airlines about accounting for their own airplanes, and so they had placed ground holds on their airplanes on the East Coast, in other words, no airplanes were to take off.

When the third one struck, I told Monte -- I said bring all the airplanes down and he said we'll do them, we'll do that according to pilot discretion.

Well, pilot discretion was to me a little too loose in the sense of I don't want pilots to go another hour to flight or their destination. I wanted those airplanes down.

So I told Monte, I said, you know, in effect, "The hell with pilot discretion, get those planes down."

http://www.msnbc.com/modules/91102/interviews/mineta.asp?0cb=-31a105678&cp1=1

ABC News, September 11, 2002

04:03:34 NORMAN MINETA, TRANSPORTATION SECRETARY

Someone came in and said Mr. Vice President, there's a plane out 50 miles.

04:03:39 CHARLES GIBSON, ABC NEWS

(VO) Mineta confers with Federal Aviation Deputy Chief Monty Belger.

04:03:43 NORMAN MINETA, TRANSPORTATION SECRETARY

And so I said, Monty, what do you have? He said, well we're watching this target on the radar, but the transponder's been turned off. So we, have no identification.

04:03:56 CHARLES GIBSON, ABC NEWS

(VO) At the FAA's Air Traffic Control Center near Washington's Dulles Airport, Danielle O'Brien is at a radar scope.

04:04:03 DANIELLE O'BRIEN, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER

It was an unidentified plane to the southwest of Dulles moving at a very high rate of speed.

04:04:11 NORMAN MINETA, TRANSPORTATION SECRETARY

Someone came in and said, Mr. Vice President, the airplane's 30 miles out.

04:04:16 LT COLONEL DAWNE DESKINS, AIR NATIONAL GUARD

We caught on the radar scope, a few blips, maybe seven or eight, you know, just enough to kind of go around in a half circle and then fade right over, losing radar contact right over, Washington. I said, my God, what is that?

04:04:31 DANIELLE O'BRIEN, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER

He was fast and it was just, it would be unprecedented for a commercial plane to come screaming through your air space at that kind of speed, unidentified, without making some type of communication.

04:04:45 MASTER SERGEANT MAUREEN DOOLEY, AIR NATIONAL GUARD

We knew that he was headed in that direction and we were calling, Washington Center, oh, my God, you've got, he's coming towards you.

04:04:51 NORMAN MINETA, TRANSPORTATION SECRETARY

The fellow came in and said, it's ten miles out. Assuming that it was coming into, National Airport, Ronald Reagan National Airport.

04:05:01 CHARLES GIBSON, ABC NEWS

(VO) At Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, F-16 fighter pilots Brad Derrig and Dean Eckmann scramble into the air. They are 105 miles, 12 minutes south of Washington. It is just 9:30 a.m.

04:05:15 MAJOR BRAD DERRIG, PILOT, AIR NATIONAL GUARD

We're directed to go and which turned out to be Reagan National which is right by the Pentagon.

04:05:20 DANIELLE O'BRIEN, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER

Our supervisor picked up our line to the White House and started relaying to them the information. We have an unidentified, very fast moving aircraft inbound toward your vicinity, eight miles west, seven miles west, and it went, six, five, four, . . .

04:05:39 NORMAN MINETA, TRANSPORTATION SECRETARY

He said, uh-oh, we just lost the bogey, meaning the target went off the screen. So I said, well, where is it? And he said, well, we're not really sure.

04:15:04 CHARLES GIBSON, ABC NEWS

(VO) Deep beneath the White House, Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta issues an unprecedented order.

04:15:10 NORMAN MINETA, TRANSPORTATION SECRETARY

The planes that are coming into the eastern seaboard, turn them around and get them going west. If they're going west, have them land at their destination, but in any event if they're not too far away, have them land.

04:15:22 CHARLES GIBSON, ABC NEWS

(VO) More than 4,000 planes are in the skies over the US. FAA policy allows pilots to use their own discretion to decide where and when they land in an emergency. But on this morning, . . .

04:15:35 NORMAN MINETA, TRANSPORTATION SECRETARY

I said, "screw pilot discretion, get the damn planes down."

.....

04:22:07 CHARLES GIBSON, ABC NEWS

(VO) White House photographer David Bohrer watches the tense moment and records it on film.

04:22:13 DAVID BOHRER, WHITE HOUSE PHOTOGRAPHER

Eventually it narrowed to Flight 93. That was the biggest threat at that point.

04:22:19 KARL ROVE, WHITE HOUSE COUNSELOR

If you take the trajectory of the plane, of Flight 93 after it passes Pittsburgh and draw a straight line, it's gonna go to Washington, DC.

04:22:27 NORMAN MINETA, TRANSPORTATION SECRETARY

You just had to do something instantaneously.

04:22:30 DAVID BOHRER, WHITE HOUSE PHOTOGRAPHER

There was a, a PEOC staffer who would keep coming in with updates on Flight 93's progress towards DC.

http://911research.wtc7.net/cache/pentagon/attack/abcnews091102_jenningsinterviews.html

9/11 Commission testimony, May 23, 2003

On Tuesday morning, September 11th, 2001, I was meeting with the Belgian transport minister in my conference room adjacent to my office, discussing aviation issues. Because of the agenda, FAA Administrator Jane Garvey was also in attendance.

A little after 8:45 a.m., my chief of staff, John Flaherty, interrupted the meeting. He asked Administrator Garvey and me to step into my office, where he told me that news agencies were reporting that some type of aircraft had flown into one of the towers of New York's World Trade Center.

Information was preliminary, so we did not know what kind of aircraft nor whether or not it was intentional. Jane Garvey immediately went to a telephone and contacted the FAA operations center. I asked to be kept informed of any developments and returned to the conference room to explain to the Belgian prime minister that our meeting might have to be postponed.

In an incident involving a major crash of any type, the Office of the Secretary goes into a major information-gathering response. It contacts the mode of administration overseeing whatever mode of transportation is involved in the incident. It monitors press reports, contacts additional personnel to accommodate the surge in operations, and centralizes the information for me through the chief of staff.

In major incidents, it will follow a protocol of notification that includes the White House and other agencies involved in the incident. These activities, albeit in the nascent stage of information-gathering, took place in these initial minutes.

A few minutes after my return to the conference room, my chief of staff again asked me to step back into my office. He then told me that the aircraft was a commercial aircraft and that the FAA had received an unconfirmed report that a hijacking of an American Airlines flight had occurred.

While Mr. Flaherty was briefing me, I watched as a large commercial jet flew into the second tower of the World Trade Center. At this point things began to happen quickly. I once more returned to the conference room and informed the minister of what had happened and ended the meeting. I received a telephone call from the CEO of United Airlines, Jack Goodman, telling me that one of United's flights was missing. I then called Don Carty, the CEO of American Airlines, and asked him to see if American Airlines could account for all of its aircraft. Mr. Flaherty reported to me that Jane Garvey had phoned to report that the CEO of Delta Airlines had called the FAA and said it could not yet account for all of its aircraft.

During this time, my office activated the Department of Transportation's crisis management center, which was located on the 8th floor at that time of the Department of Transportation headquarters, and provides for senior DOT personnel to conduct surge operations in a coordinated manner.

By this time, my office had contacted the White House. A brief moment later, the White House called my chief of staff and asked if I could come to the White House and operate from that location. I decided that, given the nature of the attack and the request, that I should be at the White House directly providing the president and the vice president with information.

When I got to the White House, it was being evacuated. I met briefly with Richard Clark, a National Security Council staff member, who had no new information. Then the Secret Service escorted me down to the Presidential Emergency Operations Center, otherwise known as the PEOC. I established contact on two lines, one with my chief of staff at the Department of Transportation, and the second with Monty Belger, the acting deputy administrator of the FAA, and Jane Garvey, both of whom were in the FAA operations center.

And as the minutes passed, the developing picture from air traffic control towers and radar screens became increasingly more alarming. Some aircraft could not be contacted. While on a normal day that may be just a communications snafu, we were faced with trying to quickly sort out minor problems from significant threats. We did not know how many more attacks might be in progress.

The FAA began to restrict air travel in the Northeast United States by a combination of actions which included sterilizing air space in certain regions and at various airports, and ultimately a nationwide ground stop of all aircraft for all locations, regardless of destination.

Within a few minutes, American Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon. At this time, as we discussed the situation with the North American Aerospace Defense commander and his staff, we considered implementing an emergency system of coordinated air traffic management to allow maximum use for defensive activities.

It was clear that we had to clear the air space as soon as possible to stop any further attacks and ensure domestic air space was available for emergency and defensive use. And so at approximately 9:45 a.m., less than one hour after I had first been notified of an airplane crash in New York, I gave the FAA the final order for all civil aircraft to land at the nearest airport as soon as possible. It was the first shutdown of civil aviation in the history of the United States.

Within minutes, air traffic controllers throughout the nation had directed 700 domestic and international flights to emergency but safe landings. Within another 50 minutes, air traffic controllers, working with skilled flight crews, made sure another 2800 airplanes returned safely to the ground.

By shortly after noon, less than four hours after the first attack, U.S. air space was empty of all aircraft except military and medical traffic. A total of approximately 4500 aircraft were landed without incident in highly stressful conditions. Additionally, all international inbound flights were diverted from U.S. air space and U.S. airports.

Unfortunately, during this time we also learned that United Flight 93 crashed in Stony Creek Township, Pennsylvania. As America knows, but it is important to keep repeating, that aircraft never reached the terrorists' target due to the heroic actions taken by the passengers and crew on United Flight 93.

...

MR. HAMILTON: We thank you for that. I wanted to focus just a moment on the Presidential Emergency Operating Center. You were there for a good part of the day. I think you were there with the vice president. And when you had that order given, I think it was by the president, that authorized the shooting down of commercial aircraft that were suspected to be controlled by terrorists, were you there when that order was given?

MR. MINETA: No, I was not. I was made aware of it during the time that the airplane coming into the Pentagon. There was a young man who had come in and said to the vice president, "The plane is 50 miles out. The plane is 30 miles out." And when it got down to, "The plane is 10 miles out," the young man also said to the vice president, "Do the orders still stand?" And the vice president turned and whipped his neck around and said, "Of course the orders still stand. Have you heard anything to the contrary?" Well, at the time I didn't know what all that meant. And --

MR. HAMILTON: The flight you're referring to is the --

MR. MINETA: The flight that came into the Pentagon.

MR. HAMILTON: The Pentagon, yeah.

MR. MINETA: And so I was not aware that that discussion had already taken place. But in listening to the conversation between the young man and the vice president, then at the time I didn't really recognize the significance of that.

And then later I heard of the fact that the airplanes had been scrambled from Langley to come up to DC, but those planes were still about 10 minutes away. And so then, at the time we heard about the airplane that went into Pennsylvania, then I thought, "Oh, my God, did we shoot it down?" And then we had to, with the vice president, go through the Pentagon to check that out.

MR. HAMILTON: Let me see if I understand. The plane that was headed toward the Pentagon and was some miles away, there was an order to shoot that plane down.

MR. MINETA: Well, I don't know that specifically, but I do know that the airplanes were scrambled from Langley or from Norfolk, the Norfolk area. But I did not know about the orders specifically other than listening to that other conversation.

MR. HAMILTON: But there very clearly was an order to shoot commercial aircraft down.

MR. MINETA: Subsequently I found that out.

MR. HAMILTON: With respect to Flight 93, what type of information were you and the vice president receiving about that flight?

MR. MINETA: The only information we had at that point was when it crashed.

MR. HAMILTON: I see. You didn't know beforehand about that airplane.

MR. MINETA: I did not.

MR. HAMILTON: And so there was no specific order there to shoot that plane down.

MR. MINETA: No, sir.

MR. HAMILTON: But there were military planes in the air in position to shoot down commercial aircraft.

MR. MINETA: That's right. The planes had been scrambled, I believe, from Otis at that point.

...

MR. ROEMER: Nice to see you, Mr. Secretary, and nice to see you feeling better and getting around as well, too.

I want to follow up on what happened in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center and try to understand that day a little bit better. You said, if I understood you correctly, that you were not in the room; you were obviously coming from the Department of Transportation, where you had been busy in a meeting in official business, but you had not been in the room when the decision was made -- to what you inferred was a decision made to attempt to shoot down Flight 77 before it crashed into the Pentagon. Is that correct?

MR. MINETA: I didn't know about the order to shoot down. I arrived at the PEOC at about 9:20 a.m. And the president was in Florida, and I believe he was on his way to Louisiana at that point when the conversation that went on between the vice president and the president and the staff that the president had with him.

MR. ROEMER: So when you arrived at 9:20, how much longer was it before you overheard the conversation between the young man and the vice president saying, "Does the order still stand?"

MR. MINETA: Probably about five or six minutes.

MR. ROEMER: So about 9:25 or 9:26. And your inference was that the vice president snapped his head around and said, "Yes, the order still stands." Why did you infer that that was a shoot-down?

MR. MINETA: Just by the nature of all the events going on that day, the scrambling of the aircraft and, I don't know; I guess, just being in the military, you do start thinking about it, an intuitive reaction to certain statements being made.

MR. ROEMER: Who was the young man with the vice president?

MR. MINETA: Frankly, I don't recall.

MR. ROEMER: And was there another line of communication between the vice president -- and you said you saw Mr. Richard Clark on the way in. Was Clark running an operations center as well on that day?

MR. MINETA: Dick was in the Situation Room.

MR. ROEMER: So there was the Situation Room making decisions about what was going to happen on shootdowns --

MR. MINETA: I don't believe they were --

MR. ROEMER: -- as well as the PEOC?

MR. MINETA: I don't believe they were making any decisions. I think they were more information-gathering from various agencies.

MR. ROEMER: Could it have been in the Situation Room where somebody in the Situation Room recommended the shoot-down and the vice president agreed to that?

MR. MINETA: Commissioner Roemer, I would assume that a decision of that nature would have had to be made at a much higher level than the people who were in the Situation Room.

MR. ROEMER: So take me through that. The Situation Room is monitoring the daily minute-by-minute events and they find out that Flight 77 is headed to the Pentagon. Somebody's got to be getting that information. The Situation Room is then communicating with the PEOC and saying, "We've got another flight that's on its way toward the Pentagon. Here are the options." Then the vice president talks to the president and says, "Here are the options; we have a shoot-down recommendation. Do you agree, Mr. President?" Is that what happens?

MR. MINETA: Again, that would be speculation on my part as to what was happening on that day, so I just wouldn't be able to really answer that -- on that inquiry.

MR. ROEMER: I know, because you had been conducting official business, and I'm sure you were hurriedly on your way over there.

MR. MINETA: As I was listening --

MR. ROEMER: I'm just trying to figure out how the Situation Room, which was gathering the minute-by-minute evidence and information and talking probably to a host of different people, and how they're interacting with the PEOC and then how the PEOC is interacting with the president, who is at that point on Air Force One, how a decision is made to shoot down a commercial airliner.

And then would you say -- let's say we're trying to put that part of the puzzle together. Then would your inference be that they scrambled the jets to shoot down the commercial airliner, it failed, and the commercial airliner therefore crashed into the Pentagon, the jets were not able to get there in time to succeed in a mission that they'd been tasked to do?

MR. MINETA: I'm not sure that the aircraft that were scrambled to come up to the DC area from Norfolk were under orders to shoot the airplane down. As I said, I just --

MR. ROEMER: But it was an inference on your part.

MR. MINETA: It was an inference, without a doubt. And that's why, in thinking about the United plane that went down in Pennsylvania, the question that arose in my mind --

MR. ROEMER: Right away was "Was that shot down?" And did you ever get an answer to that?

MR. MINETA: Yes, sir. The vice president and I talked about that. We then made the inquiry of the Department of Defense. They then got back to us saying, "No, it was not our aircraft."

MR. ROEMER: No shots were fired and no effort was made to shoot that down.

MR. MINETA: That's correct.

http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing2/9-11Commission_Hearing_2003-05-23.htm#panel_one

Academy of Achievement, June 3, 2006

Norman Mineta: That morning I was having breakfast with the Vice Premier of Belgium, Isobel Durant, who was also the Minister of Transport, and Jane Garvey, the head of the Federal Aviation Administration, was also there at breakfast. So the three of us were having breakfast, and my Chief of Staff, John Flaherty, came in and said, "Mr. Secretary, may I see you?" So I excused myself, went into my office. At the other end of my office, I have a television set. Obviously, the World Trade Center, black smoke pouring out of there. I said, "What the heck is that?" He said, "Well, we don't know. We have heard 'explosion,' we've heard 'general aviation plane going into the building,' we've heard 'commercial airplane going into the building.' We don't know." So I said, "Well, I am going to go back into the breakfast, keep me posted." So I went in and explained to Jane and to Mrs. Durant what I had just been told. About six or seven minutes later, John came back in and said, "May I see you?" So I excused myself, went back in, and he said, "It has been confirmed. It was an American Airlines (plane) that went into the World Trade Center." I went up to the TV set to get a closer look, see if I could see the hole where the plane went in, and as I was watching the TV set, all of a sudden a gray object comes from the right side of the screen, comes across, sort of disappears, and then a yellow and white billowy cloud over here, and I go, "Holy Cow, what the heck was that."

I ran back into the conference room and said, "I don't know what is going on in New York, but Mrs. Durant, I have got to excuse myself. Jane, you have got to get back to the Operations Center over at FAA." I excused myself, came back into the office. By that time, the White House had called and said I had to get over there right away.

I grabbed some manuals and some papers, went down to the car, and we went over to the White House. As we went in West Executive Drive, people pouring out of the Executive Office building, people running out of the White House, and I said to my driver and security guy, "Is there something wrong with this picture? We are driving in, and everybody else is running away." So I went into the White House and someone said, "You have to be briefed by Dick Clark in the Situation Room." So I went in there, he talked to me for four or five minutes, and he said, "You have got to go to the PEOC." I said, "What's the PEOC?" He said, "That's the Presidential Emergency Operations Center." I said, "I don't know where that is or what it is." There was a Secret Service agent standing there, says, "I will take you." Well, it's that bunker that's way under the White House.

I got to the PEOC and the Vice President was already there. Big conference table, and there are phones all along here. I took a phone and called my office, kept it an open line, and then I took another phone, called FAA -- Federal Aviation Administration Operations Center -- and kept it at open line and kept working the two phones.

Some young man came in and said to the Vice President, "There's a plane 50 miles out coming towards D.C." So I said to Monty Belger, who is the No. 2 at FAA, I said, "Monty, what do you have on radar on this plane coming in?" He said, "Well, the transponder has been turned off, so we don't know who it is, and we don't know the altitude or speed." I said, "Well, where is it?" He said, "It's somewhere beyond Great Falls right now." Then, the young man came in and said it's 20 miles away. I'd say, "Well, Monty, where is this plane in relationship to the ground?" On radar it is hard to associate with a ground point, but they'd be able to tell you roughly the distance from wherever you are, but he couldn't tell you the speed or altitude, and then all of a sudden, as I was talking to him, he said, "Oh, I lost the bogie. Lost the target." I said, "Well, where is it?" He said, "Well, it's somewhere between Rosslyn and National Airport," and about that time someone broke into the conversation and said, "Mr. Secretary, we just had a confirmation from an Arlington County police officer saying that he saw an American Airlines plane go into the Pentagon." So then I said, "Monty, bring all the airplanes down." When you see one of something happen, it's an accident; when you see two of the same thing happening, it's a trend, something. When you see three, it's a plan. So I said, "Bring all the planes down."

You mean ground all the planes?
Norman Mineta: Ground all the planes. We already had a ground hold on planes going into New York. Any plane that was going to leave from Atlanta heading to New York, those planes were left on the ground in Atlanta. That happened maybe about 8:30 or 8:40 in the morning. Now this is about 9:27.

I said, "Bring all the planes down." Well, at that point, we had 4,638 airplanes in the air. With the skill of the air traffic controllers and the skill of the airplane pilots and the flight cabin crew, getting all the passengers prepared, they brought all those planes down in two hours and 20 minutes. It was really the skill of everybody just bringing those airplanes down. Now, he said, "We will bring the planes down per pilot discretion," and I said, "Screw pilot discretion," because I didn't want a pilot who was over Kansas City thinking, "Well, I will fly on to LA, sleep in my own bed tonight," because I wanted all those airplanes down. We had, at that point, seven to ten airplanes still unaccounted for from the airlines, and so I wanted to get all those airplanes down. I didn't want that pilot in Kansas making his own decision. I said, "Bring them all down."

http://www.achievement.org/autodoc/page/min0int-8